LOKĀYATA DARŚANA
OR
LOKĀYATA—THE MATERIALIST PHILOSOPHY OF INDIA

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PREFACE

The Lokāyata darśana or the materialist philosophy of India is very old. The evidence of the existence of many nāstikas or disblelievers in the Indian society since the Ṛgvedic age is found in many Vedic mantras. The Upaniṣad also refers to Asuras clinging to materialist doctrines. But a systematic materialist philosophy emerged sometime before Pāṇini who refers to the Lokāyata in his ukthādigaṇa. Kauṭilya and Vālmīki two ancient Sanskrit writers have given us a brief idea of the Lokāyata system. While Kauṭilya descsribes the Lokāyata philosophy as useful for the people Vālmīki presents it as an injurious philosophical doctrine. Traditionally, Bṛhaspati is supposed to be the author of the Lokāyata system who wrote his *śāstra* in the sūtra form. Bṛhaspati's work was probably an extensive one. But only a few sūtras of this great philosopher have been restored to us mainly by the effort of the Baudha and Jaina philosophers. Kamalaśīla and Guṇaratna have rendered a great service to us in this regard. These philosophers and also Mādhava, Śankarācārya and Śadānandayati have examined the views of the materialsts in an appropriately critical manner which have given us an oppoprtunity to gather a vast knowledge of the materialist system. We are gratful to Dr. Dakshina Ranjan Sastri who has collected and presented together all the available sūtras of Bṛhaspati in his book "*A Short History of Indian Materialism. Hedonism, Sensationalism*".

Lokāyata is a prefect materialist philosophy. Bṛhaspati and his followers recognise only the material universe composed of atoms as real. They do not believe in the existence of God, or soul or heaven or hell for the reason that they are beyond our perception. They also declare material enjoyment as the goal of human life. These are the reasons for which the followers of Lokāyata darśana have been called *nāstikas* by ancient Indian thinkers and perfectly identified as materialists by mordern scholars.

The Lokāyata philosophy had attracted a section of people by sweet, popular ideas through several centuries. In Mādhava's age, it gained a strong ground in the society. The philosophy, however, passed through different phases of evolution during its long history of about two thousand years. We shall discuss in our book all these important points in a clear and systematic manner.

Many scholars in the East and the West have already written several books on the Lokāyata darśana. We have merely tried to follow the footsteps of these great writers. It has been noticed that even after the basic views of the Lokāyata have been presented to us, by these writers, many important materials have been left out from their discussion. In the present book, we shall try to examine all the different views of the Lokāyata preacher Bṛhaspati and his followers together with the observation made by eminent Bauddha, Jaina, Naiyāyika and Vedantist and other thinkers, and the Sanskrit grammarians, poets, dramatists and other authors on the Lokāyata system. Our aim in the present context is to present all the important details of the philosophy and present some of these in the original. Our chief objective is to write a book on the Indian materialistic philosophy purely in the academic interest. We are not followers of the Lokāyata philosophy. The Lokāyata motto viz. *'kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ'* cannot be the final end of human life. Material comforts are always desirable. But a hedonistic path alone cannot be the ultimate goal of life, because man cannot live by bread alone. He wants someting more to satiate his mental craving.

I am grateful to professor Dr. Rajendra Nath Sarma, M.A., Ph. D., D. Litt. formerly Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Gauhati University, Dr. Dilip Kumar Chakravarty and Dr. Sibnath Sarma, Professors of Philosophy of Gauhati University, Dr. Mukta Biswas, Reader in Sanskrit Gauhati University, and Dr. E. Srikrishna Sharma of Gujrat for the great inspiration given to me for publishing this book.

Apurba Chandra Barthakuria

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

India has earned a respectable position in the world civilisation for propounding high religious and spiritual ideas. Through centuries the Indian mind has been influenced by noble religious, moral and spiritual thoughts of the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the Epics and the Purānas. Almost every Indian has a great fear for religious preachings of great seers, and a deep esteem for gods and goodesses depicted in religious scriptures. Though people have only a vague idea of *mukti* or salvation, the largest section of the people have a love for virtue and a fear for hell after death. But it is interesting to note that even in the midst of strong religious campaign of religious preachers, a section of materialists grew up in the Indian society in the Vedic age itself whose materialistic ideas gradually gained ground in the society. These materialists under the leadership of Bṛhaspati (a historical figure and not god Bṛhaspati) and Cārvāka prepared a materialistic doctrine of far-reaching importance which mainly taught the hedonistic path of life to the masses. In Mādhava's age, Cārvāka materialism became firmly rooted in the minds of the people, for which Mādhava angrily complains in his *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* as :

durucchedaṁ hi cārvākasya
ceṣṭitam. prāyeṇa sarvaprāṇinastāvat
yāvajjīvaṁ sukhaṁ
jīvennāsti mṛtyoragocaraḥ
bhasmībhūtasya dehasya
punāragamanaṁ kutaḥ
iti lokagāthām anurundhānāḥ.......cārvākamatam
anuvartamānā evānubhūyante'[1]

Mādhava says that the philosophy of Cārvāka is also known by another significant name viz. Lokāyata which means

a philosophy of the common people (loka+āyata).[2] It is difficult for us to give a definite idea of the source where the word was first used. But the Lokāyata philosophy is the name of the materialist philosophy propounded by Bṛhaspati[3] in the sūtra form though the name does not appear in the sūtras available to us. Of course, Jayarāśi refers to Bṛhaspati as the author of a significant statement viz. *"laukiko mārgonusartavyaḥ"* in his *Tattvopaplavasiṁha.*[4] The word lokāyata probably appeared from this very statement.

Guṇaratna, a Jaina writer and philosopher who disliked the Lokāyatikas or the followers of the Lokāyata school has explained the term Lokāyata in the following manner :

> *lokā nirvicārāḥ sāmānyalokāstadvad*
> *ācaranti smeti Lokāyatā Lokāyatikā ityapi.*[5]

It appears from Guṇaratna's interpretation that Lokāyata not only denoted the philosophy but also its followers.

The Lokāyata daraśana appears to Guṇaratna as the darśana of the thoughtless, ordinary people. But in reality it was a highly scientific and neatly worked out system. In that age, when religion deeply influenced the minds of the general people, it was a wonder that Bṛhaspati wrote a sensational doctrine for the masses where he had to defend his position in the most scientific manner.

The materialistic ideas cropped up in the Indian society in the Vedic age itself. In a sūkta of the *Ṛgveda* dedicated to Indra, it has been said that a section of the people questioned the very existence of Indra, for which the Vedic seer had to reply to them as :

> *'śrad asmai dhatta sa janāsa*

Indraḥ'[6] (O people, please believe in Indra, he exists). In another sūkta of the *Ṛgveda*, there is a reference to Kīkaṭas, Sāyaṇa explains the term Kītkaṭa as a group of materialists whose view of life was to eat, drink and enjoy.[7] Of course, it may be Sāyaṇa's own interpretation of the term kīkaṭa.? But the relevant verse viz. *kinte kṛṇvanti kīkaṭeṣu gāvaḥ* clearly

indicates the materialistic thinking of a section of people in the Vedic age.

It has been said above that the word Lokāyata is very old in Indian literature. Pāṇini refers to this term in the *ukthādigaṇa* of his great grammar.[8] Kauṭilya describes Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata as *ānvīkṣikī vidyā.*[9] The *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki gives an idea of the Lokāyatikas as Brāhmaṇas who should not be followed under any circumstances.[10] Patañjali, in his *Mahābhāṣya* says that Bhāguri wrote a *Varṇikā* or *Vartikā* commentary on the Lokāyata śāstra[11] which proves that the Lokāyata system had already developed into a neatly worked out system on which a commentary was written in the pre-Christian era. Vātsāyana refers to the practical views of Laukāyatikas in his *Kāmasūtra.*[12]

The Lokāyata system was also known by some other names like Bārhaspatya and nāstika (atheist).[13] Pāṇini gives a rule to frame the word nāstika.[14] The word nāstika is generally used in Sanskrit literature as a non-believer in the authority of the Veda. The Bauddhas, the Jainas, the Kāpālikas and the Lokāyatikas are recognised as nāstikas. But the Lokāyatas or Lokayātikas are called nāstikas particularly for the reason that they do not believe in the existence of God, heaven or hell or soul. They are perfect materialists for whom matter is the only reality and material enjoyment is the goal of life. Patañjali, while explaining the Paninian rule *"astināstidiṣṭaṁ matiḥ"* (4.4.60) indicates that the word nāstika is used in this sense.[15] Kaiyaṭa explains the view of Patañjali more explicitly. According to him, those who do not believe in paraloka are nāstikas.[16] It may be noted here that Bṛhaspati denies paraloka in his sūtra viz. *'paralokino'bhāvāt paralokābhāvaḥ.*[17]

Bṛhaspati :

According to the Indian tradition, Bṛhaspati is the founder of the Lokāyata system. Of course, his name appears as the author of the materialist system only covertly in the *Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad* and most distinctly only in later Sanskrit texts like the *Pañjikā* commentary of Kamalaśīla, the

Probhacandrodaya and the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* of Mādhava. He framed a number of sūtras to propound his doctrine. However, it is worthnoting that a sūtra form of a śāstra assumes its form only when the śāstra gains a strong ground in the society in other forms. It is a fact that materialistic ideas occured in the minds of many Indians since very ancient times. Bṛhaspati probably gave a new shape to it by adding his own results of research to the system.

There were at least 18 sūtras of Bṛhaspati. Only a few of them have been handed down to us by different philosophers. Probably, there were many more śūtras which have been lost to us now. Kamalaśīla,[18] the commentator on the *Tattvasaṁgraha,* Sadānandayati[19] and Guṇaratna,[20] the commentator on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri have rendered a very useful service to the academic circle by presenting many important sūtras of Bṛhaspati which give us an idea of some basic views of the materialist thinker. The loss of a number of sūtras, is however, quite clear from Kamalaśīla's commentary. It identifies the sūtras 1 and 2 and then suddenly refers to the sūtras 17 and 18.[21] A few other sūtras in the commentary appear to us as quoted from Bṛhaspati's text, but there is no direct reference to Bṛhaspati in them.[22] Among other philosophers Sadānanda clearly mentions the author of three sūtras viz.

(a) *caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ.*
(b) *kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ* and
(c) *maraṇamevāpavargaḥ*[23]

as Bṛhaspati but does not identify the position of the sūtras in Bṛhaspati's text. Guṇaratna quotes some important views of Bṛhaspati viz. *madaśaktivaccaitanyam utpadyate, jalabudbuda-vajjīvāḥ* and *caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣah* of which the third one is a sūtra of Bṛhapati[24] and probably the first two also.

The first two sūtras of Bṛhaspati appear in different forms in different philosophical works.[25] According to Mādhava, Bṛhaspati composed a few poems also[26] in order to present his views on religion. One of these poems appears with a slight difference in the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*[27] of Mādhava, the *Naiṣadhacarita*[28] of Śrīharṣa, the *Prabodhacandrodaya*[29] of Kṛṣṇamiśra, Nīlakaṇṭha's commentary on the *Mahābhārata* and Nārāyaṇa's commentary on the *Naiṣadhacarita.* Similar other poems are quoted from Lokāyata texts in the commentary of Guṇaratna and the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* also. However, it cannot be definitely said that they were written by Bṛhaspati himself. The earlier Sanskrit writers like Patañjali, and Vātsāyana who have referred to the philosophy of the Lokāyata school are silent about such poems, and even Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do not mention any such poetical text of Bṛhaspati.

Though the Lokāyata philosophy had earned an honourable place in the society since very ancient times, the reference to Bṛhaspati's sūtras is found in the writings of a later period only. It may be noted here that the sūtra text of Bṛhaspati has been brought to the knowledge of scholars by Kamalaśīla who flourished in about 8th century A. D.

A brief idea of Bṛhaspati's Philosophy :

Bṛhaspati was a true materialist. Like some materialist philosophers of the West, Bṛhaspati also recognises matter as the only reality. According to his first sūtra,[30] the universe is composed of the elements. He does not reçognise 'akāśa' as a reality. Regarding the valid forms of knowledge, Bṛhaspati's view is that perception alone gives us a correct idea of things. This is clear from his sūtra viz. *pratyakṣam evaikaṁpramāṇam (nānyat).*[31] This theory has been partially revised by some later materialists.

Bṛhaspati does not believe in the existence of soul or any such permanent entity. According to him, there is no soul or an afterworld to which the soul is supposed to migrate after death.[32] He describes in the sūtra viz. *caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ* that the body itself pervaded by consciousness is another name of 'soul'. Thus, soul is a material object in his opinion. He also considers death as the liberation of the body-

soul.[33] According to him, the final aim of the human life is to enjoy it fully *(kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ).*

Some ideas of Bṛhaspati have been either amended or exapanded in later times. It may be noted here that one Bṛhaspti was the author of a nīti-śāstra. Dr. S.N. Dasgupta fails to determine the date of Bṛhaspati.[34] But if he was the propounder of the Lokāyata philosophy as described by Guṇaratna, Mādhava and Kṛṣṇamiśra, his date can be pushed back to the Pāṇinian era (6th century B. C.) or earlier.

Ajitakeśakambalī :

Sanskrit Buddhist texts have frequently referred to the Lokāyatikas. Thus, the *Lankāvatārasūtra* of the Mahāyāna Buddhists has advised the followers of Buddha not to follow the Lokāyatikas who misguide people by sweet words.[35] However, the earliest reference the Lokāyata doctrine in Buddhist sources is met with in the statements of one Ajitakeśakambalī, a philosopher who was described as keśakambalī probably for the reason that he possessed a mass of hairs and wore a rug. He was a contemporary of Lord Buddha. Ajita's materialistic views have been recorded in the *Dīghanikāya.*[36] One important difference between Bṛhaspati and Ajita was that the latter presents his views in plain statements while Bṛhaspati frames scientific sūtras to give an idea of his materialistic ideas.

Ajita bluntly rejects all religious concepts. He says that there is no paraloka. In this respect, his view agrees with that of Bṛhaspati laid down in the sūtra viz. *paralokino'bhāvāt paralokābhāvaḥ.* Ajita says that when a man dies the elements disintegrate and merge with their sources. There are also no good or bad results of his good and bad actions[37] perfomed in his life.

Though Ajita presents many revolutionary ideas which will be discussed elaborately in a future context reserved for him, his ideas have been ignored by traditional writers. Ajita's name is mentioned by modern scholars alone.

Bhāguri :

Bhāguri was the commentator on the Lokāyata śāstra. We learn for the first time about a commentary written under the title of *Varṇikā* or *Vartikā* on the Lokāyata śāstra or sūtras. Bhāguri's name appears in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (2nd century B.C.) as the author of the commentary. Dr. S. N. Dasgupta fixes Bhāguri's date in the 2nd or the 3rd century B.C.[38] He was naturally a materialist writer who flourished a few centuries after Ajitakeśakambalī. Patañjali could give his readers some idea of the nature and contents of the commentary, which he did not. Therefore, we have been deprived of a golden opportunity of writing a continuous account of the materialistc philosophy after Ajita.

Kambalāśvatara :

Kambalāśvatara, who had flourised much after Ajitakeśakambalī also wrote his philosophical doctrine in sūtras like Bṛhaspati. Unfortunately, only one sūtra of Kambalāśvatara, viz. *'kāyādeva'* has come down to us by the grace of Kamalaśīla.[39] The sūtra has been adequately explained by Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṁgraha.* According to Bṛhaspati, the conscious body is itself the soul *(caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyah puruṣaḥ).* But Kamabalāśvatara says that when the body remains associated with prāṇa and apāna winds, it generates consciousness.[40]

Cārvī and Cārvāka :

Cārvīs were a class of materialist teachers according to the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (7th century A. D.). The *Kāśikā* gives an idea of their excellent mode of teaching which inspired the students of the Lokāyata system. The Vṛttikāra says :

> *cārvī buddhiḥ tatsambandhād ācāryopi*
> *carvī sa lokāyate śāstre padārthān*
> *nayate upapattibhiḥ sthirīkṛtya*
> *śiṣyebhyaḥ prāpayati, te yuktībhiḥ*
> *sthāpyamānāḥ sammānitāḥ pūjitā bhavanti.*[41]

Now, a question may be raised as whether there is any connection between Cārvī and Cārvāka or Cārvākas who earned a name as avowed and die-hard materialists. It may be noted here that the word Cārvāka is not met with in the relevant context (1.3.36) in the *Kāśikā* and the word Carvī also disappears from the history of the materialist philosophy.

Whatever that might be, the Lokāyata philosophy earned a strong footing in the India society during the age of the Vṛttikāvras★. It was taught as another important philosophical system.

Bāṇabhaṭṭa, who flourished in the same century with the Vṛttikāra Jayāditya, gives a vivid description of the open university of Divākaramitra in the 8th Ucchvāsa of his *Harṣacarita* where the Lokāyata system was duly taught in the university[42] along with other āstika and nāstika philosophies. It appears from Bāṇabhaṭṭa's reference to the system that Lokāyata enjoyed its due importance in the seventh century without being disturbed by other schools at least in the academic scene of the country.

The name of Cārvāka as an individual appears in the *Mahābhārata* (Śāntiparvan, 38.22-23). In later Sanskrit literature, Cāravāka appears casually as an individual and sometimes the word is used in the plural number (Cārvākāḥ) as the representatives of materialist thinkers. But Cārvāka or Cārvākas as philosophers were known practically since the 8th century A. D. Śāntarakṣita who flourished in this century and Kamalaśīla who was probably his junior contemporary give some important ideas of the Cārvāka philosophy. There are different meanings of the word Cārvāka, who is generally ridiculed as the propagator of the philosophy of eating (carvaṇa). Scholars like Dr. S. N. Dasgupta are not sure whether Cārvāka was a nick-name or a real name.[43] It is also difficult for scholars to ascertain whether Cārvāka refers to an individual or the members of Lokāyata school. Is is clear from the discussion

★ Jayāditya and Vāmana, the co-authors of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* are known as Vṛttikāras.

of Śāntarakṣita, Haribhadrasūri, Kamalaśīla, Mādhava, Guṇaratna and Kṛṣṇamiśra that Cārvākas were the followers of the Lokāyata school. The present work will show that Cārvāka or Cārvākas explained and developed the ideas of Bṛhaspati. There were two distinct groups of Cārvākas viz. the dhūrta Cārvākas and the suśikṣita Cārvākas. The dhūrta Cārvākas laid more emphasis on physical enjoyment and propagated anarchy.

The Cārvāka philosophy flourished in the society in the age Guṇaratna (14th century A.D.) and Mādhava (12th century A. D.) as a perfect hedonistic philosophy. Guṇaratna adequately replies to many important views of the Cārvāka school. Mādhava mainly presents the views of the Cārvāka school without trying to reject him. The Bauddhas and the Jainas, and also some Naiyāyikas like Jayantabhaṭṭa have refuted the Cārvāka standpoints with the help of appropriate logic. We shall try to discuss it clearly in appropriate contexts.

Some Cārvāka philosophers :

There were both well-known and unknown philosophers in the Cārvāka school who have contributed a great deal towards the development of the Cārvāka philosophy. Readers learn about them from the writings of Guṇaratna, Mādhava, Jayantabhaṭṭa and Kamalaśīla. Thus, Guṇaratna says that a section of Cārvāka philosphers recognise 'ākāśa' as a fifth element, though Bṛhaspati speaks about only four element viz. earth, air, water and light and not 'ākāśa'. While discussing the kārikās of Haribhadrasūri, Guṇaratna states :

> *kecittu cārvakaikadeśīyāḥ ākaśaṁ pañcamaṁ bhūtam abhimanyamānāḥ pañcabhūtātmakaṁ jagaditi nigadanti.*[44]

Mādhava[45] (and also Sankarācārya[46]) states that the Cārvākas recognise the doctrine of svabhāva. But earlier writers including Śāntarakṣita have not attributed the svabhāva doctrine to the Cārvākas. Mādhava also refers to an important view of the Cārvāka school viz. *ṛṇaṁ kṛtvā ghṛtaṁ pibet*" (i.e. one should enjoy ghee even by borrowing money). This particular view is a part of the śloka viz :

yāvajjīvaṁ sukhaṁ jīvet etc. which appears in other works as—

yavajjīvaṁ sukhaṁ jīvet
nāsti mṛtyoragocarah
(bhasmībhūtasya dehasya
punarāgamanaṁ kutaḥ).[47]

Jayantabhaṭṭa discusses some new arguments put forth by Cārvākas on the dehātmavāda of Bṛhaspati. These views have been given by some unidentified Cārvākas. According to these Cārvākas, one simple and concrete example of matter generating consciousness is the origination of worms in a pot of curd conserved for a long period.[48]

While discussing the Cārvāka views, Kamalaśīla incidentally presents two important views of the Cārvāka school. One view is that the Cārvāka materialists recognise matter as possessing a momentary character, like the Bauddhas. He remarks—

mahābhūtacatuṣṭayaṁ (paraiḥ)
cārvākaiḥ kṣaṇikam abhyupgamyate.[49]

Though this is an important view, it has not been attributed to any particular authority.

Among the philosophers of the Cārvāka school of a later period, the name of Purandara appears in Kamalaśīla's commentary on the *Tattvasaṁgraha*. Kamalaśīla says that he for the first time admits that the Cārvākas recognise laukika anumāna or popular inference as a second means of valid cognition.[50]

A brief idea of the Cārvāka philosophy :

Though Cārvāka or Cārvākas propagate the materialist philosophy of Bṛhaspati, there is a significant evolution of the philosophy in the Cārvāka school.

The Cārvākas generally recognise the four elements which constitute the universe as the reality. This is clear from the

Ṣaḍdarsánasamuccaya[51] of Haribhadrasūri the *Sarvadarsánasaṁgraha* of Mādhava and Kamalaśīla's commentary on the *Tattvasaṁgraha*[53]. However, as Guṇaratna has said, a section of later Cārvākas recognise ākāsá also as a fifth element. But this is not the general view of the Cārvākas. The Cārvākas recognise the other views of Bṛhaspati. But Sadānandayati shows that there was a significant evolution of the concept of soul in the Cārvāka darsána[54]. According to Bṛhaspati, the soul is identical with the body. But later Cārvākas searched a subtler soul than the gross body, for which they have recognised sometimes the mind, sometimes senses and sometimes the prāṇa as the soul.

The Cārvākas generally recoginse pratyakṣa or perception as the only form of valid knowledge. They do not recognise anumāna or inference as it cannot give us a correct knowledge of a thing. But as it has been stated above, a section of Cārvākas like Purandara recognise popular inference as another means of pramāṇa but reject supra-sensory inference.[55] The Cārvākas rigidly follow Bṛhaspati and declare the concept of 'paraloka' as unreal.[56]

Bṛhaspati declares material enjoyment (kāma) as the ultimate goal of life. But in the age of Kṛṣṇamiśra and Mādhava, Cārvākas realised that material enjoyment without wealth is impossible. Therefore, they have declared artha and kāma as the two goals of the human life.[57]

Philosophers of all schools in India have talked about mokṣa or apavarga (salvation). According to the Vedānta, the realisation of Brahman as the one and only reality is salvation, while other philosophical systems speak differently of mokṣa or salvation. But Cārvākas describe death as the liberation of a person.[58]

Acccording to Mādhava,[59] and Śrīharṣa,[60] the Cārvākas declare that there is no existence of svarga, or soul that migrates to another world. They scoff at all religious beliefs and practices and condemn the śrāddha ceremony.[61]

Kāpālikas :

Guṇaratna describes Kāpālikas as the followers of the materialist school.[62]

The Kāpālikas flourished in India since the age of the Upaniṣads. They were a sub-sect of the Māheśvaras or Śaivas. We learn from relevant Sanskrit texts that the Kāpālikas were hedonists. It has been said in the *Prabodhacandrodaya* that by embracing a beloved woman beautiful like Pārvatī, Kāpālikas attain Śivahood.[63] They eat meat and drink wine regularly. But they may not be called materialists in the same sense as the Cārvākas, because the Kāpālikas aspire for the liberation of the soul. In the *Prabodhacandrodaya*, the Kāpālika Somasiddhānta declares that the holy wine prescribed in the Kāpālika religion delivers the soul from the clutch of pāśas or fetters.[64] If the Kāpālikas joined the camp of nāstikas, it was certainly in a later period of the evolution of the materialist philosophy of the Cārvākas.

Materialist Philosophy described in later Sanskrit Literature :

It has been stated above that the Lokāyata philosophy originated in the Vedic age itself. The philosophy was best known as the Lokāyata system in the early stage of its development. But in a later period it was known as the Cārvāka philosophy. Philosophers of both orthodox and non-orthodox schools in India have adequately discussed the materialist philosophy of the Cārvākas which they have never accepted. Among the philosophers, Śankarācarya, Śāntarakṣita (a Buddhist) Mādhava, Haribhadrasuri (Jaina), Guṇaratnasūri (Jaina) Kamalaśīla (Bauddha), Hemacandra (Jaina), Mallisena (Jaina), Śālikanātha (Mīmāṁsaka) Jayantabhaṭṭa (a renowned Naiyāyika) Sadānandayati (Vedantist) and Udayana and Varadārāja (both Naiyāyikas) have examined the views of the materialist school in their works. Among them, Kamalaśīla, Guṇaratna and Varadārāja are three renowned commentators. Jayarāśi is another philosopher who has discussed some important views of Bṛhaspati in his *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*. Jayarāśi was a materialist. Some other philosophers like Vācaspati Miśra, Pārthasārathi Miśra, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Vādideva (Jaina) and Bhaṭṭotpala have casually referred to a few Lokāyata theories on anumāna (inference), Puruṣa (soul), the apauruṣeyatva of the Veda, and svabhāvavāda Thus, Vācaspati Miśra describes that the Lokāyatikas reject *anumāma* as a pramāna in a śūtra viz *nānumānaṁ pramāṇam.*[65] Pārthaśārathi Miśra shows that the Lokāyata philosophers describe the theory of apauruṣeyatva of the origin of the Vedas as propagated by the Mīmāṁsakas as a fit of imagination.[66] Madhusūdana Sarasvatī presents the Bāṛhapatya sūtra viz *caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ* in his commentary on the *Gitā* (16.11). Bhaṭṭotpala. the commentator on the *Bṛhatsaṁhitā* of Varāhamihira refers to the theory of svabhāva of the Lokāyatikas according to which the world is an outcome of svabhāva, or in other words, it has naturally come into existence without being produced by any divine agent. Vādideva presents a sūtra of Purandara on inference and its interpretation in his *Syādvādaratnākara.*

The Purāṇas and particularly the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, and the allegorical dramas like the *Prabodhacandrodaya* of Kṛṣṇamiśra and the *Naiṣadhacarita* of Śrīharṣa discuss some important views of the Cārvāka school.

It appears from the above works that though most of the authours in these works have discussed a few common views only, their dicussion on the Cārvāka darśana shows that there was certainly a great popularity of the Cārvāka philosophy in all ages.

The dehātman theory of Bṛhaspati :

Bṛhaspati, the founder of the Lokāyata philosophy, recognises the body endowed with consciousness as the soul in his sūtra viz. *caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ.* The sūtra appears in Śankara's *Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya,* Guṇaratna's commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri, and the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* of Sadānandayati etc.

This revolutionary theory of Bṛhaspati has been severely criticised by different philosophers. Guṇaratna, a Jaina philosopher champions the cause. He examines in all possible ways the materialist view and discards it with appropriate logic. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are two other philosophers who have also refuted the dehātman theory with adequate arguments. We shall give an idea of their standpoint in the appropriate context.

Materialists and the concept of rebirth :

Indian philosophers including the Bauddhas have propagated the theory of rebirth. It may be noted here that the Bauddhas do not recognise the soul. According to the *Upaniṣads*[67] and the *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*,[68] there is an eternal soul which does not die with the body, but enters into a new body after the death of a person. The Vedantists, the Naiyāyikas and also the Jainas recognise such an immortal soul. But the Bauddhas reject the very concept of such a permanent soul. However, the Bauddhas also speak about the continuation of vijñāna or consciousness.[69] The Bauddha philosopher Śāntarakṣita, the Jaina philosopher Guṇaratna and even the Naiyāyikas like Jayantabhaṭṭa believe that the behaviour of a newly born "untrained" baby is governed by his behaviour of his previous life. The materialists, on the other hand, opine that there is no such rebirth of a so-called permanent soul. The body-soul perishes and disappears with death. They argue that if there was such a "live" soul which transmigrates to another body, in that case, the soul of an elephant and a horse will be one and the same, but it is not. Moreover, if such a soul existed at all, every child would have remembered the activities of his past life which is never seen.

Bṛhaspati and Cārvāka :

The Lokāyata philosophy has been frequently described as Cārvāka darsána by Sanskrit writers. Though Bṛhaspati was the founder of the Lokāyata philosophy, his views were explained and expanded by Cārvāka or Cārvākas which popularised the

system in this country where āstika thoughts still dominate the Indian minds.

Bṛhaspati and Cārvāka or Cārvākas are separated by a long period. But some ancient thinkers of India try to establish a direct relationship between the two great materialist thinkers Thus, Kṛṣṇamiśra, the author of the *Prabodhacandrodaya* says :

tadetad asmadabhiprāyānubandhinā
vācaspatinā praṇīya cārvākāya samarpitam
tena ca śiṣyānuśiṣyadvāreṇa jagati bahulīkṛtaṁ tantram.[70]

Kṛṣṇamiśra describes Cārvāka as a contemporary of Bṛhaspati. But Mādhava refers to him as 'Bṛhaspatimatānusārī[71] which means a follower of Brhaspati's view. He was not a contemporary of the great materialist preacher. In fact, Cārvāka (or Cārvākas) flourished in the Indian scene several centuries after Bṛhaspati's Lokāyata doctrine was known to Kauṭilya and others.

Cārvāka, the exponent of the Lokāyata philosophy was not the same person with Cārvāka of the *Mahābhārata,* because in the epic, this person appears in the garb of an ascestic who holds a tri-fold staff (tridaṇḍa) in his hand, and wears a garland of beads. Cārvāka of the Lokāyata philosophy always hates the religious ear-marks and particulary the 'tridaṇḍa'. Cārvāka is described as a Rākṣasa in the epic, and a wicked friend of Duryodhana.[72]

Cārvāka, Pāṣanda and Pākhaṇḍa :

Pāṣaṇḍa and pākhaṇḍa are synonymous words. In fact, pākhaṇḍa is a corrupt form of pāṣaṇḍa. The words are generally used in the sense of the opponent of the Veda. M.R. Sakhare quotes a passage from the *Brahmavaivartapurāṇa* viz.

pāśabdena trayiāśabdaḥ
pālanājjagato mataḥ
taṁ khaṇḍayanti tasmāt te
pakhaṇḍās tena hetunā

in his *Lingārcanacandrikā*[73] in order to show that the word pākhaṇḍa in particular is used in this sense. Though the word pāṣaṇḍa also coveys the sense of an opponent of the Veda, many members of different religious sects of India use the word to condemn their opponents without considering its original significance. Thus, the Kāpālika Somasiddhānta in Ānandarāyamakhin's *Vidyāpariṇaya* states that the Kāpālikas and Pāñcarātrins are condemned as pāsaṇḍas by their opponents in spite of the fact that they recognise the authority of the Veda[74]. They are described as pāsaṇḍas by their enemies exclusively for the reason that they perform some unorthodox religious rituals.[75] But that cannot be a sufficient ground for calling them anti-Veda. The Kāpālikas eat meat and drink wine. But they recognise the Vedic god Rudra as the Supreme Being. They remain engaged in spiritual persuit for liberating the soul from the clutch of the pāśas. The Pāñcarātrins are the followers of Viṣṇu. Víṣṇu is a great Vedic god who has been later on recognised as Brahman in religious literature. The Kaulas of the left path are also not pāṣaṇḍas or anti-Veda because they worship the Vedic god Maheśvara (Rudra) and the Upanisadic goddess Umā though they adopt a hedonistic path in their religion. The Cārvākas are pāṣaṇḍas or pākhaṇḍas in the true sense of the term. This is the reason for which the commentator on the *Yaśastilakacampū* of Somadevasūri explains the word *pākhaṇḍilingāḥ* in a passage of this campūkāvya as *'pākhaṇḍilingāḥ cārvākādayaḥ.*[76]

Jāyarāśi :

It has been stated above that Jāyarāśi has dicussed some impotant views of the great materialist philosopher Bṛhaspati in his *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*. Jāyarāśi was a great original thinker. He was a loyal follower of Bṛhaspati. He lays an emphasis on living a popular way of life. He says :

'laukiko mārgo' nusartavyaḥ', Thereafter he quotes two very important sūtras of Bṛhaspati viz.

"pṛthivyāpastejo vāyuriti tattvāni,
tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasaṁjñā."[77]

Jayarāśi's book has been published by the Oriental Institute of Baroda (1940) and republished by Bauddha Bharati (Varanasi) in 1987. No work of the Lokāyata school was discovered by scholars prior to the the publication of this book. However, many parts of book are lost. But the remaining portion is an asset in the treasurehouse of Indian philosophy.

Regarding Jayarāśi, Dr. D. R. Sastri says :

There are different classes of Cārvākas. A particular division of school engaged themselves in rejecting all sorts of pramāṇas. Jāyarāśi belonged to that group.....

Jāyarāśi accepted Bṛhaspati as his Guru and with his permission demolished the doctrines of other schools......

To him there is no valid means of knowledge.[78]

Jāyarāśi examines the views of different philosopical schools on pramāṇas, and the theories of soul. In the last section of his work, he examines śabdaprāmāṇya. In this context, he specially refers to the theory of sphoṭa found in the grammatical school.[79] He strongly supports the view of Bṛhaspati that there is no other world or a soul which migrates to the other world.[80]

We quote a portion from the editorial comment on Jāyarāśi's purpose below.

"A careful reading of the text leaves the impression that Jāyarāśi is as serious a thinker as any other, and that he wants to show the incapacity of human instruments of knowledge to know anything really.[81]

Different names of materialists :

The Indian materialists are known by different names. They are generally called *nāstikas*. According to Manu, a *nāstika* is a non-believer in the authority of the Veda. Guṇaratna says that the materialists are known by different names like Cārvākas, Lokāyatas, Lokāyatikas and Bārhaspatyas.[82] It should

be noted here that the word Cārvāka has been used in the sense of materialist philosophers in the works of some later Sanskrit writers only like Śāntarakṣita, Guṇaratna, Mādhava and Kṛṣṇamiśra. The early writers like Kauṭilya, Patañjali and even Kaiyaṭa do not refer to Cārvāka anywhere in their works.

Commentaries on the Lokāyatadarśana :

There were several commentaries on the Lokāyata darśana written in different times. Patañjali refers to the *Varṇikā* commentary of Bhāguri. Kamalaśīla refers to at least two commentaries while explaining the Kārikā viz.

tebhya eva tathā jñānaṁ jāyate
vyajyatethavā
in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṁgraha* (1858)

There were similar commentaries in different times as it can be easily imagined from the works of Udayana, Jayantabhaṭṭa, Guṇaratna and Mādhava where there are some excellent discourses on the body-soul theory of Cārvākas.

Modern writers on Materialism :

In India, there is a good deal of research on the materialist philosophy of Bṛhaspati and Cārvāka. Dr. Haraprasad Shastri and Dr. Dakshina Ranjan Sastri are two great exponents of *Lokāyata darśana.* Dr. Haraprasad Shastri is recognised as the pioneer in the mater. Dr. Dakshina Ranjan Sastri has written three excellent books in English on Lokāyata viz. *Charvak philosophy, Cārvāka ṣaṣṭi,* and *A Short History of Indian Materialīsm, Hedonism. Sensationalism.* His another book viz *Carvak Darsan* writen in Bengali is also very useful for scholars. However, Dr. Deviprasad Chattopadhyaya's *Lokayata* is a very famous work. Among other writers Dr. Baladev Upadhyaya and Dr. Sarvananda Pathak (*Carvak Darsan ki Sastriya Samiksa*) have written on the subject in Hindi. Dr. S. Radhaskrishnan and Dr. S. N. Dasgupta have also greatly

contributed to the Lokāyata philosophy in their historical works.

Dakshina Ranjan Sastri quotes a large number of Bṛhaspati's sūtras in his *"A Short History of Indian Materialism, Hedonism, Sensationalism"* which have been laboriously collected by this celebrated scholar from various sources.

Dr. Shastri's another book *"Cārvāka ṣaṣṭi"* is an important contribution to the study of the Cārvāka philosophy.

Dr. Sarvananda Pathak's "Cārvāk Darshan ki Sastriya Samiksa" is an excellent critical exposition of the Cārvāka philosophy. The author spares no effort in collecting the sūtras of Bṛhaspati, Kambalāśvatara and Purandara.

The present work :

The present work will be mainly a critical exposition of the materialistc views of Bṛhaspati and his followers which remain scattered over a vast range of Indian literature like Veda, Upaniṣad, Purāṇa, philosophical texts, Sanskrit drama and poetry, Ayurvedic work, and also the Pāli sources. We shall adequately explain these views together with a reference to the arguments and counter-arguments of the advocates and opponents of the materialist philosophy. While doing so, we shall discuss the gradual evolution of Lokāyata darśana through centuries. But as a critical discussion on the darśana may create some difficulty to the general readers to understand the philosophy, we shall add a brief chapter on the Lokāyata system in the present work to give them a clear idea of the philosophy through a simple and easy method. We shall present as much new material as available to us from various sources not mentioned by other writers in order to make the study a comprehensive and fruitful one.

References :

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2. Ibid, p. I.
3. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 451.
4. Tattvopaplavasiṁha, p. I
5. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya. p 451.
6. Ṛgveda, 2.12.5.
7. Vide Sāyaṇa on Ṛgveda 3.53.14.
8. Pāṇini, 4.2.60.
9. *Sāmkhyaṁ yogo lokāyatam cetyānvīkṣikī ... ānvīkṣikī lokasyopakaroti,* *Arthasāśtra,* 1.2.
10. *kaccinana lokāyatikān Brāhmaṇān tāta sevase* Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 100.38.
11. Mahābhāṣya, 7.3.45.
12. Kāmasūtra, 2.23-24.
13. Ṣaḍarśanasamuccaya. pp. 450456.
14. astināstidiṣṭaṁ matiḥ, 4.4.60.
15. Mahābhāṣya, 4.4.60.
16. Kaiyaṭa under Ibid.
17. Tattvasaṁgraha, Part II, p. 637.
18. Ibid, pp. 633-634, 637.
19. Advaitabrahmasiddhi, p. 99.
20. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p.
21. Tattvasaṁgraha, p. 637.
22. *etāvāneva lokoyaṁ yāvān indriyagocaraḥ; punaruktadeśāntaraṁ kālāntaraṁ avasthāntaraṁ vā paralokaḥ,* Ibid, p. 637.

23. Advaitabrahmasiddhi, p. 99.
24. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccya, p. 451.
25. *pṛathivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni,* Tattvopaplavasiṁha (Jayarāśi), p.1. *pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti catvāri tattvāni,* Tattvasaṁgraha, p. 63.
26. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, p.5.
27. *agnihotraṁ trayo vedāstridaṇḍaṁ bhasmaguṇṭhanam buddhipauruṣahīnānāṁ jīvikā dhātunirmitā,* Ibid, p.5.
28. *agnihotraṁ trayītantraṁ tridaṇḍaṁ bhasmapuṇḍrakam, prajñāpauruṣaniḥsvānāṁ jīvo jalpati jīvikā* Naiṣadhacarita 17.39.
29. *agnihotraṁ trayo vedāstridaṇḍam bhasmaguṇṭhanam prajñāpauruṣahīnānāṁ jīviketi Bṛhaspatih,* Prabodhacandrodaya. II. 26.
30. *pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti (catvāri) tattvāni, tatsamudāye viṣayendriyasaṁjñā* Bārhaspatya sūtra I, Tattvasaṁgaha, p. 633.
31. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya. p. 223.
32. Vide sūtra 17 (quoted above).
33. *maraṇam evāpavargaḥ,* Advaitabrahmasiddhi, p. 99 (quoted).
34. A History of Indian Philosophy, part III p. 531.
35. *Lokāyatiko vicitrairhetupadavyañjanair bālān vyāmohayati,* Lankāvatārasūtra p. 70.
36. Dīghanikāya, Sāmaññaphalasutta. 2.23.
37. Ibid, Sāmaññaphalasutta, 2.23.

38. A History of Indian Philosophy, Part-III, p. 531.
39. Tattavasaṁgraha, Part-II, p. 635.
40. *kāyādeva tatojñānaṁ*
    prāṇāpānādyadhiṣṭhitāt.
    yuktaṁ jāyata ityetat kambalāśvataroditam,
    Ibid, 1863.
41. Kāśikā, 1.3.36.
42. Harṣacarita, 8.
43. A History of Indian Philosophy, Part-III, p. 532.
44. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 450.
45. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, p.5.
46. Sarvasiddhāntasaṁgraha
47. See Bhāskara's commentary on Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśinī, part, p 316. Bhāskara reads *bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya* in stead of *bhasmībhūtasya dehasya in his commentary.*
48. Nyāyamañjarī. Part. II, p. 13.
49. Tattvasaṁgraha, part-II, P. 639.
50. Ibid, Part-I, P. 526.
51. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, 83.
52. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, p1.
53. Tattvasaṁgraha, Part-II, pp. 633-634.
54. Advaitabrahmasiddhi, p 101.
55. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 457.
56. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, p.5.
57. Ibid, p.1; Prabodhacandrodaya, p. 70.
58. *mṛtyurevāpavargaḥ,* Prabodhacandrodaya, p. 70.
59. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, p.1.
60. Naiṣadhacarita, 17.
61. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, p. 5.

62. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 451.
63. Prabodhacandrodaya, III.
64. *idaṁ pavitram amṛtaṁ*
    pīyatāṁ bhavabheṣajam
    paśupāśasamuccheda-
    kāraṇaṁ bhairavoditam,
    Ibid, III. 20.
65. *nānumānaṁ pramāṇam iti vadatā*
    lokāyatikenāpratīpannaḥ sandigdho
    viparyasto vā puruṣaḥ kathaṁ pratipadyeta,
    Sāṁkhyakārikā, pp. 124-125.
66. Ślokavārtika, p. 60.
67. Kaṭhopaniṣad, 1.2.18.
68. Gītā, 2.22.
69. Tattavasaṁgraha, 1938.
70. Prabodhacandrodaya, p. 71.
71. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, p. I.
72. *rājānaṁ brāhmaṇacchadmā*
    cārvāko rākṣaso'bravīt
    tatra duryodhanasakhā
    bhikṣurūpeṇa saṁvṛtaḥ
    sākṣaḥ śikhī tridaṇḍī ca
    dhṛṣṭo vigatasādhvasaḥ,
    Śāntiparvan, 38, 22-23.
73. Lingārcanacandrikā, ed. by M.R. Sakhare (1941), p. 289.
74. Vidyāpariṇaya, Act IV, p 86.
75. Ibid, p. 86.
76. Yaśastilakacampū, N.S. Press Bonbay, p. 435.
77. Tattvopaplavasiṁha, p. 1.
78. Charvak philosophy, p. 24.

79. Tattvopaplavasiṁha (Bauddha Bharati edition, Varanasi, 1987), pp. 22.-123.

80. *idaṁca cetasi samāropyāha*
Bhagavān Bṛhaspatīḥ
'paralokino'bhāvāt paralokābhāvaḥ, Ibid, p. 45.

81. Tattvopaplavasiṁha, Introduction, pp XIII-XIV.

82. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p 451.

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CHAPTER - II

THE LOKĀYATA PHILOSOPHY IN A NUTSHELL

In the previous chapter we have casually discussed some important views of Lokāyata school. But a casual and piecemeal discussion on the Lokāyata philosopy cannot give us a systematic and total idea of the philosophy. Therefore, before entering into a critical discussion on the philosophy, we shall give an idea of the basic views of this only materialistic system of India in a nutshell purely in the interest of the common readers who will be able to gather a clear and comprehensive knowledge of the Lokāyata philosophy without being entangled in an intricate process of a critical deliberation.

It has been discussed earlier that Bṛhaspati was the propounder of Lokāyata Darśana or Lokāyata materialism. Though the *Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad* indentifies this Bṛhaspati with the preceptor of gods, he was actually a historical person whose date has not been fixed till this date. Bṛhaspati wrote his Lokāyata philosophy in a sūtra form. Materialist ideas occured in the minds of many thinkers in the Vedic age itself. But Bṛhaspati is the earliest authority on the materialist philosophy who presented a scientific and systematically worked out doctrine where many revolutionary views find a place which revolutionised the entire philosophical world.

Pāṇini who flourished in the 6th century B. C refers to Lokāyata in his great grammar. This shows that Bṛhaspati's philosophy flourished in the sixth century B. C or one or two centuries earlier. Patañjali, the renowned Sanskrit grammarian of the 2nd century B. C describes a *Varṇikā* commentary written on the Lokāyata śāstra in his *Mahābhāṣya* (7.4.45). It can be imagined from the above accounts of great grammariams that

Lokāyata Darśana assumed a distinct shape during the four hundred years between Pāṇini and Patañjali. The materialist philosophy was adored by the people in the age of Jayāditya, the co-author of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (7th century A. D). He describes that the Cārvī teachers of Lokāyata Darśana earned a great applause from their students by explaining the Lokāyata views to them in a convincing and attractive manner.

Bāṇabhaṭṭa (7th century A. D) who was a contemporary of Jayāditya describes in his *Harṣacarita* that Lokāyata darśana was regularly taught in the university of Divākaramitra in his time. However, though Lokāyata was studied in India for several hundred years, no Sanskrit writer has made any attempt to give the readers any idea of the materialist text of Bṛhaspati or its commentaries till the 8th century A. D. It was Kamalaśīla (8th century A. D.) who presented for the first time some important sūtras of Bṛhaspati in his *Pañjikā* commentary written on Śāntarakṣitas's *Tattvasaṁgraha*. Of course, Śāntarakṣita has discussed many views of Bṛhaspati in the form of kārikās in his famous Buddhist work. It may be mentioned here that Jāvāli, a materialist describes some important anti-religious views of the materialist school in the Ayodhyākāṇḍa of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. After Kamalaśīla, Guṇaratana, the commentator on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri, Mādhava, the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* and Sadānandayati, the author of the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* have widened our horizon of knowledge by discussing some new and rare sūtras signifying the evolution of the Lokāyata philosophy through the ages. Guṇaratna, Mādhava and Sadānandayati, again, give us an appropriate knowledge of Cārvāka atheism and hedonism. Guṇaratna had a direct knowledge of the behaviour of the Lokāyatas of his age. These hedonists were anarchists, who enjoyed everybody's women without any discrimination and without fear for the law of the country.

Bṛhaspati and Ajitakeśakambalī were great authorities on the Lokāyata darśana. While Bṛhaspati presents his materialist doctrine in sūtras, Ajita gives his views in plain prose statements in the *Dīghanikāya*. Both Bṛhaspati and Ajita recognise the world as a material composition. They do not believe in the existence of paraloka or a world after death and a permanent soul. Ajita boldly declares that there are no good or bad results of good and bad activities performed by a man in his life.

Ajita also does not recognise the blood relation among men. He says that there is no father or mother of anybody in this world. A similar philosophy has been propagated by Jāvāli also in the Ayodhyākāṇḍa of Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa*.

The meaning of Lokāyata :

There are many meanings of the word Lokāyata. But the simple and easily acceptable meaning of the word is 'a people's philosophy'. Mādhava accepts this meaning in his *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*. He says that the common people always adore artha or material acquisition and kāma or material enjoyment as the sole aims of life as described by Cārvāka, and totally forget the Supreme Reality, that is, the Supreme Being. Lokāyata is an appropriately significant word which denotes a philosophy which is always adored by the common people.

Lokāyata epistemology :

Bṛhaspati recognises pratyakṣa or direct perception as the only valid means of knowledge *(pratyakṣaṁ evaikaṁ pramāṇam).*

There are some distinct reasons behind this. We generally accept whatever object we perceive as real, because as we perceive it with our own senses which cannot be false. Many people including the scientists talk of the existence of many other things in the universe, Now, because these objects are beyond our perception, we cannot ordinarily accept them as true or real. There is another reason behind the rigid view propagated by Bṛhaspati. He had a great suspicion regarding the behaviour of religious preachers and priests. These advocates of

religious practices have always taught the people that there are virtue and vice, heaven and hell and results of good and bad actions of a man. These religious preachers always propagated the view that when some specific Vedic sacrifices are performed, the performers gain a place in heaven and live there a happy divine life after death. Bṛhaspati observed that nobody ever perceived such a divine land. Therefore, he had a strong suspicion in his mind regarding the religious preachers. He thought that these people played a trick upon their innocent followers and exploited wealth from them in the name of performing religious activities. Therefore, he states firmly *'pratyakṣam evaikaṁ pramāṇaṁ'*, that is, perception alone is the valid form of knowledge (and there is no scope of anumāna or inference in this world).

However, anumāna or inference is also essentially necessary for us in our practical life apart from pratyakṣa or perception. This point will be clearly explained in the present chapter. Anumāna has been accepted as a pramāna by all other philosophers including the Bauddhas. Anumāna is necessary for us in life even for some common matters of everyday experience. Let us cite one such instance. We sometimes hear the whistle of a train while sleeping at home. We immediately draw the conclusion that a train is on its track. In this case, we take the help of anumāna or inference which is based on our past experiences that a train sounds its whistle before moving or while running on the track. We sometimes see a column of smoke on a hillock and draw the conclusion through inference which is based upon our past, direct experiences that there is fire in the hillock, because where there is smoke there is fire.

Though Bṛhaspati does not recognise anumāna or inference, some later materialists, as Kamalaśīla observes, headed by Purandara fully realised the necessity of anumāna in our practical life. Therefore, these materialists have accepted anumāna also as another means of valid knowledge. However, these philosophers recognise laukika anumāna or popular

inference alone as a second pramāṇa, Such an inference is involved in such sentences as *parvato vahnimān dhūmāt* (i.e there is fire in the hillock because smoke is constantly rising from it) But Purandara and other materialists do not recognise any alaukika anumāna or suprasensory inference by means of which a causal relationship between religious activities and their results is established (cf. *yāgāt svargo bhavati*) Guṇaratna clearly mentions the new approach of later materialists in his commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya.*

Lokāyata metaphysics :

Bṛhaspati and Ajitakeśakambalī recognise the material world composed of the four groups of material elements viz earth, air water and light as the real world, and reject any idea of paraloka or a world after death. According to Bṛhaspati there is no soul apart from the conscious body and no afterworld to which the soul is supposed to migrate after the death of a person. The Upanisadic philosophers and also Naiyāyikas and Jainas have recognised a permanent ātman apart from the body. This ātman is conscious. But Bṛhaspati says : *caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ* which means that the material body which remains associated with consciousness is the puruṣa or soul. There is no other soul apart from the body.

The orthodox philosophers describe the soul as the source of consciousness of the body. But Bṛhaspati does not accept this view. According to him, when the elements are combined into the form of a body they themselves produce consciousness *(tebhyaścaitanyam)*. He argues that country liquour is produced by putting together the ingredients like rice, water and molasses (guḍa). When wine is finally produced from them it possessess intoxication. But the ingredients themselves are without any intoxication. Similarly, when the inanimate elements assume the form of the body, they also produce consciousness which is absent from the constituting elements.

Bṛhaspati composed a revolutionary sūtra in support of his theory which appears sometimes as *madaśaktivaccaitanyam* and sometimes as *madaśaktivadvijñānam.* The sūtra in any form proves that Bṛhaspati was a believer in *asatkāryavāda,* though his concept of *asatkārya* is somewhat different from that of other philosophers. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, however, say that according to some commentators, consciousness remains latent in the material elements themselves which emerge into full form when they assume the form of the body.

The cause and effect relationship between the material body and consciouness is, however, not accepted by the opponents of the Lokāyata philosophy on the pertinent ground that a dead body is always deviod of conciousness in spite of possessing all the elements. Another materialist Kambalāśvatara, therefore, opines in the the sūtra viz *kāyādeva* that when the body remains associated with the two vital winds prāṇa and apāna, it remains conscious.

Ākāśa in Lokāyata Philosophy :

All pholosophical schools of India except Lokāyata recognise ākāśa or space as a distinct entity. Bṛhaspati does not recognise ākāśa because it cannot be perceived. Its existence is merely inferrable. But Bṛhaspati does not accept inference, However, as Guṇanatra observes, a section of later Cārvāka materialists have recognised ākāśa also as a fifth element. They have probably done so under the pressure of other philosophical systems for whom ākāśa is a reality.

The concept of salvation in Bṛhaspati's doctrine :

The different philosophical schools of India have propagated different theories of salvation (apavarga or mokṣa). Bṛhaspati also gives a sūtra on apavarga or salvation. According to him, death itself is the end of a man. When a man dies, nothing remains of him not to speak of a soul. Therefore, death itself is salvation for a man *(maraṇam evāpavargaḥ).*

The ultimate goal of life :

According to the orthodox Indian thinkers, dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa are the four puruṣārthas or goals of human life. But Bṛhaspati recognises kāma or material enjoyment as the only goal of life. Man must utilise his worldly life for a distinct purpose. According to Bṛhaspati, this purpose is to enjoy life fully, particularly because nothing exists of a man after death. Bṛhaspati declares his hedonistic view in a *sūtra viz kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ.* He was a propagator of hedonism. But it is also a fact that he wished everybody to live a comfortable life at all costs.

The Cārvāka school and its philosophical ideas :

The Cārvāka school appeared at the final stage of the development of the Lokāyata system. The Lokāyata philosophy is sometimes called Cārvākadarśana also. It is not finally determined whether Cārvāka was an individual philosopher or the name represented a class of materialists in the beginning. The name of Cārvāka appears in the Lokāyata philosophy only in about 8th century A. D. when Kamalaśīla, the famous Buddhist philosopher mentions the name in his work. The term Cārvāka has been variously derived by scholars from carvaṇa (eating) and cāru vāk (sweet words) because Cārvāka preaches the doctrine of material enjoyment as the goal of human life with sweet words. Cārvāka or Cārvākas have accepted the important materialist views of Bṛhaspati, but occasionally these views have been partially amended to adjust the philosophy with the existing situation.

It has been already discussed that Purandara and some other Cārvākas have accepted popular inference also as second valid means of knowledge. Cārvākas (the plural number is also used with the term) have accepted artha or material acquisition or material possession as another puruṣārtha, because without it no material enjoyment is possible. One important contribution of Cārvākas to the Lokāyata philosophy is that they recognise

the king of country or the image of a deity as God, but do not accept an invisible God. The Cārvāka philosophy which is merely a continuation of the Lokāyata philosophy is a perfect hedonistic system. The Cārvākas have laid a greater emphasis on material enjoyments rather than on research on Bṛhaspati's scientific materialism. The Cārvākas condemn all religious activities.

Anti-ireligious views of the Cārvāka School :

The Cārvāka materialists were avowed enemies of religion. In fact, the Lokāyatikas since the age of Ajitakeśakambalī were against all religious beliefs and practices. Ajita denounces sacrifices, gift-making and such other religious activities. He declares that there are no good or bad results of one's pious, or immoral and illegal activites. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki, a materialist philosopher Jāvāli advises Rāmacandra not to perform śrāddha or any other religious activity which is without any significance in life. He says that śrāddha performed for a dead man is merely a wastage of money and materials and nothing else. The Cārvākas also declare religion as a meaningless affair. Mādhava quotes several poems in his *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* supposed to be written by Bṛhaspati himself. The Cārvākas utilise these poems fully for propagating the atheistic views of the Lokāyata school. According these poems, there is no heaven (or hell) or salvation, nor a permanent soul. The materialists condemn Vedic sacrifices and the śrāddha ceremony. According to one poem, some wicked people and demons created the Vedas. In another poem viz.

agnihotraṁ trayo vedāstridaṇḍaṁ
bhasmaguṇṭhanam etc,

religion is described as a means of earning livelihood of a section of worthless people who have no talent or power to do anything else in the world.

According to Cārvākas all men should enjoy life fully. They should drink ghee even by borrowing money (ṛṇaṁ kṛtvā ghṛtaṁ pibet).

Svabhāvavāda :

Indian materialists do not recognise God or any invisible agent as the creator of the universe. They opine that everything grows in the universe by nature. This is the famous svabhāva theory of the Indian materialists.★

★★★

★ The views briefly discussed here will be critically and elaborately discussed in the succeeding chapters in the interest of scholars and researchers.

CHAPTER - III

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LOKĀYATA SCHOOL

India is a land of many philosophical systems. The wise men of India since the age of Upaniṣads till modern times have presented philosophical ideas which bear the stamp of their great originality. The Indian philosophies have been broadly divided into two groups viz. Āstika darśana and Nāstika darśana. The Āstika school is represented by six well-known systems viz. Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmaṁsā and Vedānta. The Nāstika or the heretical school comprises the Lokāyata (Materialist) or the Cārvāka philosophy, the Bauddha, the Jaina, the Kāpālika and such other systems. The fundamental difference between the two philosophical schools is that the Āstika philosophies believe in the authority of the Vedas, while the Nāstika refuses to recognise the prāmāṇya of the Vedic texts.

The Lokāyata or the Cārvāka system is the only materialistic system of India. It vehemently opposes the Vedas and the Vedic cult. The Lokāyata Materialists are, therefore, rightly called Nāstikas.[1]

The Early stage of the Lokāyata :

The Lokāyata philosophy as it has been discussed in the previous chapter is as old as the Vedic Saṁhitās. In this context a reference has been made to the Vedic verse viz. 'kiṁ the *kṛṇvanti kīkaṭeṣu gāvaḥ'* etc[2]. It contains some views of the early Lokāyata thinkers. The commentator Sāyaṇa, while explaining the verse remarks in the following manner :

pibatakhādatāyām eva loko na para iti vadanto nāstikāḥ kīkaṭāḥ.[3]

The philosophy of the Kīkaṭa materialists is probably the beginning of hedonistic materialism which was later on embraced by the Lokāyatikas as their ultimate goal of life.

In a later philosophical text vix. the *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* of Haribhadhadrasūri, we read a similar statement of the Lokāyata philosophers which says *"piba kāda ca cārulocane yadatītaṁ varagātri tanna te".*[4] However, except for casual references to the nāstikas, we do not find any clear-cut idea of the hedonisitc philosophy of the Lokāyatas or Lokāyatikas from the Vedic literature.

Coming to the Upanisadic period, we hear a materialistic declaration about the non-existence of a permanent soul surviving after death in a passage of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* viz *na pretya saṁjñāstī* (2.4.12) Again, we read about the doctrine of 'svabhāva' or Naturalism in a passage of the *Śvetaśvataropaniṣad* viz.

svabhāvameke kavayo vadanti
kālaṁ tathānye parimuhyamānāḥ.[5]

Though in the beginning svabhāvavāda or Naturalism was not described as a theory propounded by the materialists, it a later period, Mādhava and Bhaṭṭotpala ascribe its origin to the Lokāyata school. Śāntarakṣita gives us a clear idea of the doctrine of svabhāva by citing appropriate illustrations in his famous philosophical work the *Tattvasaṁgraha.*[7] The doctrine has its own merits. We shall discuss the point more elaborately in another context. According to 'svabhāvavāda', 'svabhāva' or 'nature' is responsible for the emergence of all the diverse objects of the world.

It is a fact that the history of the materialist philosophy can be traced back to the Vedic age. But a scientifically worked out philosophy presented in the sūtra form was available to scholars in a much later period.

The *Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad (7.9)* covertly refers to the origin of the Lokāyata philosophy. But it does not mention the name of the philosophy except describing god Bṛhaspati as its author.

It has been discussed earlier that references to Lokāyata darśana are met with in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī,* Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra,* the *Rāmāyaṇa,* the *Kāmasūtra* of Vātsāyana and Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya.* The *Mahābhārata* also casually refers to the materialist doctrine (I.70.46).

Pāṇini the greatest grammarian of India flourished in the 6th centrury B. C. Kautilya, who was the Prime Minister of Candragupta Maurya belonged to the fourth century B. C. as Candragupta became the paramount ruler of India sometime after 327 B. C. the date in which Alexander invaded India and quickly left the country without fighting against Magadha.

Mahesh Candra Pal, the editor and publisher of the *Kāmasutra* of Vātsāyana after a thorough research on the date of the author of the *Kāmasūtra* has finally drawn the conclusion that Vātsāyana was a contemporary of Candragupta Maurya (4th century B. C.).[6]

There is a great deal of research on the date of the *Rāmayaṇa* of Vālmīki also. M. Winternitz, after a laborious research on the date of Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa* has arrived at the following conclusion :

> *"everything indicates that our epic (Rāmāyaṇa) was composed only after the appearance of the Buddha and of the birth of the oldest Pali literature i.e. after the 5th century B.C."*[7]

It should be noted here that the epic became popular in India before the first century A. D., as the Jaina monk Vimalasūri recast the *Rāmayaṇa* legend in his Prakṛt poem *Paumacariya.*

The Śāntiparvan of the *Mahābhārata* (ch. 28) discusses some views of the nāstikas or Indian materialists. The Śāntiparvan was apparently written after the development of Pāli Buddhism, because some very important Buddhist views on life, death and rebirth have been discussed together with the materialist views in the same chapter of the same section of the epic (Śāntiparvan, 218.32-34).

Patañjali was a contemporary of the emperor Puṣyamitra Śunga, who flourished in the second century B. C. Patañjali was a priest in the Aśvamedha sacrifice performed by Puṣyamitra (Cf. *iha puṣyamitraṁ yājayāmaḥ : Mahabhāṣya,* 3.2.115)

Pāṇini refers of Lokāyata in his great grammar (4-2-60). But he does not find any scope to discuss the philosophy. On the other hand, Vālmīki, Kauṭilya, Vātsāyana, Patañjali and the author of the *Mahābhārata* give some idea of some basic features of the philosophy. Patañjali renders another valuable service to the academic circle by bringing to the knowledge of scholars that there was a commentary on the Lokāyata Śāstra wirtten by the philosopher Bhāguri.

In the Ayodhyākāṇḍa of the *Rāmāyaṇa,* Rāma advises Bharata to avoid the company of Lokāyatika Brāhmaṇas. He describes these materialist preachers as :

anarthakuśalā hyete bālāḥ
paṇḍitamāninaḥ
dharmaśāstreṣu mukhyeṣu
vidyamāneṣu durbudhāḥ
buddhimān ānvīksikīṁ prāpya
nirarthaṁ pravadantite.[8]

In the chapter 108 of the Ayodhyakāṇḍa of the *Rāmāyaṇa* Rāma meets a materialist Jāvāli who advises Rāmcandra to behave like a truely practical man.[9] He says that there is no father or mother of anybody. He says that neither Daśaratha is related to Rāma, nor Rāma is related to Daśaratha, who gave birth to his 'son' through a physical process.[10] Jāvāli also decribes the śraddha ceremony performed for the dead relatives as a colossal wastage of material as the dead person never enjoys the śrāddha ceremony performed for him. Jāvāli advises Rāma to avoid all kinds of dāna, dīkṣā, yāga and tapasyā as they do not yield any result."[11] These views are strikingly similar to the materialist views of Ajita Keśakambalī and Cārvākas. Both Ajitakeśakambalī and the Cārvākas scoff at religion and religious practices. Like Jāvāli, Ajita also declares that there is no father or no mother of anybody. He describes all meritorious or religious activites like gift-making (dinna) and the performing of sacrifices (itthaṁ or iṣṭam) as useless.

Kauṭilya praises the Lokāyata system in the following manner :

sāṁkhyaṁ yogo lokāyataṁcetyānvikṣīkī
anvīkṣamāṇā lokasyopakarotī vyasanebhyudayeca
buddhim avasthāpayati (1.2).

Vātasāyana praises the Lokāyatikas as a class of practical people who always said : *varam adya kapotaḥ śvo mayūrāt. varaṁ sāṁśayikānniṣkād asāṁśayikaḥ kārsāpaṇaḥ"* (It is better to have one dove in hand than a peacock in the bush. A small coin in hand in better than a gold coin yet to attain.) They reject religion on practical grounds.[12]

The name of Lokāyatas and their philosophy appear in such ancient Buddhist texts as the *Vinayapiṭaka* (Cullavagga, 5.17.44), the *Saṁyuktanikāya* (12.48.50) and the *Dīghanikāya*. The Lokāyata philosophy, however, bloomed into full form in a much later period.

The meaning of Lokāyata :

Lokāyata is a significant term. It is not easy to give a definite idea of the origin of the term. But scholars have tried to explain it as *lokeṣu āyataṁ prasṛtam (śāstram)* meaning a popular philosophy.

Dr. S. N. Dasgupta interprets the term in two different ways :

(i) loka+a+ yatam and
(ii) loka + ā + yatam.[13]

According to the first interpretation, Lokāyata means a philosophical system which propagates the doctrine of non-action (ayatam). According to the second interpretation, it means a popular philosophical doctrine.

Other scholars have given some other meanings of Lokāyata. Thus, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan opines that Lokāyatas are so called, because they recognise this world alone as real.[14] Dr. A. K. Warder, on the other hand, considers Lokāyata as a synonym of Natural philosophy or Naturalism.[15] Guṇaratna describes Lokāyata as a philosophy of foolish people (loka) having no power of judgement.

Bṛhaspati, the propounder of the Lokāyata doctrine :

According to the Indian tradition, Bṛhaspati was the propounder of the Lokāyata doctrine. Though this Bṛhaspati was a historical person, the *Maitrayaṇī Upaniṣad* tries to identify him with the preceptor of gods. It says : *Bṛhaspatir vai Śukro bhūtvendrāsyābhayāya...... imām avidyām asṛjat,* (7.9).

The *Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad* is comparatively a new Upanisadic text which came into existence during the period of the development of the Buddhist philosophy. It refers to the Nairātmyavāda of the Buddhists in a passage.[16]

There is a reference to Bṛhaspati as the founder of the Lokāyata school in the Sanskrit texts of a comparatively modern period like the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*[17] of Mādhava and the *Prabodhacandrodaya* of Kṛṣṇamiśra.[18] Several poems[19] apart from a number of sūtras are attributed to Bṛhaspati.

The sūtra text of Bṛhaspati :

It is clear from the commentary of Kamalaśila written on the *Tattvasaṁgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, the commentary of Guṇaratna written on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri and also the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* of Sadānandyati that Bṛhaspati wrote a philosophical text on the Lokāyata views in sūtra form. An account of the sūtras of the Lokāyata philosopher is given below together with their sources :

1. **pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni :** *Tattavopaplavasiṁha* of Jayarāśi;[20] Kamalaśīla's commentary on the *Tattvasaṁgraha*[21] of Śāntarakṣita; Guṇaratna's commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya.*[22]
2. **tatsamudāye viṣayendriyasaṁjñā :** Kamalaśīla's commentary on the *Tattvasaṁgraha.*[23]

3. **tebhyaścaitanyam :** Ibid;[24] Guṇaratna's commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*[25]; *Tattavopaplavasiṁha.*[26]
4. **caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ :** *Brahmasūtra-śāṁkarabhāṣya*[27] *Advaitabrahamasiddhi* of Sadānandayati;[28] Guṇaratna's commentary on the *Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya*;[29] *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī.*
5. **maraṇamevāpavargaḥ :** *Advaitabrahmasiddhi;*[30]
6. **paralokinobhāvāt parālokābhāvaḥ :** Kamalaśīla's commentary the *Tattvasaṁgraha;*[31] *Tattvopaplavasiṁha.*[32]
7. **pratyakṣam evaikaṁ pramāṇam :** *Sammatitarkaprakaraṇabhāṣya;*[33] *Ṣyādvādamañjarī* of Mallisena.[34]
8. **kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ :** *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*[35]
9. **ihalokaparalokaśarīrayor bhinnatvāt tadgatayorapi cittayor naikaḥ santānaḥ :** ***Tattvasaṁgraha.***[36]
10. **jātigrahaṇam asiddham ekagrāmagatānāṁ sarveṣāṁ smaraṇāt :** ***Tattvasaṁgraha.***

The first sūtra in our list appears as the second sūtra in Kamalaśīla's commentary. Naturally, a question arises regarding the first sūtra in Bṛhaspati's sūtra text. It was probably *laukiko mārgonusartavyaḥ.* as it appears in the *Tattavopaplavasiṁha* of Jayarāśi.

The second sūtra viz. *tatsamudāye viṣayendriyasamjñā* as we quote it from Kamalaśīla's work appears in two other forms in Guṇaratna's commentary on the *Ṣaḍdaraśanasamuccaya* and some other sources. Guṇaratna presents the second sūtra as :

tatsamudāye śarīraviṣayendriyasaṁjña.[37] while Jayarāśi gives a slightly different version of the sūtra viz. *tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasamjñā.*[38]

The third sūtra was probably followed by another sūtra viz. *madaśaktivaccaitanyam.* Though the sūtra is not mentioned by Kamalaśīla and Sadānandayati, the author of the *Advitabrahmasiddhi*, it finds a place in Guṇaratna's commentary[39], and the *Prakaraṇapañjikā.*[40] But Guṇaratna and the author of the *Prakaraṇapañjikā* also do not clearly state that it was given by Bṛhaspati. The sūtra appears in the *Śāṁkarabhāṣya* of the *Brahmasūtra* in a slightly different form.[41] The fourth sūtra viz. *caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ* is the foundation stone of the *bhūtacaitanyavāda* of the materialists which faces a serious criticism in later times.

The fifth sūtra appears in an amended form as *mṛtyurevāpavargaḥ* in Kṛṣṇamiśra's allegorical drama the *Prabodhacandrodaya.*

A critical analysis of the sūtras :

Bṛhaspati lays the foundation stone of the Lokāyata philosophy in his sūtras. According to him, there are only four elements viz. earth, air, water and light. These four elements compose the (human) body, and also the other objects of the world.

The orthodox philosophers viz. the Vedantists, the Naiyāyikas, and also Jaina 'heretics' have recognised the existence of 'ākāśa' or space. But Bṛhaspati does not consider 'ākāśa' as a fifth element. The most important reason for the non-recognition of 'ākāśa' as another element is that Bṛhaspati does not accept 'anumāna' or inference as a 'pramāṇa'. Ākāśa is not a subject of direct perception, but of inference, for which he has rejected 'ākāśa'. Kamalaśīla has clearly discussed this in his commentary.[42]

The other elements have been recognised by the later materialist philosophers like Ajitakeśakambalī also. Ajita describes this world as *'catummahābhūtikoyaṁ puriso'.*[43] When the four mahabhūtas or elements are combined due to the natural factors, the body is created.

The sūtra *'tebhyaścaitanyam'* bears a great significance in the philosophy of Bṛhaspati. Bṛahaspati was a perfect materialist. He rejects the view of many orthodox schools that there is a conscious soul or God apart from the material body which is made up of inanimate beings viz, the four elements.

According to the third sūtra, consciousness in a live body is generated by the inanimate matter, and there is no fifth object called Jīva or Ātman which is supposed to be the source of consciousness by the Vedantists, the Jainas and the Naiyāyikas.

Now, a question arises as : "How does inanimate matter generate consciousness?" To this, the materialists reply that like water, molasses and rice preserved in a pot for sometime which generate the intoxicating wine though these ingredients are non- intoxicating by character, the inanimate material elements also generate consciousness when they are combined into the form of a body.[44] This is the meaning of the sūtra *madaśaktivaccaitanyam* which was lost from Bṛhaspati's text but was restored by other philosophers in different forms. The sūtra has been explained by different authors. Thus, Haribhadrasūri gives a brief idea of the Lokāyata view laid down in the sūtra in the following manner :

pṛthīvyādibhūtasaṁhatyā
tathā dehapariṇateḥ
madaśaktiḥ surāngebhyo
yadvattadvaccidātmani.[45]

The author of the *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* explains the sūtra more clearly as :

"pṛthivyādibhūtebhyaścaitanyābhivyaktiḥ,
*piṣṭodakaguḍadhātakyādibhyo madásaktiv*at."[46]

Śankarācārya,[47] and Sadānadayati,[48] who were Vedantists, probably do not heartily adore the image of wine, for which they give another image also, that is, the image of betel-nut which becomes red after it is chewed with leaf and lime.

Whatever may be the argument of opponents on Bṛhaspati's view on the issue, it is a fact that he is the first philosopher who revolts against the religious order and tries to give a scientific interpretation of the body and the 'soul'.

It has been discussed above that the sūtra viz. *'caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ'* appears in the *Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya*, Guṇaratna's commentary on the *Saḍdarśanasamuccaya* and the *Advaitabrahamasiddhi* of Sadānanadayati etc. According to this very significant stūtra, the body endowed with consciousness is the puruṣa or the soul. The famous body-soul theory (dehātmavāda) of the materialists starts from this very sūtra. Sadānanda clearly describes the above sūtra as a composition of Bṛhaspati himself. But Abhinavagupta attributes its authorship to the Cārvākas in a general way in his *Īśvarapratyabhījñāvimarśini*.[49] However, Bhāskara refers to Bṛhaspati as its author.[50]

The fifth sūtra viz. *maraṇamevāpavargaḥ* is equally singificant like the earlier sūtras. Other philosophical schools recognise the existence of a soul or a conscious state after death. But for Bṛhaspati and his followers death is salvation. Certainly for achieving salvation no special effort is needed in the Lokāyata philosophy.

The eighth sūtra viz. *kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ* draws our attention to the hedonistic path advocated by Bṛhaspati for the common pepole. As the material body perishes and disappears forever, Bṛhaspati says that every person should enjoy his life fully. This has been stated in a poem also ascribed to Bṛhaspati by Mādhava viz.

yāvajjīvaṁ sukhaṁ jīven
nāsti mṛtyoragocaraḥ
bhasmībhūtasya dehasya
punarāgamanaṁ kutaḥ.[51]

(This poem has been quoted in a previous context)

But a man cannot follow a hedonistic path unless he has an adequate wealth to lead a 'pleasant life'. Therefore, later materialists have described artha and kāma as the two ultimate goals of the human life. Mādhava writes about this new standpoint of the materialist thinkers in his *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*. There are different theories about salvation (mokṣa or apavarga) in

Indian philosophies. In most of these philosophies there is a reference to a life after death. The Bauddhas do not recognise the existence of a 'self' or God. But they also propagate the theory of rebirth. The *Upaniṣads*, the *Gītā*, the Vedānta philosophy, and the philosophies of the Jainas and the Naiyāyikas clearly and categorically refer to the theory of rebirth. But Bṛhaspati propagates an entirely contradictory view viz. *maraṇamevāpavargaḥ*, that is, man attains salvation at his death.

This view has not been accepted by many philosophers of other schools. The Naiyāyikas and the Jainas have said that a newly born baby sucks its mother's breast without any tutoring. This is possible only because the baby inherits the habit of his previous birth. The materialists, on the other hand, cling to the theory viz.

ihalokaparalokayor bhinnatvāt
tadgatayorapi cittayor naikaḥ santānaḥ.

It has been quoted by Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* commentary as the eighteenth sūtra of Bṛhaspati.[52]

The Buddhist philosopher refers to four other sūtras found in the Lokāyata literature. They are—

(i) *etāvān eva puruṣo yāvān indriyagocaraḥ,*

(ii) *punaruktadeśāntaraṁ kālāntaraṁ avaśthāntaraṁ vā paralokaḥ,*

(iii) *nānumānaṁ pramāṇaṁ,* and

(iv) *vacanāllingād vivakṣā pratiyate.*[54]

He does not discuss the authorship of them. But Bṛhaspati himself was probably their author. There is a kārikā in the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri which is strikingly similar to sūtra (i). Haribhadra says that according to the materialists :

etāvān eva lokoyaṁ yāvān indriyagocaraḥ.

Kamalaśīla quotes the sūtra viz. *punaruktadeśāntaraṁ kālāntaraṁ avasthāntaraṁ vā paralokaḥ,* but does not interpret it. However, the apparent meaning of the sūtra is that the materialists recognise a different place, a different time or a different state as *paraloka*; but it does not necessarily refer to a different world like heaven or hell.

Ajitakeśakambalī :

Ajitakeśakambalī was another great philosopher of the materialist school after Bṛhaspati. His views are recorded in the *Dīghanikāya.* The text of Ajita's philosophy is given below.

*natthi (mahārāja) dinnam, natthi yittham, natthi hutam, natthi sukaṭadukkaṭānaṁ kammāṇaṁ phalaṁ vipāko; natthi ayaṁ loko natthi paroloko natthi māta, natthi pitā .... cātummahābhūtiko ayaṁ puriso yadā kālaṁ karoti paṭhavī paṭhavikāyam anupeti.........*etc.[55]

Dr. S. N. Dasgupta gives us a clear idea of the above statement of Ajita in the following way :

"Another philosophical school led by Ajitakeśakambalī thought that there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds; there is no other world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor any former lives any efficacy with respect to this life."[56]

One important view expressed by Ajita in the passage *catummahābhūiko ayaṁ puriso etc.* that the world is made of the four elements and when a man dies, his body is disinte–grated, and the constituents of the body return to their original sources. Thus, nothing is left of a person after death.

A Note on Ajita's Views :

Ajita presents some important views on the materialist philosophy. Ajita says that the human body is made up of four elements. When appropriate time comes, the earthy portion of the body merges with earth, the watery part with water and so on. And thus, nothing remains after death. He speaks in categorical terms that the dead body is carried by four persons

on a cot who are his last friends. When the body is burnt down, nothing remains.[57] Thus, there is no soul wich transmigrates to another body after death in Ajita's philosophy.

Ajita does not believe in the existence of a paraloka. He says clearly *'natthi paro loko'*. It reminds us of the famous sūtra of Bṛhaspati viz. *paralokino' bhāvāt paralokābhāvaḥ (Sūtra17).* He, however, does not recognise this world also as real *(natthi ayam loko)*. According to Haribhadrasūri, the materialists declare: the world which people perceive and live in is alone real. But Ajitakeśakambalī denies its existence also for the reason that this beautiful world is practically a bundle of the four elements viz. earth, air, water and light. When these elements are separated from one another, the world falls into pieces and thus, its existence is only relative. The materialist philosopher was a non-believer in religious beliefs and practices. He says that there are no such things as alms, sacrifice or oblations. For him, they are merely futile exercises which do not produce any meritorious result. It reminds us of a passage in the *Mahābhāṣya* where the nāstikas argue that there is nothing called 'dharma' in this world,[58] or, in other words, dharma is a meanigless term. The religious preachers of India have always taught that a man reaps the rewards of his good or bad actions in this life or the life after death. But Ajita boldly discards this view as :

natthi sukaṭadukkaṭānaṁ kammāṇaṁ phalaṁ vipāko (i.e. nāsti sukṛtaduṣkṛtānāṁ karmaṇāṁ phalaṁ vipākaḥ.)

According to Ajita, there is neither mother nor father *(natthi mātā, natthi pitā)*. This is a nihilistic view similar to the view of morden existentialists. However, in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Jāvāli is the first philosopher who preaches such a doctrine. He tells Rāmacandra :

kaḥ kasya puruṣo bandhuḥ kimāpyaṁ kasya kenacit
eko hi jāyate jantureka eva vinaśyati

tasamān mātā pitā ceti
Rāma sajjeta yo naraḥ
unmatta iva sa jñeyo
nāsti kaściddhi kasyacit.[59]

In later times, Śankarācārya propagates the same idea from a Vedantic point of view.[60] Ajita further says that there is no wise man in the the world even among the Brāhmaṇas or the Śramaṇas who has perceived this world or the other world and communicated his knowledge to other persons.[61]

Ajita has made an important contribution to the evolution of the materialist doctrine by elaborating it and adding some new ideas to the views of Bṛhaspati. It is interesting to note that while other philosophcial schools were engaged in propagating religious ideas, and ideas about the world after death, both Bṛhaspati and Ajita could boldly stand against their views.

Bhāguri :

The name of Bhāguri appears as a materialist philosopher in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. Patañjali who flourished in the second centrury B. C. describes Bhāguri as a famous commentator on the Lokāyata śāstra. Bhāguri was a great grammarian of ancient India who discovered some important phenomena of the Sanskrit language. Whether this grammarian was identical with Bhāguri, the materialist writer or not is not clear to us.

Patañjali says that Bhāguri was the author of the *Vartikā* or the *Varṇikā* commentary written on the Lokāyata doctrine (cf. *Varṇikā Bhāgurī Lokāyatasya; Vartikā Bhāgurī Lokāyatasya, Mahābhāṣya*, 7.3.45) Kaiyaṭa explains the word *Varṇikā* as *vyākhyānī* and *ṭīkāviśeṣaḥ*.[62] Nāgeśa also explains the word in a similar manner as-*Lokāyata-śāstrasya vyākhyānarūpo granthaviśeṣah.*[63]

The word 'Lokāyata' appears in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini. The Lokāyata doctrine florished in India since pre-Paninian times. It appears from Patañjali's reference to the *Varṇikā* and

Vartikā that the Lokāyata śāstra had assumed a definite scientific shape before the 2nd centutry B. C. Bhāguri certainly wrote a famous commentary on this śāstra which became popular in the academic circle in the days of Patañjali.

Patañjali :

Patañjali was a grammarian. But while discussing he important features of the ablative case, he casually refers to the nāstikas who reject the very concept of 'dharma'. He says :

"ya eṣa manuṣyaḥ saṁbhinnabuddhir bhavati sa paśyati nedaṁ kiñcid dharmo nāma nainaṁ kariṣyāmi."[64]

The word *saṁbhinnabuddhi* in the above passage is significant. Kaiyaṭa explains it as :

saṁbhinnabuddhir dharmādharmayor ekākārabuddhir nāstika ityarthaḥ.[65]

The nāstikas or materialists treat both virtue and vice as unreal, for which they are described as *saṁbhinnabuddhi'* by Patañjali.

Patañjali explains the word nāstika as *nāstīyasya matiḥ* (*Mahābhāṣya,* 4.4.60) Kaiyaṭa elaborates the view in the following manner :

paro lokostīti matir yasya sa āstikastadviparīto nāstikaḥ.[66]

Kaiyaṭa gives only a partial idea of the meaning of nāstika. The materialists not only reject the concept of paraloka but also everything which is beyond our perception. It has been said in a previous context that Bṛhaspati rejects the idea of paraloka. Mādhava says in his *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* that Bṛhaspati expresses the same idea in a poem which denies the existence of svarga or heaven, apavarga (salvation) and also the soul.

In the first Āhnika of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, some opponets of the Vedic religion discuss the idea of drinking holy wine during he Sautrāmaṇi and the Vājapeya sacrifices as meaningless in the following poem :

yadudumbaravarṇānāṁ
ghaṭīnāṁ maṇḍalaṁ mahat
pītaṁ na gamayet svargaṁ
kiṁ tat kratugatṁ nayet.[67]

These people were apparently a group pf materialists in age of the *Mahābhāṣya.*

Kambalāśvatara :

Like Bṛhaspati, Kambalāśvatara also propagates the theory that the body itself generates consciouness. Kambalāśvatra wrote his materialist doctrine in sūtras. The relevant sūtra in the present context is *kāyādeva.*[68] which has been quoted by Kamalaśīla in his commentary on the *Tattvasaṁgraha.* Sāntarakṣita, the author of the *Tattvasaṁgraha* was a Buddhist thinker. He elaborates the sūtra of Kambalāśvatāra in the following manner :

kāyādeva tato jñānaṁ
prāṇāpānādyadhiṣṭhitāt
yuktaṁjāyata ityetat
kambalāśvataroditaṁ
(Tattvasaṁgraha 1863)

Materialists argue that a man's life begins with the foetus born in mother's womb. Consciousness is totally absent (particularly in the early stage of the foetus) from the foetus. Therefore, the view that consciousness is inherited by a body from the previous birth cannot be treated as logically correct. However, it may be argued that it remains potentially present in the foetus. But this is also not acceptable to materialist thinkers because, consciousness cannot exist potentially without a foetus. Some philosophers argue that a new body comes into existence immediately with the death of a person. Materialists rejects this uptopian view also.

According to the materialists, the last mental state of a worldly person possessing a deep attachment for the world cannot generate a conscious state at his death, because the man is dead. So is the case of a saint without any attachment. Therefore, the new body cannot inherit consciousness from a previous body. Kambalāśvatara readily upholds the body-soul theory of Bṛhaspati apparently for this reason. But he says that the body which remains invariably associated with the two vital winds viz. prāṇa and apāna alone generates consciousness,[69] not otherwise. This is a significant departure from Bṛhaspati's concept of the conscious body. There is probably a reason behind this. The dead body, though it is composed of four kinds of elements, is without consciousness in the absence of the vital winds.

It may be noted here that Śāntarakṣita explains the Bārhaspatya sūtra *'tebhyaścaitanyam'* as :

tasmād bhūtaviśeṣebhyo
yathā suktasurādikam
tebhya eva tathā jñānaṁ
jāyate vyajyate'thavā.[70]

The interpretation is singnificant, because one school of thinkers opine that consciousness is not actually generated but it remains latent in matter which becomes manifest to others after the elements are combined. This is not the orthodox view of Indian materialists.

Cārvāka :

The name of Cārvāka occupies an equally important position like Bṛhaspati in the Lokāyata philosophy. In fact, the materialist philosophy is popularly called the Cārvāka philosophy in Sanskrit literature. Scholars are unable to ascertain whether Cārvāka was a nickname or real one, and an individual philosopher or a class of materialists. Cārvāka appears as a Brāhmaṇa ascetic and a friend of Duryodhana in the *Mahābhārata*, and in the *Veṇisaṁhāra*[71] of Bhaṭṭanārayaṇa as a cunning person but not as a follower of the Lokāyata school. In the *Prabodhacandrodaya* of Kṛṣṇamiśra, Cārvāka is described as the first direct disciple of Bṛhaspati. But the word Cārvāka appears as a class of materialist philosophers in the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*[72] of Haribhadrasūri. The *Pañjika* commentary of Kamalaśīla, on the other hand, describes Cārvāka as another name of Bṛhaspati.[73] The name of Cārvāka (s) appears constantly in the works of Sanskrit authors since the time of Kamalaśīla (8th century A.D.).

The Meaning of Cārvāka :

The word Cārvāka has been variously explained by Sanskrit writers. The general idea is that the term has emerged from either cāru vāka (sweet words) or carvaṇa (eating). The Cārvāka philosophers always use sweet, pleasing words like 'piba khāda ca cārulocane' (o beautiful maid, eat drink and be merry), and yāvajjīvaṁ sukaṁ jīvet. (so long as you are alive, you should live a happy life). According to the materialist philosophers, carvaṇa or enjoyment is the only goal of life. It is another reason for which the Indian materialists are generally called Cārvākas. The word Cārvāka may also mean Cāru's vāk or Bṛhaspati's vāk or philosophy. Guṇaratna, on the other hand, attributes a figurative meaning to the word. According to him, the Cārvākas swallow both virtue and vice i.e., they do not believe in the existence of either of them, for which they are called Cārvākas (eaters)[74]. Guṇaratna says that word 'cārvāka' according to Hemacandra is an irregular word like 'mayāka' and śyāmāka.[75]

The Cārvāka philosophy is partly an ampification and partly an enlargement of Bṛhaspati's ideas.

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    mṛto hi kim aśiṣyati
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CHAPTER - IV

THE LOKĀYATA PHILOSOPHY IN BUDDHIST AND JAINA WORKS

It has been discussed in the previous chapter that Ajitakeśakambalī was a great philosopher of the early Buddhist period. Ajita's views were gradually forgotten and Bṛhaspati and Cārvāka rose into prominence in the writings of Buddhist, Jaina and orthodox writers. It may be noted here that no comprehensive text of the Lokāyata school is available to scholars at present. They can gather the views of materialist thinkers mainly from the writings of the opponents of Bṛhaspati and Cārvāka and those, too in a fragementary form.

Śāntarakṣita :

Śāntarakṣita, the author of the *Tattvasaṁgraha* and Kamalaśīla, its commentator have rendered a very valuable service to the literrary circle by presenting the important views of the Lokāyata school. Śāntarakṣita begins the discussion on the Lokāyata philosophy with a note on the dehātmavāda of the materialist school.

It is clear from his discussion that the Cārvākas accept the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. Now, because all objects of the universe are purely momentary, the Cārvāka philosophy argues that the body, mind intellect etc. are also governed by the same law. It is bacause of this very important reason, there is no possibillity of the existence of a permanent soul after one's death. While corroborating the view of Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla quotes the Bārhaspatya sūtra (17) Viz. *paralokinobhāvat paralokābhāvah.*

Śāntarakṣita says that according to the Lokāyatikas consciousness is generated in a body as a result of the

combination of the four elements in it like the intoxication of wine produced by the non-intoxicating ingredients of wine.[1] We have already explained this view in an earlier context Kamalaśīla quotes the Bārhaspatya sūtra viz. *tebhyaścaitanyam* (sūtra 3) in this context. It has been generally explained by scholars that consciousness is generated by the four elements. But Śāntarakṣita signigficantly remarks that according to the materialists.

tebhya eva tathā jñānaṁ
jāyate vyajyate' thavā. (1858)

In this context Kamalaśīla opines that some commentators think that consciousness is generated by the elements, while others opine that consciousness (which remains latent in the elements) is manifested (and not generated).[2]

The materialists state that when the four elements are combined into a single entity, it is called the body, the senses etc. Śāntarakṣita reminds his readers of the Bārhaspatya sūtra viz.

tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasaṁjñā in this context. Kamalaśīla clearly explains this point in his *Pañjikā* commentary.[3]

The author of the *Tattvasaṁgraha* adequately discusses the dehātmavāda of the Lokāyatikas with the help of the arguments of the two opposing groups.

The Vedantists and also the Jainas argue in favour of the existence of a permanent soul which transmigrates after death into another body. The Lokāyatikas, on the other hand, believe that the animate body which is their soul, ends in death, and nothing survives after this. The opponents argue on this view of the Lokāyata school and particularly the sūtra *'kāyādeva'* of Kambalāśvatara that consciousness remains as a potential force after the death of a person without a substratum. The Lokāyatikas reject this view on the ground that such a potential consciousness cannot exist.[4] Consciousnesss invariably remains in a body. A section of opponents argue that a new body comes

into existence immediately with the death of a person. But the materialists are not ready to accept such an imaginary body, because it has not been perceived by any person in this world.[5]

The Lokāyatikas firmly deny that the same consciousness continues in a new body. Consciousnesss refers to the cognition of objects for which the function of the sense-organs is essentially necessary. But in a foetal body (kalala) particularly in its early stage, the presence of consciousness is impossible even in a dormant form, because the sense organs are not fully developed in this immature foetal body. Again, if the same consciousness is supposed to linger in a different body, in that case, the consciousness of a horse and an elephant must be recoginsed as the same, which no sane person will accept.[6] The Cārvākas have said in a categorical manner in a sūtra (framed by Bṛhaspati) viz. *ihalokaparalokaśarīrayor bhinnatvāt tadgatayorapi cittayor naikaḥ santānaḥ (Sūtra 18)* that the same consciousness cannot exist in two different bodies– one related to the present world and the other pertaining to the world after death. In fact, the Cārvākas do not believe in *paraloka*. But they raise the question of *paraloka* only in a theoritical sense in order to reject it with appropriate arguments.

The place of anumāna in the Lokāyata Literature :

Śāntarakṣita covertly refers to the Bārhaspatyas or Lokāyatikas who refuse to recognise anumāna as a form of valid knowledge in the following passage :

na pramāṇam iti prāhur
anumānaṁ tu kecana
(Tattvasaṁgraha 1455)

Kamalaśīla appropriately explains the word *'kecana'*as *"Bārhaspatyādayaḥ"*[7] *(nanumānaṁ pramāṇam āhuḥ)*

There are two kinds of anumāṇa viz. *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna.* Kamalaśīla explains them appropriately in his

commentary.[8] Cārvāka rejects both of them as non-pramāṇas. Anumāna or inference is based on three imortant factors :

1. pakṣadharmatā,
2. sapakṣattva, and
3. vipakṣataḥ sarvato vyāvṛtti or vipakṣāsattva.

Let us explain the points clearly now. We sometimes see a column of smoke arising from a hill. It is due to our past experience elsewhere, we think that there cannot be smoke without fire and therefore, there is fire in the (yonder) hill. We draw this conclusion through inference.

Now, in order to draw a perfect conclusion through inference, one must depend upon the following factors.

The mark or the sign with the help of which we proceed to the conclusion is called linga or hetu in the Nyāya Philosophy. Smoke is the linga in the present case. It is present in the hill which is a case of pakṣa, while fire is a case of sādhya in the language of the Nyāya. The presence of the linga in the pakṣa is a must in the process of inference. This phenomenon is called pakṣadharmatā.

Linga must be present not only in the pakṣa but also similar other objects which are known to possess the sādhya (in the present case kitchen, anvil etc. where we always see smoke remaining associated with fire).

This is called sapakṣasattva in the Nyāya philosophy.

Lastly, the linga must not be present in any such thing where the sādhya does not exist (a lake or a pool in the present instance). This is described as vipakṣavyāvṛtti in Nayāyadarśana.

The above factors must be duly applicable to a case of anumāna without fail. The Cārvākas reject such inferential knowledge as similar with mithyājñāna or false knowledge.[9] These materialists describe 'vivakṣā' or the intention of the speaker as *'vacanāllingād vivakṣā pratīyate.*[10] In it, there is a covert reference to anumāna as a means of cognition,

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla criticise them for contradicting their own standpoint when they say *nāumānaṁ pramāṇam.*[11]

Now, the negative attitude shown by Cārvākas regarding inference deserves our attention. Inferential knowledge is not based on the same footing with, 'mithyājñāna or false knowledge. Inferential knowledge is valid knowledge like the results of perception. Śāntarakṣita asks the materialists :

trirūpālingapūrvatvam
nanu saṁvādilakṣaṇam
tallakṣaṇanca mānatvam
tat kiṁ tasmān niṣidhyate.[12]

Kamalaśīla comments upon this in the following manner :

"yatastrirūpaḷingatvaṁ yajjñānaṁ
tat pāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibaddham,
ato'visaṁvādakaṁ pratyakṣavat".[13]

He means to say that in anumāna the knowledge of a fact is derived indirectly through a particular process unlike in pratyakṣa. But that cannot be treated as a case of 'false knowledge'. The result attained in anumāna is as good as the result derived from pratyakṣa or perception. It is a fact that a mistake may occur in the observation of the man in the process of inference. Thus, sometimes a mass of vapour or fog may be wrongly thought as smoke, and sometimes a doubt may arise about the actual nature of the object. In such cases, the viewer will never achieve the correct result.[18] Upon this Śāntarakṣīta says that the linga or hetu is attained by the intelligent people through constant observation, like the gem-testers who acquire a perfect knowledge of the colour of gems through a similar method.[15]

Kamalaśīla says :

vivecayantyeva vāṣpādibhyo dhūmādīn
anabhyastatattat svalakṣaṇāḥ. tataḥ pravivecya
pravṛttaścaite prāpnuvantyeva vahnim.....
na hi dhūmāt suparinīścitāt anumitasya
vahneranyathābhāvaḥ śakyate kartum".[16]

There was a materialist philosopher Purandara who coolly replies to the question of anumāna. Millions of people all over the world always resort to anumāṇa or inference to gather the knowledge of many things which do not belong to the scope of pratyakṣa. Again, all the philosophical schools, except the Lokāyata declared anumāna as a valid pramāṇa for distinct reasons. Udayana says in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* that Cārvākas also must depend upon anumāṇa for practical purposes.[17] These are some of the reasons for which Purandara (probably 8th century A.D.) re-examines the theory on 'anumāna'.

Purandara's theory of anumāna :

It has been said in an earlier context that there is a general view that the Lokāyatikas do not recoginse 'anumāna' or inferece as a 'pramāṇa'. But scholars learn from the commentary of Kamalaśīla that some later materialists have accepted popular inference also as another means of knowledge. The Cārvākas by and large have rejected 'anumāna' as a means of knowledge for the reason that it is not free from fallacy. But Purandara, a materialist, says that *lokaprasiddha* or popular inference has been recognised by the Cārvākas (including himself) also. Kamalaśīla quotes the view of Purandara in the following passage of his *Pañjikā* :

Purandarastvāha–'lokaprasiddham anumānaṁ cārvākaira-pīṣyata eva, yattu kaiścidalaukikaṁ mārgamatikram-yānumānamucyate tanniṣiddhyate.[18]

The materialists since the time of Bṛhaspati had rigidly clung to the view that perception alone can give a correct knowledge of a matter. But in later times, the Cārvākas realised that some kind of anumāna is necesary for practical purposes. If a Cārvāka goes away to a distant place, he cannot perceive his wife and children from there. Does it mean that they do not exist? Certainly not. A materialist will certainly go to a shop for buying commodities. He will also attend his duty in a royal office. Now, because the market is at a distant place or the royal

office is a few miles away from his home, will he take it for granted that the market or the office is non-existent, because it is beyond his perception? It is for such reasons, the later materialists accepted 'anumāna' also as another pramāṇa. Moreover, anumāna is based on pratyakṣa. Therefore, there is less difficulty in recognising anumāna of a popular nature like *parvato vahnimān dhumāt.* But the materialists had a bitter enmity with religious preachers who inspired the innocent people to practise religion with an assurance that they would certainly derive meritorious results in this life or in the other world from religious activities. Materialists considered these preachings as false and meaningless. The results of religious activities as described by the propagators of religions are the subject of supra-sensory inference which is not acceptable to materialists.

Vādidevasūri, a Jaina philosopher quotes a sūtra from Purandara's materialist text in his *Syādvādaratnākara* which is as follows: *pramāṇasya gauṇatvād anumānād arthaniścaya-durlabhāt.*[19] It is clear from Vādideva's reference to the above sūtra that Purandara wrote his work in sūtra form. The passage quoted by Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* from Purandara's work is apparently a part of the commentary written on his sūtra text. Purandara apparently rejects supra-sensory inference (alaukika anumāna) in the above sūtra, which is essentialy necessary for establishing the existence of heaven or hell or other supermundane objects, and not popular inference (laukika anumāna) which is involved in such instances as *parvato vahnimān dhūmāt.* Guṇaratna has clearly distinguished between laukika anumāna and alaukika anumāna in his commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya.*[20]

The intended meaning of the above sūtra of Purandara can be easily understood from the following interpretation of the sūtra.

avyabhicārāvagamo hi laukikahetūnām
anumeyāvagame nimittaṁ sa nāsti tantrasiddheṣu

iti na tebhyaḥ parokṣārthāvagame nyāyyatā
idamuktam anūmānād arthalābhaniścayo durlabhaḥ.[21]

There is an appropriate logic when Purandara distinguishes between popular inference and supra-sensory inference, because in the case of popular inference the conclusion is drawn after a regular observation of a particular phenomenon over a long period, while in the case of suprasensory (*alaukika*) inference as involved in such cases as *yāgāt svargo bhavati,* there is no scope of examining the relationship of hetu and sādhya as it is beyond the scope of common observation.

Popular inference is less prone to fallacies, while suprasensory inference is not. Inference is an important means of gathering the knowledge of many scientific truths. But popular inference based upon perception like that which is involved in the case of fire being determined with the help of smoke cannot help us in learning some scientific truths. The 'black hole' and ultraviolet ray cannot be perceived by human beings. But they are realities. The knowledge of their existence is gathered through inference which depends upon some other important scientific data.

Śāntarakṣita's reply to the materialists :

Śāntarakṣita does not accept some basic views of the materialist school. Though as a Buddhist, he does not recognise a permanent, or a transmigrating soul, he also does not approve the view that nothing remains after death. It is a fact that in death, the physical body is totally destroyed. But according to Sāntarakṣita, vijñāna or conscious states are beginningless and endless facts. Consciousness is not produced by material element. A newly born baby feels the desire to suck his or her mother, and he or she is also afraid of certain situations (like the sudden appearance of a jackal). Similarly, some persons feel the sense of love, and compassion towards other persons spontaneously without being tutored by anybody to do so.

These are some of the proofs of the existence of a conscious state before birth which is responsible for a series of similar states in different births.[22]

Both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla critically examine the important view of the Lokāyata school and refute and reject them with the help of appropriate arguments. They argue that the cause and effect relationship of body and consciousness cannot be proved without giving rise to a fallacy. They say that if the last conscious state before death is not recognised, in that case, a conscious state in this very birth must be accepted. It must be eternal, or must be without cause, or must be caused by God or some other external agent, or by the atoms which are momentary in character according to the Cārvākas.[23] According to the two Buddhist philosophers, all these arguments are futile. If a thing is recognised as eternal and uncaused it is not correct. It is also not possible for the Cārvākas to prove the causal relationship between body and consciousness, because the presence and absence of consciousness alone cannot determine the cause and effect relationship between the two.[24]

Kamalaśīla proceeds against the body-soul theory of Bṛhaspati in a logical manner and refutes it with the help of his sound critical analysis.

He says that, if atoms are considered as the generators of consciousness in a body they may generate it either as single entities, or through a cumulative behaviour. In the first case, the results will vary. Now, if the second alternative is accepted, in that case, when a part of the body is crippled, no consciousness will arise, like sprout that does not emerge from a seed in the absence of earth, air or light.[25] Kamalaśīla further argues that when a man is born with a sound body, but later on becomes crippled does not lose his previous mental faculties. Again, an elephant which possesses a massive body will be more intelligent or mentally sound than a man who has a smaller body. Similarly, a little boy will be comparatively dull than an aged man,[26] because he has a smaller body. But this is not

correct. In fine, there is no cause and effect relationship between body and consiousness.

It may be argued, however, that the body which remains associated with senses generates consciousness. Kamalaśīla says that this is also not correct. Now, if the presence of one or all the senses in perfect order is necessary for producing consciousness, in that case even the malfunctioning or the total disorder of a single sense (indriya) will stop the process.[27] Thus, it can be safely said that the body is not the cause of consciousness. Some materialists argue that the sound body duly nourished through nutritious food and best exercises etc. increases one's desires, attachment and other mental faculties which decidedly proves their theory that there is a causal relationship between the body and its consciousness. Kamalaśīla says that the absence of such a phenomenon is also noticed in many cases. Therefore, the materialist theory is without any foundation.[28]

The conscious states are a continuous and unending series. According to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, paraloka is a merely a state in this series of conscious states and nothing else.[29] Śāntarkṣita says that though there are two distinct states of a person in two distinct and successive lives, the conscious state which existed at the time of his death generates the feelings or tendencies according to the man's prior habit. He weeps, cries, smiles or fears difficult situations to which he was fully accustomed in the previous birth.[30] Now, a question may be raised as : "Why does then he not remember the past events of the previous birth?" The question is quite logical. The materialists have said *"jātigrahaṇam asiddham; ekagrāmagatānāṁ sarveṣām smaraṇāt."*[31] It means that it is not possible for any man to remember his incidents of previous birth, because had he ever recollected these incidents, then all persons in the world would have recollected them without any discrimination like persons coming from the same village.

On this point, Śāntarakṣita says that it is due to the severe shock the person receives in the foetal state, he does not

remember his past life. But the pious persons who have never received such shock, can remember all past incidents of previous birth very clearly.[32]

Haribhadrasūri's treatment of the Lokāyata Philosophy :

Haribhadrasūri, a Jaina philosopher and the author of the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* devotes a chapter of his work on the treatment of Lokāyata philosophy. Haribhadra presents some well-known views only of the Lokāyata School. But Guṇaratna presents many new ideas in his commentary.

Haribhadra presents the basic views of the Lokāyata school in seven kārikās (Lokāyatamatam 80-87). He describes that according to the Lokāyata school there are only four elements viz. earth, air, water and light and only one means of knowledge viz. perception.[33] These points have been clearly discussed in preceding chapters. Haribhadra says that the Lokāyatikas describe the body which is composed of the inanimate material elements itself generates caitanya or consciousness like the intoxication of wine produced by rice, molasses etc.[34] preserved together. This is the famous bhūtacaitanya theory of Bṛhaspati with which scholars are already acquainted.

Haribhadra shows that the Cārvākas recognise kāma or material enjoyment as the sole aim of the human life. They do not believe in the existence of a permanent or eternal soul or the other world to which the soul is supposed to migrate after the death of a person by orthodox philosophers. They also do not recognise virtue or vice, the results of good or bad actions or the salvation of the soul (in the Vedantic sense). According to the Lokāyata materialists, *'etāvān eva lokoyaṁ yāvān indriyagocaraḥ"* (*Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya.* Kārikā 81).

Now, some women did not believe in the philosophy of their materialist husbands. These women had a deep faith in religious preachings. But their husbands regularly pleaded with them that virtues, vices, heaven and hell or the liberation of the soul are purely the creation of the religious preachers who

befool the simple people of the world who believe them as true. When the religious wives did not listen to these teachings of their husbands, one day a materialist woke up in the night, took his wife with him and created some artificial foot-prints of a wolf with his fingers. When it was morning, the village people observed these artificial foot-prints of an imginary wolf and the news of the wolf intruding into the city spread like wild fire. Thus, the materialist could convince his wife that the general public always believe in the religious preachings of hyprocritical preachers[35] without questioning or examining them.

Haribhadrasūri shows that the materialists lay an excessive emphasis on the enjoyments of the world. They provoke the women to enjoy life in the following manner :

piba khāda ca cārulocane
yadatītaṁ varagātri tanna te
na hi bhīru gataṁ nivartate
samudāyamātraṁ
idaṁ kalevaram.[36]

The materialists consider those persons who persue supermundane happiness as fools.[37] According to them *"dharmaḥ kāmāt paro na hi"*[38] or the enjoyment of worldly happiness is the only dharma in our life. Haribhadra and the commentator Guṇaratna are silent about the Bārhaspātya sūtra viz, *kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ.* But they adequately explain the materialist standpoint on the ultimate goal of life.

Guṇaratna :

Guṇaratna, the commentator on the *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* was a great philosopher. He explains the Lokāyata views presented by Haribhadra adequately. He also gives his own opinions on some materialist views under the *Jainamata* section also of Haribhadra's work. He gives two entirely different meanings of Lokāyata and Cārvāka from other writers.

Guṇaratna quotes the relevant sūtras of Bṛhaspati in his discussion.[39] Occasionally, the philosopher adds some new ideas to the traditional thoughts collected from later Cārvāka literature.[40]

Guṇaratna says that though the Lokāyatikas by and large recoginsed four bhūtas or elements, a section of Cārvākas in a later period have recognised ākāśa or space also as a fifth element. These materialists could not resist the idea of the Vedantists and the Naiyāyikas or the idea the general people for whom there is 'ākāśa' at least in a conventional sense. Even the modern scientists recognise the existence of space. It has been already said that Cārvākas generally do not recognise ākāśa because it is inferrable and not a subject of direct perception. According to the learned, commentator, Kāpālikas and some Brāhmaṇas and members of lower castes embraced the materialistic ideas in his age.

Guṇaratna gives his readers some new ideas about the Lokāyata philosophy and Cārvāka hedonism. He says that the materialists describe the individual self (jīva) as *"jalabudbudavajjīvāḥ."*[41] We have so long learnt that the Lokāyatikas recognise the conscious or animate body as the soul. But they could not resist the pressure of the common idea of the people that there is a *jīvātman* apart from the body. It is probably for this reason they had to offer a new sūtra in which the character of the material soul is described in a symbolical language. The author of the *Nyāyakumudacandra* explains the significance of the sūtra very clearly. He says that in an ocean and elsewhere, bubbles appear in the water due to physical factors which are natural and not the handiwork of any invisible agent. Similarly, the 'soul' which experiences pleasure and pain is nothing but an effect of the combination of the four elements in the body.[42] There is no proof of the existence of any eternal and independent soul apart from this.

The Jaina authors, however, do not accept the materialistic intepretation of the soul. Guṇaratna quotes two other rare sūtras of the Lokāyata teacher Bṛhaspati viz. *"madaśakti-vaccaitanyam"* and *"caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ."*[43] The first sūtra apppears in the *Prakaraṇapañjikā*[44] also while the second sūtra appears in two other works viz the *Śāṁkarabhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra* and Sadānandayati's *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*. Prabhācandra, another Jaina philosopher adequately explains the view laid down in the sūtra.[45]

The Cārvākas boldly argue that consciousness is invariably and exclusively noticed in a body. It remains in the body so long as the body exists, and disappears as soon as the body is destroyed. Thus, we can safely draw a conclusion that there is causal relationship between the body and its consciousness. It should not be assumed that consciousness is derived from a jīva or soul, because such a soul is non-existent like an imaginary lotus in the sky.[46]

Now, a question may be raised here as : "Why is then consciousness non-existent in a deadbody?" To this question, Cārvākas reply that the mere appearance of the body is not enough, unless it possesses all its constituents. Otherise, even the picture of a horse shall behave as a live horse. The dead body does not possess two basic constituents viz. air and light. Therefore, conciousness disappears from a dead body.[47]

It is clear from the arguments put forward above that the body itself generates consciousness. It is not derived from any conscious soul which is non-existent by all means. No body has ever perceived such a soul. Therefore, when we say "I am happy" or "I am lean", the word I (aham) refers to the conscious body and nothing else. The materialists sum up their view in the following way :

tataḥ siddhaṁ śarīrakāryameva caitanyam.
tataśca caitanyasahite śarīra eva
ahaṁ pratyopapattiḥ siddhā.[48]

The sūtra *madaśaktivaccaitanyam'* is the basis of the *bhūtacaitanya* theory of the Lokāyatikas which says that consciousness emerges from the combination of the elements themselves as their chemical effect.

Guṇaratna presents an elaborate account of the hedonistic life led by the Cārvākas in his time. They considered material enjoyment as the only goal of life. There were two distinct groups of Cārvākas viz. the dhūrta Cārvākas and the suśikṣita Cārvākas. The dhūrta Cārvakās were engaged in immoral behaviour and anarchy. Some of the Cārvākas who disobeyed social rules of permitted sex, probably belonged the Kāpālikas turned atheists as described by Guṇaratna.

Guṇaratna criticises the dehātaman theory :

Guṇaratna bitterly criticises the dehātmavāda or body-soul theory of the Cārvākas. He elaborately presents all the different views put forward by the materialists in support of their theory that there is no separate jīva or 'ātman' except the body which generates the consciousness mistaken by orthodox philosophers as an attribute of a permenent soul.

1. The Cārvākas deny the existence of a soul apart from the body. The existence of a soul cannot be proved with the help of any pramāṇa or means of cognition. The Cārvākas by and large recognise pratyakṣa or perception as the sole pramāṇa.

Therefore, they say :

> *pratyakṣaprameya ātmā, tataścavidyamāna eva*
> *prayogaścātra: nāstyātmā, atyantāpratyakṣatvāt*
> *yadatyantparokṣaṁ tannāsti, yathā khapuṣpam.*[49]

2. The materialists do not recognise anumāna as a means of knowledge. But even if anumāna is accepted as a theoritical measure, it cannot prove the existence of 'soul', because anumāna or inference is always based on pratyakṣa or perception. If nobody has ever perceived 'soul' its existence cannot be proved with the help of anumāna. If however, somebody argues for the sake of logic that he has perceived soul, then, anumāna becomes redundant.[50]

3. Naiyāyikas recogise upamāna or analogy as a kind of pramāṇa. One common example of upamāna is 'gauriva gavayaḥ' i.e. gavayas are animals which look like a cow. But in the case of 'soul', such an analogy is useless, because none has ever perceived soul in order to draw the analogy.[51]

4. The Vedantists and even Jainas and Bauddhas recognise āgama or holy scripture or, to speak more precisely, the statements made therein as an authority. But no 'āgama' has ever established the fact that anybody anywhere in the world at any time has perceived 'soul', Moreover, āgamas very often make contradictory statements. Therefore, āgamas cannot be treated as an authority.[52]

5. The Mīmāṁsakas recognise arthāpatti also as another valid means of knowledge. One common example of arthāpatti is *pīno Devadatto divā na bhuṅkte* i.e. Devadatta is fat, but he does not eat in daytime. Therefore, it can be deduced that he eats in the night for which he grows fat. It is impossible to apply such a method of deduction in the case of Ātman.[53]

Guṇaratna refutes the view of Bṛhaspati that the body itself generates consciousness. He says that the gross material body does not produce any effect in the form of consciousness. He shows that consciousness disappears from the body of a mad man, a man remaining in a state of coma or in sleep. In some cases a fat man sometimes loses much of his consciousness, while in many cases, a thin man possesses more consciousness than a fat man.[54]

1. Guṇaratna challenges the Cārvāka view that matter generates consciousness. He says that nobody has perceived this phenomenon anywhere. The Cārvākas do not recognise 'anumāna', Therefore, we must depend upon pratyakṣa alone in this context. As conciousness is abstract in character, nobdy can perceive the cause and effect relationship between matter and consciousness.[55]

2. It has been said by Bṛhaspati that consciousness is generated in a body in the same manner as the intoxication of wine generated by non-intoxicating agents. Upon this, Guṇaratna states that a body remains devoid of consciousness when it is dead in spite of the presence of the material elements in the them.[56]

The Cārvākas try to give a fitting reply to this argument. They say that consciousness is the cumulative effect of all the elements. But in a dead body, there is no light and air. Therefore, there is no consciousness. Guṇaratna says on this that even when a dead body is placed on a pyre, and enough air is pumped into it, it does not regain consciousness.[57] Therefore, the dehātman theory of Cārvākas is without any logical foundation.

Guṇaratna not only disproves the body-soul theory of the materialists, but also establishes with the help of appropriate logic the existence of jīva as an independent entity and the locus of different attributes.

3. Some Cārvākas, again, argue in the same manner as Kambalāśvatara that the body remains conscious when the vital airs prāṇa and apāna remain associated with it, but becomes dead in their total absence. Guṇaratna says upon that at the time of death, prāṇa blows more rapidly, but the body fast loses consciousness. On the other hand, a yogin holds his breath in the state of meditation; but he gains more consciousness in this state.[58]

4. Guṇaratna refutes the materialist idea that 'I am fat' or 'I am lean' refers to the body. He describes such expressions as purely secondary.[59]

According to the philosopher, ātman or jīva or soul is a subject of perception. In this world, whatever object possesses attributes is subject of perception. The soul posseses the specific attributes like memory, desire to know things, desire to act or move, and also consciousness (vijñāna). Therefore, like other objects possessing attributes, the 'soul' is also perceptible. However, such a perception is not physical, but it is purely mental.[60]

Guṇaratna says that the existence of soul can be established through inference also. He argues that the body functions in different ways. It possesses the desire to act according to the necessity. The body makes different physical efforts; the senses hear, see, smell and touch. In all such cases,

there is a live agent which inspires the body to behave in different ways in different circumstances. This live agent is the soul. One can easily infer the presence of a hidden active agent (jīva) in this case behind all physical operations. It is the prime mover of the body.[61]

The Jainas have been described as nāstikas for the reason that they do not recognise the authority of the Veda. But Guṇaratna's discussion on the essential attributes of the soul which clearly shows that his arguments in favour of the existence of a transmigratory soul is not different from the āstika view on the subject. Guṇaratna says that the soul transmigrates to another body after death. Unlike the 'soul' of the Cārvākas, it does not disappear along with the body; but occupies a new body after death. This is the reason for which babies desire to suck their mother from the day of their birth, which is a habit inherited by them from their previous life.[62]

Guṇaratna shows that Cārvākas were great enemies of religion. They expressed their anti-religious views in a few poems also. The poems are quoted below :

tapāṁsi yātanāścitrāḥ
saṁyamo bhogavañcanā
agnihotrādikaṁ karma
bālakarīḍeva lakṣyate
yāvajjīvaṁ sukaṁ jīvet
tāvad vaiṣayikaṁ sukham
bhasmībhūtasya dehasya
punarāgamanaṁ kutaḥ.[63]

It appears from Guṇaratna's work that Cārvākas in a later period of the development of the Bārhaspatya philosophy composed really excellent poems in support of the materialist philosophy. Some more poems of a similar nature are found in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* and the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi of* Sadānandayati. These poems will be critically examined in Ch. Vll of the present work.

The Lokāyata and the Kāpālikas :

Guṇaratna describes that some Brāhmaṇas and Kāpālikas of the Māheśvara school also embrace the Lokāyata philosophy. It is a fact that many Brāhmaṇas were followers of the Lokāyata system since the age of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. In the Ayodhyākāṇḍa of the Epic, Rāmacandra has advised his brother Bharata not follow the Lokāyata Brāhmaṇas in the following poem :

kaccinnalokāyatikān brāhamaṇān tāta sevase.[64] Guṇaratna furnishes an information for readers that the Kāpālikas also embraced the nāstika (Lokāyata) philosophy. He says : *kāpālikā bhasmoddhūlanaparā, brāhmaṇādyantyajāśca kecana nāstikamatam ādriyante.*[65]

It may be noted here that Śīlānka, the commentator on the *Sūtrakṛtāngasūtra* writes that many followers of the Sāṁkhya and the Bhāgavata religions first become initiated in their religion and after reading the Lokāyata system they become deeply involved in it and start a materialistic life. Then they wear blue garments.[66]

The Kāpālikas are one of the four dīfferent sects of the Māheśvara school as described by Śankarācārya. (*Brahmasūtra*, 2.2.37). According to the *Prabodha-candrodaya*[67] of Kṛṣṇamiśra and the *Vidyāpariṇaya*[68] of Ānandarāyamakhin, the Kāpālikas live a hedonistic life. However, they are not nāstikas probably in the same sense as the Cārvākas, because, as it has been discussed earlier, they hanker for attaining Sivahood after death.

Guṇaratna gives his readers an appropriate idea of the gross hedonistic life which was led by the Indian materialists in his age. It is learnt from Mādhava's *Sarvadarśan-asaṁgraha* that the Cārvākas always advocated physical enjoyment as the goal of the human life. According to them, one should drink ghee even by borrowing money.[69] Guṇaratna says that the Lokāyatikas enjoyed meat and wine. They copulated even with their mothers.[70] In a particular period of the year, they went out of their residence in a group and enjoyed women according to

their sweet will.[71] No other author has drawn such a grim picture of anarchy regarding the materialists. One important gain derived from Guṇaratna's work is that the commentator presents a vivid picture of Lokāyata's hedonistic philosophy from his personal experience.

Guṇaratna's reference to anumāna in the Lokāyata philosophy :

It has been already described that a section of Cārvākas in later times accepted *laukika anumāna* also as another means of valid knowledge. Guṇaratna, while discussing the views of Bṛhaspati casually refers to the Cārvākas of his age who accepted popular inference as another means of gathering knowledge in worldly life. He says :

viśeṣaḥ punaścārvākair lokanirvahaṇapravaṇaṁ dhūmādyanumānam iṣyate kvacana na punaḥ svargādṛṣṭādipra-sādhakam alaukikam anumānam.[72] It is clear from the above passage that the Cārvākas in Guṇaratna's time as in the age of Kamalaśīla fully realised the practical utility of anumāna. Of course, they did not recognise such cases of anumāna as *yāgāt svargo bhavati.*' This has been clearly discussed by Purandara in the passage quoted earlier.

Mallisena :

Mallisena quotes the relevant sūtra of Bṛhaspati regarding the validity of a single pramāṇa viz, *pratyakṣam evaikaṁ pramāṇam.*[73] Mallisena being a practical thinker fully realises that pratyakṣa or direct perception alone cannot give the idea of every object in the world, or a state of mind. Thus, when a man displays certain facial expressions, another man grasps his mind. When a man, for example, expresses joy on hearing the words of another person, the other person realises that the man is willing to hear him. This is a clear case of anumāna or inference and not of pratyakṣa.[74]

It may be noted in this context that Vācaspati Miśra has clearly stated that the inner state of a man such as his ignorance of an object, or his doubt about the real nature of an object cannot be learnt with the help of pratyakṣa. In such cases, anumāna is the only shelter.[75] Vācaspati Miśra describes in his *Bhāmatī* the Cārvākas as worse than animals, because animals also select their right food and the place of sleeping through anumāna while Cārvākas reject anumāna totally.[76]

Mallisena further argues that the standpoint of materialists that there is no paraloka as it is not directly perceived by anybody is wrong. Pratyakṣa or perception is related to the present affairs alone and not the past or the future. Thus, the existence of paraloka can be established through inference,[77] or āgama and not perception. Materialists by and large do not recognise inference. Therefore, they bluntly reject the idea of anumāna.

Again, Mallisena observes that all types of partyakṣa are not acceptable. Some kinds of partyakṣa, for example, the idea of the existence of water in a mirage is false. Therefore, we recognise only that pratyakṣa or perception which gives us a correct knowledge of a thing.[78]

Mallisena rejects some important views of the materialist school in an adequate manner. He says that pratyakṣa or perception must be related to reality to give us a correct knowledge of a thing. But to know whether the particular instance of pratyakṣa is related to the reality or not, one must depend upon anumāna or inference again. And why? Because, it is through inference only he can assert the validity of valid perception.[79] The point is explained more clearly below :

Sometimes, a mirage can create the impression of the existence of water in it. The impression is a result of perception. But the result so derived is wrong. Now, after a careful examination of the phenomenon, it is found that the mirage does not contain any water. Thus, in this case, initial perception does not give the viewer a correct idea of the essential character of the mirage, where inference alone is our shelter. Mallisena further argues that sometimes due to the diseased condition, many persons see two moons, which is a false knowledge. Therefore, perception alone cannot give a viewer the correct knowledge of a thing always, as it is imagined by the the Cārvākas.[80]

Now, because perception is not enough to give the universal idea of the existence or non-existence of an object some other pramāṇa is also necessary for people to gather the knowledge of certain things. Thus, for establishing the existence of paraloka or heaven and hell, and the soul or God, pratyakṣa or perception alone cannot be the shelter.[81] One can establish their reality through other pramāṇas only such as anumāna (inference).

Regarding *bhūtacaitanyavāda,* the philosopher refers to Rāmacandra's *Dravyālaṁkāra* where it has been stated that consciousness is not generated by matter. Had it been so, men could have discovered its existence in every material thing everywhere. Now, the Cārvākas argue that when matter assumes the form of a body (as is the case of the human body), it generates consciousness. The Cārvākas give the example of wine in this case. They say that consciousness is generated like the intoxication in wine as a cumulative effect of the combination of four distinct classes of matter.[82]

The author of the *Dravyālaṁkāra* argues that if it is so, in that case even in a deadbody the presence of consciousness could be felt. The materialists cannot argue that a dead body is different from a live body as it contains all the elements. Rāmacandra says that like a live body a dead body also possesses blood etc. But there is no consciousness in it.[83]

The Indian materialists offer new arguments in support of their contention. They say that a live person remains completely ignorant of what is happening in the world in sleep. Therefore, it can be agrued that consciousness is affected by the condition of the body.[84] Rāmacandra says that in sleep, man's consciousness is temporarily obstructed by torpor. But when he awakes, he remembers all previous incidents. He further argues that even a man with a sound body may be mentally disturbed.

Again, even a sick person may possess a sound mind. Thus, there is practically no causal relationship between the body and its consciousness.[85]

Prabhācandra :

Prabhācandra examines the Bārhaspatya sūtra *pratyakṣam evaikaṁ pramāṇam* which appears in an amended form in his work as *pratyakṣaṁ ekaṁ eva hi pramāṇam, aguṇatvāt pramāṇasya.*[86] Prabhācandra's contention is that the materialists recognise pratyakṣa alone as a form of valid knowledge, because it is not secondary or subordinate to other pramāṇas. There is some truth in the above observation. Direct perception needs no help from any secondary source for drawing a correct conclusion about a thing.

But it has been already discussed that perception cannot give a correct knowledge of a matter in all cases. A viewer of a mirage observes through perception that there is water in it. But the result of this perception is wrong. The earth looks flat, but it is scientifically proved that it is round like all other planets. Thus, in many affairs of worldly importance, perception alone cannot be the only flawless pramāṇa. It has been shown above that anumāna is essentially necessary in gathering many worldly truths.

Similarly, authoritative statements are also sometimes essential for us to learn a fact. Patañjali says in his *Mahābhāṣya* that the Greeks (Yavanāḥ) invaded Sāketa (Ayodhyā) in his time.[87] Both pratyakṣa and anumāna are useless in the present case to learn this historical fact. Prabhācandra refutes the sūtra of materialists given above adequately in his *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*. Prabhācandra says that pratyakṣa or perception is not always aguṇa or non-secondary, because sometimes it depends upon anumāna for giving a correct knowledge of thing.[88]

Vādideva :

Vādideva, a Jaina philosopher who wrote the *Syādvādaratnākara* quotes a sūtra of Purandara on anumāna which has been discussed above. He also gives an idea of the points on which Cārvākas have disputed the authority of anumāna as a pramāṇa.

According to him, these materialists consider anumāna or inference as indistinct (aspaṣṭatvāt); it is based upon perception for which it cannot be a valid pramāṇa. Inferences are sometimes contradicted. Again, there is no uniform rule that a liṅga will always give an idea of the sādhya,[89] in anumāna.

It is clear from Vādideva's discussion that the Cārvāka philosophers offered some important arguments in rejecting anumāna as a means of knowledge. They have made a forceful attempt to dismiss anumāna as a pramāṇa on several grounds considered by them as most scientific and irrefutable by their opponents. But in spite of this the Cārvāka position is not invulnerable.

These philosophers have laid an emphasis on 'vividness' in rejecting anumāna. They mean to say that unlike pratyakṣa which gives a knowledge of a thing due to the direct contact of the thing with the senses, anumāna gives the knowledge of a thing or a phenomenon only indirectly, and therefore, it does not possess the vividness of pratyakṣa. Hence, it cannot be accepted.

To this point, it can be replied that vividness is not a determining factor of a *pramāṇa*. Sometimes, even pratyakṣa does not give a correct knowledge. This point has been discussed in the previous context.

One strong argument of the Cārvāka materialists is that *anumāna* is based on pratyakṣa or perception, for which it cannot be a valid means of knowledge. But this argument is not correct. False inferences are always contradicted and refuted; but there are thousands of cases of right inferences, which must be accepted for practical reasons.

The materialists further argue that the invariable relationship between hetu and sādhya cannot be established as a universal phenomenon. There is some truth in it. Sometimes, a column of smoke may be drifted away by the wind, and it may accumulate in a nearby hillock. But it does not mean that there is fire in the hillock. It is for such reasons, the mental faculty of the observer to judge the phenomenon in a proper manner is essentially necessary.[90]

Hemacandra and the Cārvāka philosophy :

Hemacandra, the great Jaina philosopher who was a renowned grammarian, linguist, poet and poetician had an appropriate knowledge of the Cārvāka philosophy also. He explains the word Cārvāka as an irregular one like the words māvāka and śyāmāka in the uṇādi section of his grammar. He describes Cārvākas as *prakaṭanāstikas* in the following poem of his *Yogaśāstra :*

varaṁ varākaścārvāko
yosau prakaṭanāstikaḥ
vedoktitāpasacchadmā.
channaṁ rakṣo na jaiminiḥ. (2.38)

Hemacandra gives an appropriate idea of the hadonistic views of Indian materialists, for whom the human life is meant for the best material enjoyments and nothing else, in his epic the *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacarita.* According to him, the materialists propagate the *bhūtacaitanya* theory discussed in earlier contexts, and do not believe in the existence of paraloka and reject the concepts of dharma and adharma. They criticise the worship of stone images of gods and goddesses.[91]

References :

1. *tasmād bhūtaviśeṣebhyo*
   yathā suktasurādikam
   tebhya eva tathā jñānaṁ
   jāyate vyjyatethavā, Tattvasaṁgraha, 1958.
2. *tatra kecid vṛttikārā vyācakṣate :*
   utpadyate tebhyaścaitanyam anye
   abhivyajyate ityāhuḥ, Ibid, p. 633-634.
3. Ibid, p. 634.
4. *na cāpi śaktīrūpeṇa tadā*
   dhīravatiṣṭhate, Ibid, 1886.
5. Ibid, p. 636.
6. *yadi dehoparodṛṣṭah*
   kathamastīti gamyate
   bhinnadehapravṛttañca
   gajavājyādicittavat,
   Ibid, 1968.
   Vide also History of Indian philosophy, Part- III, p. 541.
7. Ibid, Part I, p. 520.
8. *anumānaṁ svārthāparārthabhedena dvividham*
   tat svārthaṁ yat trirūpāllingāt pakṣadharma-
   tvam, sapakṣe sattvaṁ, vipakṣācca sarvato vyāvṛttiḥ
   .....parārthaṁ tu yathoktatrirūpalingaprakāśavacanā-
   tmakaṁ draṣṭavyam,
   Ibid, Part -I, PP. 494-495.
9. Ibid, Part I, p. 520.
10. Ibid, Part I, p. 520.
11. Ibid, kārikā 1456.
12. Ibid, Part I, p. 523.
13. *na hi dhūmo vāṣpādirūpeṇa sandihyamāno*
    vahner niścāyako bhavati, I, pp. 525-526.
14. Ibid, Part I, p. 526.

15. Ibid, Part I, p. 526.
16. Ibid, Part I, p. 526.
17. Nyāyakusumāñjali : Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1957, p. 355.
18. Tattvasaṁgraha, Part I, p.526.
19. History of Indian Philosophy, Part III, P. 536n.
20. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 451.
21. History of Indian Philosophy, p. 536n.
22. Tattvasaṁgraha, 1938.
23. Ibid, Part II, p. 639.
    The relevant passage is quoted in Ch. I, Fn 49.
24. Ibid, Part II, p. 640.
25. Ibid, 1936.
    Vide, also :
    (a) *"paralokotra sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ sa ca kathaṁ sidhyati, yadi buddhir anādyanantā sidhyati asya evāvasthāviśeṣaḥ paralokaprajñapteḥ, na tu deha āropyadhātau, dehābhāvepi paralokābhyupagamāt"*
    Kamalaśīla, Ibid, Part II, p. 662.
    (b) *paraloka ityavasthā-bhedakstaṁ vyavasthāmātrameva, bālyayauvanādibhedavat,*
    Kamalaśīla, Ibid, Par II, p. 670.
26. Ibid, p. 642.
27. **Ibid,** p. 642.
28. **Ibid, p. 642.**
29. **Ibid, p. 637.**
30. **Ibid, p. 649.**
31. **Ibid, p. 665.**

32. *svalpīyānapi yeṣaṁ tu*
    nopaghāto mahātmanām
    śrūyante visphuṭā vācastesāṁ
    sā ca smṛtiḥ sphuṭā,
    Ibid, 1946.
33. *pṛthvī jalaṁ tathā tejo*
    vāyurbhūtacatuṣṭayam
    ādhāro bhūmiretesāṁ
    mānaṁ tvakṣajam eva hi,
    Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, kārikā 83.
34. Ibid, Kārikā 84.
35. *bhadre vṛkapadaṁ paśya*
    yadvadantyabahuśrutāḥ
    Ibid, Kārikā 81.
    Vide also Guṇaratna, Ibid, pp. 452-455.
36. Ibid, Kārikā 83.
37. Ibid, p. 451.
38. Ibid, Kārikā 86.
39. Ibid, p. 450.
40. Ibid, pp450-451.
41. Ibid, p. 451.
42. *yathaiva hi samudrādau niyāmakadṛstārthaka-padārthasāmarthyavaśād ....*
    prādurbhavanti tathā .... jīvaḥ, Ibid, p. 342.
43. Ibid, p. 451.
44. Prakaraṇapañjikā, p. 146.
45. Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, p. 117.
46. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 217.
47. Ibid, p. 224.
48. Ibid, p. 217.
49. Ibid, p. 217.
50. Ibid, pp. 218-219.

51. Ibid, p. 219.
52. Ibid, p. 219.
53. Ibid, p. 220.
54. *dṛśyate ca kesāṁcit kṛśatarāśarirāṇāmapi cetanāprakarṣaḥ, keṣāṁcit sthūladehānāmapi tadaprakarṣaḥ,* Ibid, p. 222.
55. Ibid, pp. 222-233.
56. Ibid, p. 223.
57. Ibid, p. 224.
58. Ibid, p. 224.
59. Ibid, p. 222.
60. Ibid, p. 226.
61. Ibid, p. 228.
62. Ibid, pp. 234-235.
63. Ibid, p. 453.
64. Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 100.34.
65. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 450.
66. Vide Sūtra-kṛtāngasūtra (N.S. press edition), pp. 280-281.
67. Act III.
68. Vidyāpariṇaya, Act IV.
69. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, p. 5.
70. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 451.
71. Ibid, p. 451.
72. Ibid, p. 457.
73. Syādvādamañjarī, p. 130.
74. Ibid, p. 131.
75. Sāṁkhyakārikā, pp.124-127.
76. Bhāmatī under Brahmasūtra, 3.3.54.
77. Syādvādamañjarī, p.132.

78. Ibid, p. 132.
79. Ibid, p. 132.
80. Ibid, p. 132.
81. Ibid, p. 132.
82. Ibid, p. 133.
83. Ibid, p. 133.
84. Ibid, p. 133.
85. Ibid, p. 133.
86. Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, p. 177.
87. Mahābhāṣya, 3.2.111.
88. Prameyakamālamārtaṇḍa, p. 177.
89. Syādvādaratnākara, pp. 131-132. (see History of Indian Philosophy, Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, part III, p. 537).
90. Ibid, pp. 131-132.
91. I. 230, 235-236.

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CHAPTER - V

MATERIALIST PHILOSOPHY IN ĀSTIKA SCHOOLS

Śankarācarya :

Śankarācārya, the renowned Vedantist, has critically examined some important views of the Lokāyata school in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra*. Śankara places the Lokāyatikas in the same category with the ordinary people who have no spiritual knowledge. While discussing their nature of 'ātman' Śankara says in his *Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya* :

> *"dehamātraṁ caitanyaviśiṣṭam ātmeti prākṛtā janā lokāyatikāśca pratipannāh".*[1]

The sub-commentator Govindānanda explains the meaning of 'prākṛtāh' as :

> *"śāstrajñānaśūnyāḥ prākṛtāḥ".*[2]

Śankarācārya examines an important view of the Lokāyata school laid down by Bṛhaspati in his sūtra viz. *"tebhyaścaitanyam".* According to the Lokāyatikas, the aggregate of the four elements which assumes the form of the body itself produces the consciousness of the body. There is no other object called 'soul' which is supposed to be a permanent entity by many others. This point has been discussed clearly in previous cotexts.

Śankarācārya shows that the Lokāyatikas rigidly stick to the view of Bṛhaspati that like the intoxication of wine which is produced by the innocent, non-intoxicating ingredients like water and molasses, consciouness is also generated in the body by the combination of the inanimate material elements which constitute the body *(madasáktivad vijñānam[3]).* They further

argue that consciousness remains in the body so long as a person is alive and disappears as soon as he is dead. This phenomenon clearly proves the causal relationship between matter and consciousness.[4]

Śankarācārya critically examines the theory propagated by the materialists best known in the philosophical tradition as *bhūtacaītanyavāda,* and rejects it as fallacious on different grounds.

(i) He says that the materialists lay emphasis on the fact that consiousness remains till the body remains alive, and disappears as soon as the body is dead. But this is not sufficient to prove the cause and effect relationship between matter and consciousness. According to Śankara, consciousness, memory etc. are the attributes or properties of the self which transmigrate to another body after death, while the material attributes like the form of a body continue even after death for a period.

(ii) The physical form is visible to other persons also. But consciousness etc. belonging to a person are never experienced by others.

(iii) Śankarācārya further says that physical properties like the form of the body are experienced by us through consciousness. If consciousness is also treated as a material property generated by the combination of elements, it will be wrong, because consciousness never experiences itself like the fire which never burns itself or the expert actor who cannot ride on his own shoulder though he is expert in his own art.[5]

However, the great Vedantist discusses some new Vedantic ideas in this context. The Lokāyatikas consider the conscious body itself as synonym of 'soul'. The body itself possesses the tendency to perform different actions. But Śankara says that it is the Supreme Person (Īśvara) who creates the tendency in a body which is insentient by itself. Now, a question arises in this context. The Supreme Person is 'akriya'. He does not perform anything, but remains a mere witness or observer. The Vedantist

philosopher says on this point that though the Supreme Person remains an observer, He like a piece of magnet that remains without motion, becomes the mover of the body by his very presence. Therefore, the body which is insentient by itself acts according to the wish of the prime mover.

Śankarācārya is said to be author of the *Sarvasiddhānta-saṁgraha* also, which is a philosophical work written in poetry. The first chapter of the work deals with the Lokāyata system. In this chapter, the author presents all the views of the Lokāyata school with which readers are already acquainted. The salient features of the the Lokāyata philosophy presented by Śankara in the form of poems are discussed below. It may be noted here that Śankara does not furnish any new philosophical data regarding the Lokāyata doctrine.

1. Śankara says that the Lokāyatikas recognise only four elements viz, earth, water, light and air.[7]

2. They recognise pratyakṣa as the only form of valid knowledge.[8]

3. The materialists do not accept the existence of adṛṣta or heaven or hell which people have never seen. They argue that nobody has seen the 'unseen'. It never exists like the horns of a hare.[9]

4. According to the Lokāyalikas, the pleasure arising from the enjoyment of women and fine garments and fragrant consmetics is the synonym of heaven while physical pains are another name of hell.[10]

5. Svabhāva or nature is the cause of the different phenomena in this universe, like the multi-coloured body of a peacock or the melodious song of a koel *(svabhāvavyatirekeṇa vidyate nātra kāraṇam.)*[11]

6. The body (made up of the four elements) which passes through different phases of evolution is the soul.[12]

7. Consciousness is generated by the combination of the four elements like the betel nut, leaves and lime producing the intoxicating effect in the body.[13]

8. There is no heaven or hell except this world. There are many people in this world who imagine the existence of Śivaloka or Viṣṇu's celestical abode. But these are merely some false concepts propagated by wicked persons.[14]

9. All religious and welfare activites of the generous people are meaningless in this world. The Lokāyatikas say that the gifts made to the needy, and religious temples, roadside gardens, the reservoirs of water and inns prepared by the magnanimous people with a pious motive are merely the sources of attraction for padestrians, having no religious effect.[15]

10. The materialists declare that the death of a person is itself his salvation.[16]

11. They advise the people to abandon the religious path. They tell the cammon people that by practising penaces or fasting on religious occasions they merely reduce the body but do not render any useful service to themselves.[17]

12. The Lokāyatikas declare religious activities as a means of earning livelihood.[18]

A critical examination of the views presented by the author of the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṁgraha* on the Lokāyata school shows that there is no new idea apart from what have been discussed earlier. The different sūtras of Bṛhaspati and the age-old preachings of the Cārvākas have been nicely blended in the poems. The Lokāyatikas have advised the people to earn money through their prescribed occupations and enjoy life fully.[19] According to Śankarācārya, the Lokāyatikas denounce the vow of chastity of women also as :

pātivratyādisaṁketo buddhimadbhir
durlabhaiḥ kṛtaḥ.[20]

The materialist philosophy in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* :

Mādhava gives his readers an appropriate idea of the materialist thoughts of the Cārvākas of his age in his

Saravdarśanasaṁgraha. He discusses the origin of the Cārvāka philosophy, its great popularity among the masses, and its basic views in the first chapter of his philosophical text.[21] According to this philosopher, Cārvāka recognises artha or material wealth and kāma (material enjoyment) as the goals of human life.[22] Cārvāka strongly supports the views of Bṛhaspati that there are only four material elements. When they assume the form of a body, they generate consciousness. But when the body is destroyed, consciousness disappears forever. There is no soul apart from the body. Cārvāka follows Bṛhaspati in a faithful manner, and says that perception alone is the form of valid knowledge.[23] Most of these views have been already discussed in the previous sections of this work.

Mādhava describes meterialists as practical people, who advise the people not to avoid hapiness because it remains associated with pain. In this context they argue that no wise man will throw away the best kind of rice because it remains blended with husk, or discard the best fish because it contains bones. The eater should remove the unwanted elements and enjoy the desirable portion.[24] The materialist philosophers scoff at religious ideas and practices as the means of livelihood of worthless people.[25]

The Cārvākas were practical people. They argued that no body should behave in a cowardly manner in this world. They should enjoy their life against all odds. They say that if some cultivator does not grow paddy in his field fearing that wild animals will eat it up, or a householder stops cooking due to the presence of beggars in his house, he is a coward and a fool.

The Lokāyatikas were always the strongest opponents of the religious order. We have already given some idea of the anti-religious views of the followers of Bṛhaspati in previous contexts. Now, it can be argued that happiness may not be always mundane, but even some pious persons may enjoy them even in heaven after death. Therefore, religious scriptures and preachers have propagated religious ideas for the benifit of the

people in the other world. To this question, the Cārvākas reply that there is no existence of such happiness.

They argue in this case in a strong manner in support of their view. They say that the very idea of the existence of any supermundane happiness in a *paraloka* is full of fallacies on the following ground. The section of Action in the Veda denounces the section of Knowledge (the Upaniṣads), and vice-versa. And thus, there is no valid reason to recognise paraloka. Cārvākas say that the believers in *karmakāṇḍa* refute the authority of the *jñānakāṇḍa,* and the advocates of *jñānakāṇḍa* refute the authority of the *karmakāṇḍa.* Therefore, Cārvākas suspect that religion is merely a means of earning livelihood of a section of wicked people and nothing else.

In fact, the Vedantists do not reject the idea of paraloka or the result of meritorious activities like Vedic sacrifices. But they opine that such results are not permanent. Mādhava quotes a poem from the Lokāyata literature viz.

Agnihotraṁ trayo vedās
tridaṇḍaṁ bhasmaguṇṭhanam
buddhipauruṣahīnānāṁ
jīviketi Bṛhaspatiḥ.[28]

to preach the 'truth' that religion is a practical means of earning bread of a class of cunning Brāhmaṇas. This is a famous poem of the Cārvāka school which is available in different versions in different works.[29] According to this poem, the religious practices like the Agnihotra sacrifice, the study of the three Vedas, the holding of the three-armed staff (which is a symbol of the controlling of speech, mind and body), and the smearing of the body with ashes are some means of earning livelihood of a section of people who are without any intellect and power.

Now, the Agnihotra sacrifice is performed with cow's milk. Some householders perform it every day. The word 'Agnihotra' used in the above poem represents all Vedic sacrifices. That the Cārvākas were opposed to all Vedic sacrifices can be clearly understood from the scathing criticism

levelled by Indian materialists against the Vājapeya yāga in the *Naiṣadhacarita*. It has been said in this Māhākāvya that priests advise the yajamāna to tie some elephants in trees, and when the yāga is over, the priests take away the elephants. Thus, it is a glaring example of Vedic priests exploiting their devotees. The 'tridaṇḍa' is held by saints of different sects. Many Vedantists are associated with this practice. The rubbing of the body with ashes is a regular religious rule of the Śaivas. The materialists think that these are some means of deceiving the lay followers by a section of worthless people, who earn their livelihood with the help of them.

Mādhava presents some imortant philosophical views of the Cārvāka school in the following passage :

"kanṭakādijanyaṁ duḥkhameva narakam.
lokasiddho rājā parameśvaraḥ dehocchedo mokṣaḥ."[30]

According to the above passage, the physical pain generated by bodily wounds is the synonym of hell. The concept of hell has emerged from the wise thinking of Indian seers who belived that every anti-social and non-believer is bound to reap the reward of his action in hell. But Mādhava quotes a passage from the Lokāyata literature to show that the Cārvākas do not believe in the existence of paraloka[31]. It has been clearly stated by Guṇaratna that the Lokāyatikas scoff at the idea of vices and virtues and *paraloka* in the following manner :

yat pare jīvam punyapāpe tatphalaṁ
svarganarakādikaṁ ca prāhuh, tan nāsti
apratyakṣatvāt ....
yāvātā parikalpyamānaḥ paralokayāyī jīvaḥ
pratyakṣeṇa nānubhūyate, tavatā
jīvasya sukhaduḥkhanibandhanau dharmādharmau
tatprakṛṣṭaphalabhogabhumī svarganarakau
ākāśe vicitracitraviracanam iva
kasya na nāma hāsyāvahāni.[32]

Both Mādhava and Guṇaratna have rendered a very valuable service to the readers by presenting the anti-religious views of the Cārvākas in a clear and appropriate manner. They were conversant with the relevant poems of the materialists denouncing religion. The author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* describes that the king of the country is parameśvara or the supreme Lord (God) of he universe according to the Cārvāka philosophy. He quotes a poetical passage from the Cārvāka literature in this context viz.

lokasiddho bhaved rājā
pareśo nāparaḥ smṛtaḥ.[33]

It is clear from above śloka that the Cārvāka materialists were not opposed to the monarch or the monarchical system. The theory viz. *dehocchedo mokṣah* reminds us of the Bārhaspatya sūtra viz. *maraṇamevāpavargaḥ*.

Accoding to the Cārvākas the expression 'I am fat' and 'I am lean' refer to the body and not the soul. They argue that use like 'my body' is merely a secodary use like Rāhu's head.[34] The point deserves a critical examination. The Cārvākas advocate the dehātaman theory of Bṛhaspati. Therefore, when the Vedantists argue that 'ahaṁ' or 'I' refers to the individual self, it becomes unpalatable for Cārvākas. Therefore, they try to prove the correctness of their theory by referring to expressions like 'ahaṁ sthūlaḥ' (I am fat) and 'ahaṁ' kṛśaḥ (I am thin) which naturally refer to the body. The soul cannot be fat or thin as it is never perceived. But sometimes speakers use another significant expression, that is, 'this is my body'. In this case, there is a clear distinction between the body and its master (the soul of the Vedānta philosophy). The Cārvākas argue that 'mama śarīram' or 'my body' is merely a secondary use like the 'head of Rāhu'. According to Indian mythology Rāhu which is not a planet possesses only the head, but people use the expression *'Rahoḥ śiraḥ'* in a secondary sense. Similar is the case of the expression *'mama śarīram'* according to the Cārvākas who recognise the conscious body as a synonym of 'soul'.

Mādhava, after examining the basic views of the Cārvāka school which remain scattered over a wide range of literature, summarises them in following poems :

anganālinganājjanyasukhameva
pumarthatā
kanṭakādivyathājanyaṁ
duḥkhaṁ niraya ucyate
lokasiddho bhaved rājā
pareśo nāparaḥ smṛtaḥ
dehasya nāśo muktistu
na jñānānmuktiriṣyate
atra catvāri bhūtāni
bhūmivāryanalānilāḥ
caturbhyaḥ khalu bhūtebhyaś
caitanyamupajāyate
kiṇvādibhyaḥ sametebhyo
dravyebhyo madaśaktivat
ahaṁ sthūla kṛśosmīti
sāmānādhikaraṇyataḥ
dehaḥ sthaulyādiyogācca
sa evātmā na cāparaḥ.[35]

Mādhava examines the Cārvāka theory of knowledge :

The Cārvākas recongise 'pratyakṣa' or perception alone as the only form of valid knowledge. The reason for this is that whatever is perceived is beyond our doubt. But what is inferred cannot be stated as correct or valid for distinct reasons. So is the case of other pramāṇas. Mādhava discusses the Cārvāka theory of knowledge most elaborately in his *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha.*

We have repeatedly stated that the Cārvākas by and large do not recognise anumāna or inference as a means of valid knowledge. But why? Anumāna is essentially necessary to prove the existence of fire in a hill, for instance, from a distance on noticing the constant emergence of smoke from the hill.

On this point, the Cārvākas argue that anumāna in order to rise to the position of a valid means of knowledge must be free from all fallacies.

Now, when a person sees smoke in a kitchen he approaches it and finds that it is associated with fire. Therefore, when he notices the same or similar cases elsewhere also, then he draws the conclusion on the basis of his experience that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, This is a case of anumāna. But it is not possible for a person to examine all such cases of association of fire and smoke in the past and also future. Therefore, the relation of concomittance cannot be treated as universal in this case.

Similarly, anumāna or śabdapramāṇa also cannot help us in establishing a universal concomittance in the present case. According to the followers of Kaṇāda śabdapramāṇa is included in anumāna itself. Now, if this pramāṇa is not accepted by us in that case, we can choose the authoritative statements of ancient seers (vṛddhavyavahāra) for our purpose. But it will be equally fallacious like the statements of Manu which cannot be accepted as true. The position of upamāna is also the same. Thus, anumāna, upamāna etc. cannot be treated as valid pramāṇas.[36] Mādhava is silent on Purandara's view. He quotes the view of orthodox Cārvākas in the following passage :

dhūmādvijñānānantaram agnyādivijñānapravṛttiḥ
pratyakṣamūlatayā bhrāntyā vā yujyate.[37]

Now, a question may be raised regarding Cārvāka atheism as :

"If there is no svarga or naraka or any invisible object in the universe, there is no invisible agent also like God. If so, how does the universe function at all without such an agent? To this question Cārvākas reply that it is svabhāva or Nature which is at the root of everything which emerges to our view in the form of creation".[38]

Cārvākas and religion :

Mādhava presents a number of poems from the Cārvāka literature. One such poem is

na svargo nāpavargo vā
naivātmā pāralaukikaḥ.[39]

according to which there is neither heaven, nor salvation or a soul which transmigrates to the (non-existent) paraloka. The poem reminds us of the Bārhaspatya sūtra viz.

paralokinobhāvāt paralokābhāvaḥ.

The Cārvākas ridicule Vedic sacrifices. They describe the Vedas as the creation of the hypocrites, the knave and the Rākṣasas.

They say :

trayo vedasya kartāro
bhaṇḍadhūrtaniśācarāḥ.

It may be noted here that Mādhava describes the above poems and also those which will be discussed below as the part of poetical writings of Bṛhaspati himself.[14] But it is highly doubtful that Bṛhaspati at all composed these poems. There are references to Bṛhaspati's sūtras in different philosophical works, but nowhere the authors ever refer to these poems of Bṛhaspati. The poems were probably current in the society through verbal transmission in the name of Bṛhaspati.

It has been already discussed that Jāvāli denounces the śrāddha ceremony as a meaningless wastage of money and materials. The other Indian materialists also declare in the same manner the performance of the śrāddha ceremony for the dead as a futile excercise. The say :

mṛtānāmapi jantūnāṁ
śrāddhaṁ cet tṛptikāraṇam
nirvāṇasya pradīpasya.
snehaḥ saṁvardhayeccikhām.[42]

It means that if srāddha performed for a dead man can give satisfaction to him though he is dead, in that case oil poured into a light which is extinguished will reburn. But this is impossible.

Now, there is a highly controversial poem in Mādhava's collection, in which the Vedic mantras have been described as nonsensical utterances. The Cārvāka materialists refer to the Vedic mantra viz.

sṛṇyeva jarbharī turpharī tu etc. (Ṛgveda 10.106.6)[43] in this context.

The Cārvākas point out to the mantra as a glaring case of a nonsense utterance where not a single word is word in the true sense of the term. Sāyaṇa refers to similar other mantras like *amyak sā te ṛṣṭirindra* in his Introduction to the *Ṛgveda*[44] which have been rejected by the Cārvākas as meaningless ślokas. This is the reason for which Cārvāka Lokāyatikas describe the *Ṛgveda* as a creation of hypocrites.

It may be noted here that Sāyaṇa explains this Vedic verse in an easily intelligible manner. According to him, the verse has been dedicated to the Aśvins.[45] Yāska and Sāyaṇa interprete the adjectives jarbharī and turpharī most adequately. Yāska explains the words as 'jarbharī bhartarāvityarthaḥ, and turpharī tu hantārau' *(Nirukta)*, 13.5). Sāyaṇa explains them as *'jarbharī bhartārau ekatraivāvasthāpakau tathā turpharī tu tarphitārau śatrūṇāṁ hantārau (Ṛgvedabhāṣya,* 10.106.6).

There is an obscence ceremonial in the Aśvamedha section of the *White Yajurveda.*[46] The Cārvākas seize the opprtunity to criticise the *Yajurveda* as a creation of *dhūrtas* for this particular reason.

The Vedas prescribe animal sacrifices. Different kinds of birds and beasts are sacrificed at the altar of deities in the Vedic sacrifices. Thus, the readers of the *Śuklayajurveda* (chapter 24) find that different varieties of domestic and jungle birds, and other animals including the the porpoise, lions, the snakes, the frogs and peacocks and fowls were offered to gods and goddesses in the Vedic animal sacrifice.

Now, the Cārvākas think that these animals were sacrificed in order to legalise meat-eating by the Śrotriyas in a covert manner. Bacause, demons are fond of meat, the Cārvākas argue that surely the demons created the *Yajurveda* in their own

interest. The view of these materialists, is, however, not based on a sound logical foundation. Many of the animals mentioned above like the lion and the porpoise are not consumed by human beings and particularly the Śrotriyas. On the other hand, the Cārvākas themselves were the worst meat-eaters. It has been said in a poem of the Cārvākas :

bhojanaṁ māṁsarahitaṁ
śayanaṁ sundarīm vinā
pādacāreṇa gamanaṁ narakaṁ
kim ataḥparam.[47]

Hemacandra describes Cārvākas as prakaṭanāstikas for the reason that they favour meat-eating openly.

According to Mādhava, Bṛhaspati gives several poems, some of which are already quoted by us. We shall discuss the remaining poems in chapter-VI of this book.

Mādhava renders a useful service to the academic circle by quoting a cluster of eleven poems from the Lokāyata text of Bṛhaspati apart from some other poems the authorship of which is not clearly mentioned by him, in the first chapter of his *Sārvadarśanasaṁgraha.*[48] The eleven poems truly reflect the anti-religious views of the founder of the Lokāyata system.

In the third poem, Indian materialists criticise animal sacrifices not out of compassion for animals, but out of hatred for the priests. Animal sacrifice was not a part of the Vedic religion alone, but it was a regular religious feature of many other countries. In ancient Greece a goat (tragos) was sacrificed at the altar of gods which was a painful sight for many viewers. The word tragedy emerged in English literature from this 'sad' affair. Animal sacrifice is not heartily accepted by many religious worshippers in India. The Indian religon has passed through different phases of reform as a result of rethinking of religious preachers on old religious preachings, and now, no animal is sacrificed in Vedic or Puranic worships. The only exception is noticed in the Tantric religion.

Materialists have criticised the śrāddha ceremony as a futile activity since the age of the *Rāmāyaṇa.* But śrāddha is a solemn religious ceremony where the dead relatives are remembered with honour. It is a fact that nobody has perceived the dead persons enjoying the religious offerings in Śrāddha in a human form, or in other forms in another world. But it must be remembered that religion is religion. It rests on belief–belief in the unseen. Everything in the world cannot be experienced with the help of perception. In many cases we have to depend on supra-sensory powers of the seers which connot be dismissed as false. Apart from this debatable view, the Śrāddha ceremony has another important aspect. The piṇḍa offered to the dead is thrown to the water for the benifit of aquatic creatures, or given to the cows. This is a great benificial service to the animal kingdom.

In the poem viz *svargasthitā yadā tṛptiṁ gaccheyuḥ etc.* in the cluster of eleven poems mentioned above, there is a sarcastic remark about gift-making in honour of dead persons during the śrāddha ceremony. But gift-making is always a great benificial act, which nobody should condemn or criticise. Of course, the recepient of the gift must be a worthy man.

Sāyaṇa : Sāyaṇa discusses some important views of the Lokāyata school where the authority of many Vedic mantras have been challenged by the materialists.[49]

Udayanācārya : Uayanācārya, the famous Naiyāyika gives some important views of the Lokāyata school in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and *Kiraṇāvali.*

In the introduction to the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Udayana describes the concept God in different philosophical schools. According to him, the Lokāyatikas consider God as *lokavyāvahārasiddha.*[50] The commentator Varadārāja explains the term *'lokavyavahārasiddha'* adequately. According to him, the Lokāyatikas do not believe in an invisible, eternal God who is the paramount Lord of the universe. They opine that if there is a God at all, he is either the king of the country or the image

of a deity.[51] The king is the sole authority in the country. He is, however, a visible, mortal being. The Lokāyatikas believe only in the existence of visible objects and nothing invisible.

The commentator Nārāyaṇa Miśra also explains the term *lokavyavahārasiddha* in a similar manner. He says :

"lokavyavahārasiddhaḥ=rājādiḥ pratyakṣaḥ, caturbujādyupetā pratimaiva vā pratyakṣātiriktasya pramāṇasyābhāvāt."[52]

Udayana examines the "dehātman" theory of the Cārvākas who do not believe in paraloka. They reject paraloka in the following manner :

nānyaddṛṣtaṁ smarantyanyo
naikaṁ bhutaṁ apakramāt
vāsanasaṁkramo nāsti
na ca gatyantaraṁ sthire (1.15)

The cryptic but significant statement has been adequately explained by the commentators. The Cārvākaś do not believe in the existence of an immortal, transmigratory soul on the ground that a newly born person never remembers the incidents of his past life for the simple reason that a soul does not transmigrate to the new body. Udayana argues that the human body is changing all the time. The body of a little child does not linger after a certain period. The little boy, the young lad and the old man do not possess a single body. Therefore, the thing which has been experienced by a child should not be remembered by him when he grows young or old due to the changing character of the body. But in reality it is not so. Therefore, the theory that body generates consciousness is wrong.

Udayana says that some materialist thinkers may argue that the upādāna or the constituents of an object themselves transmit their attributes to the effect. In that case, in spite of the everchanging character of the body, the body may derive consciousness or memory from its cause. The philosopher argues that if this view is accepted as true, in that case, when

a hand which is the upādāna or a constituent of a body is severed (in a battle) the body separated from the hand will not remember the past experiences of the hand.[53] But in reality it is not so.

Now, the opponents of Udayana raise a new and strong point. They argue that the atoms which constitute the body remain in fact in the body. It is the consciousness which is inherently possessed by the atoms is inherited by the material body. Udayana adequately replies to this point also. He says that the consciousness of the atoms is not experienced by the senses like the form of the atoms. So, the argument bears no logic.

Udayanācārya explains the view expressed by Praśastapāda on the dehātmavāda of the Cārvākas most adequately in his *Kiraṇāvali.* Praśastapāda does not state in categorical terms when he examines the dehātmavāda that he actually discusses a well-known Cārvāka standpoint on the concept of the origin of caitanya.

Praśastapāda rejects the dehātman theory on the following grounds :

na śarīrasya caitanyaṁ
ghaṭādivad bhūtakāryatvān,
mṛte ca sambhavāt.[54]

Udayana explains the above view most appropriately. He says that the body is not the locus or storehouse of consciousness. If consciousness is recognised as an inherent attribute of the body, in that case, it should remain even in a dead body like the form of the body which remains inherently present in it even after death till it is totally disintegrated. All material objects derive their material attributes from their basic elements. These attributes remain present in the effect of the elements till the end.

It is also worthnoting in this context that consciousness is conspicuously absent from the material elements, and therefore, it is difficult to assume that it is generated by matter in the

body.[55] Praśastapāda examines the soul theory of later Cārvākas in a critical manner.

Praśastapāda says that even the indriyas are not the soul as it is thought to be by a section of materialists. Sadānandayati discusses this view of later materialists in his *Advaitabrahma-siddhi*.

Praśastapāda rejects the view on practical grounds. He says that (for example) if the eyes become blind a man remembers his past experience. Thus, the soul has its independent identity from the senses. He suggests that the soul is the ultimate source of all experience and not the senses.

The soul is also not a synonym of the mind. According to Praśastapāda and Udayana the mind differs from other indriyas only in name.[56]

The body-soul theory has been discarded even in the *Kārikāvali* of *Viśvanātha* where it has been said– "*śarīrasya na caitanyaṁ, mṛte tu vyabhicārataḥ*."[57]

The theory was propounded by the materialists, and the Naiyāyikas have firmly challenged the theory.

Praśastapāda's Conclusion :

Praśastapāda shows that 'ātman' or the soul has its own separate and independent existence. He describes the 'ātman' as one who controls the body. He also describes it in different ways as the controller of the mind like the body. His views are based on the traditional concept of the 'ātman' found in orthodox philosophical systems.[58]

Jayantabhaṭṭa refutes Cārvāka views :

Jayantabhaṭṭa, the author of the *Nyāyamañjarī* presents some important philosophical views of the Cārvāka school and refutes them with the help of adequate logic.

It has been discussed above that the Cārvākas believe in the *dehātmavāda*. Jayantabhaṭṭa says that *dehātmavāda* was propagated by the Suśikṣita (Educated) Cārvākas. According to these educated materialists, the so-called soul remains till the

body remains alive; but after the death of a person, it is totally destroyed. They argue that if the soul had lingered even beyond death, in that case it would have remembered all the activities of the past life. It has been said in an earlier context that the Bauddhas and the Jainas have rejected this view.

The Cārvākas argue that a dead body which is burnt down cannot come back in any form to the world. They ask the question :

bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya
punarāgamanaṁ kutaḥ? [59]

Like other opponents of the view, Jayantabhaṭṭa also offers an adequate reply to the Cārvākas.

Jayanta says that the soul is not like other material objects (such as a jar) which can be destroyed. The material objects which have different parts are destroyed. For example, when a cloth is torn into pieces, the fibres go out of it and the cloth is reduced to small invisible particles. Then the cloth is said to be destroyed. The gradual destruction and disappearance of the cloth or a jar is noticed by all. But the soul is not a visible object the destruction of which can be declared. Jayantabhaṭṭa states in categorical terms that the soul is not like the body which is burnt down or a lump of flesh which is torn into pieces by birds. Nobody has ever seen the destruction of the soul. The soul is ever-existing. It is a permanent being.[60]

Regarding the transmigration of the soul, which is refuted by the Cārvākas, it has been said by Jayanta that transmigration is not a popular phenomenon in the case of the ātman. The soul is all-pervasive. Therefore, it exists in every body at all times equally. This is the reason for which even when a man goes to Vārāṇasī, he feels desires for worldly or unworldly things and remembers past incidents as before.[61]

As regards the *bhūtacaitanyavāda* of the Cārvākas, Jayanta says that the *bhūtacaitanya* theory is without any logical foundation. The Cārvākas argue that caitanya or consciousness is inherently related to the body. When a person is fed with

healthgiving food, it positively works upon his consciouseness. Thus, when a boy is given Brāhmī ghee and such other substantial foods, he becomes intelligent and sharp. Again, during the rainy season, worms grow up quickly in a pot of curd from inanimate curd itself. All this is suggestive of the fact that consciusness is an attribute of the body (and not of the soul).[62]

To this point, Jayanta replies that caitanya is related to the knowing of an object. It is with the help of caitanya, a person perceives or knows something. It has nothing to do with Brāhmī ghee or such other substantial food. The consciousness of the self is present everywhere. Sometimes, it generates worms and other living organs in curd or other things when they are polluted due to different factors.★[63]

Jayantabhaṭṭa firmly adheres to the age-old view that the soul is eternal, all-pervasive and conscious. It is the consciousness of the soul which remains in the body till one's death. Like the Bauddha and Jaina philosophers Jayantabhaṭṭa also says that a baby expressess its joy and sorrow, and desires to suck its mother without being tutored by anybody. His behaviour in the present case is guided by the recollection of his similar behaviour in pervious births. Jayanta explains his point more clearly in the following sentence :

> *"sarāgā eva jantavo jāyante na khalu loke*
> *kaścana tādṛśo dṛāśyate prāṇī yo jāto*
> *vītarāgaśca. sa eṣa sarāgo jāyamānaḥ,*
> *pūrvopacitaṁ rāgādivāsanām anusaratīti*
> *siddho janmāntarasaṁbandhaḥ.*[64]

The materialist philosophy in the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* :

Sadānandayati discusses many important views of the Lokāyata school in his *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*. An important contribution of Sadānanda to the study of the Lokāyata system

★ Worms grow out of the eggs laid by certain insects in curd. The phenomeon has no relation with the Cārvāka theory.

is that he quotes a few sūtras of Bṛhaspati in his work, and presents some new ideas of the materialists on 'soul'. The sūtras quoted by Sadānanda from the Lokāyata literature are—

(i) *caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ,*
(ii) *kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ,* and
(iii) *maraṇam evāpavargaḥ.* [65]

The first sūtra appears in the works of Śankarācārya and Guṇaratna also. But unlike Sadānanda these two authors do not mention the authorship of the sūtra. All the three sūtras quoted above have been adequately discussed in previous contexts. The opponents of the Indian materialists have clearly discussed the view of the Lokāyata school that there is no immortal soul to survive after death. But none else has referred to the specific sūtra of Bṛhaspati describing death as the salvation of man.

The materialist philosohers recognise only four elements and not 'ākāśa', and pratyakṣa is the only pramāṇa according to their philosophy. Sadānanda says that they do not believe in God or paraloka. We are already conversant with these views of the Indian materialists. According to Sadānanda these materialists describe that childhood, youth, old age etc, and the caste-division and religious ceremonies like cūḍākaraṇa are purely related to the body, and have no connection whatsoever with the soul. Even when an elderly person or a Brāhmaṇa blesses a junior person as 'śataṁ jīva' it refers to the body.[66]

Now, a question may be raised as follows: "If consciousness is generated by matter, why does then an earthen pot not behave as an animate being?" To this the Lokāyatikas reply that an earthen pot contains only a single element, that is, earth, while an animate being contains all the four elements together.[67]

Sadānanda describes the *bhūtacaitanya* theory of materialists with the help of a new similie in stead of the old similie of wine. He says that according the Lokāyata philosophy the elements combined together generate consciousness like betel nut, leaf and lime pasted together

producing the red colour.[68] Sadānanda quotes several poems from unnamed Lokāyata sources to present the above views of the Lokāyata School.

The author of the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* gives his readers some additional knowledge of the concept of 'soul' of the later materialists. Most philosophers have discussed that the materialists stick to the theory of Bṛhaspati viz. *caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ*, that is, the conscious body is the soul. But this theory could not satisfy the later Lokāyata thinkers who were compelled to review the old theory for many distinct reasons. There were three distinct schools of thinkers who have given some new ideas about the essential character of the soul.

(i) The members of the first school observed that Bṛhaspati's theory was not applicable to a dead body, which totally loses consciousness, in spite of the material combination remaining the same. They have described the senses which remain active till the death of a person as the soul (*maraṇaparyantaṁ yāvantīndriyāṇi tiṣṭhanti tānyevātmā).*[69]

(ii) The second school opines that sometimes even when the indriyas do not function, the mind remains active. Therefore, the mind is 'ātman.'[70]

(iii) According to the thinkers of the third school, the yogins withdraw the mind from all objects in the state of trance; but prāṇa or the vital wind functions regularly in this state also. Therefore, prāṇa itself is the soul.[71]

The members of these three philosophical schools realised that the soul is a subtle object and certainly subtler than the body.

Sadānanda describes the gross hedonism of Lokāyata materialists most appropriately. He says that the Lokāyatikas live a sensuous life, and abhor all worldly pains. Sadānanda refers to the anti-Vedic and anti-religious views of Cārvākas in the following passage of his *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* :

vedasya prajñāpauruṣahīnān prati jīvikāmātraviṣayatvāt taduktam :

agnihotrañca pītañca
tripuṇḍraṁ bhasmadhāraṇam
prajñāpaurṣahīnānāṁ
jīvo jalpati jīvikām.[73]

Sadānanda's reply to the materialists :

Sadānanda rejects the body-soul theory of the materialists. He firmly adheres to the Vedantic theory of soul. He says that there is an eternal soul. In this world we notice many irregularities and differences. Sometimes, even a pair of twins born from the same parents possess different physical structures and different behaviours. The Lokāyatikas opine that such differences are caused by Nature. But Sadānanda says that Nature (Svabhāva) is beyond our perception which is the only form of valid knowledge according to the Lokāyatikas. Therefore, the svabhāva theory is untenable in this case. Hence, one must recognise an eternal soul, the active agent who is responsible for creating such differences between the children of the same parents.[74]

He further says that the existence of a distinct 'I' the soul can be easily ascertained from such statements regularly used by us like 'mama dehaḥ' (my body), 'mama manaḥ' (my mind) and 'mama prāṇaḥ' (my life).[75]

The Cārvākas have identified the conscious body with the soul. They have said that 'I am fat' 'I am lean', 'I am young' and 'I am old' and such other expressions refer to the body and never to an independent Vedantic soul. Guṇaratna has described such expessions of the Lokāyatikas as secondary or mere imposition of the body on the soul which can exist independently. Sadānanda clearly distinguishes between 'I' (aham) and 'my' (mama) in his discussion in order to justify the Vedantic concept of the soul. He says that the expressions like 'my body', 'my senses', 'my mind', and 'my life' are indicative

of the existence of an independent, eternal, conscious soul apart from the body or mind, sense etc.[76]

Sadānanda collects the following poems from some Cārvāka literature :

pramāṇamekaṁ pratyakṣaṁ
tattvaṁ bhūtacatuṣṭayam
mokṣaśca maraṇānnānyaḥ
kāmārthau puruṣārthakau
na hi khalvīśvaraḥ kartā
paralokakathā vṛthā
dehaṁ vināsti cedātmā
kumbhavad dṛśyatāṁ puraḥ
hrasvo dīrgho yuvā bāla
iti dehobhidṛśyate
asti jātaḥ pariṇato
vṛddhaḥ kṣīṇo jaro mṛtaḥ.[77]

References :

1. Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya, pp. 43-44.
2. Ibid, P. 43.
3. Ibid, p. 766.
4. (i) *ata eva pratyakṣe dehe sati darśanād asati cādarśanād dehasyaiva caitanyamapite Lokāyatikāḥ pratipannāh,* Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya, p. 418.
   (ii) *dehamātrātmavādino Lokāyatā...... samastavyasteṣu bāhyeṣu pṛthīvyādiṣvadṛṣṭamapi caitanyaṁ śarīrākārapariṇateṣu bhūteṣu syād iti tebyaścaitanyam madaśaktivadvijñānaṁ caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣa iti cāhuḥ,* Ibid, pp. 765-766.

5. *Ye hi dehadharmā rūpādayaḥ yāvaddehe bhavati .... na hi naṭah śikṣitaḥ san svaskandham adhirokṣati,* Ibid pp. 769-768.
6. *yathāyaskānto maṇih svayaṁ pravṛttirahitopyasaḥ pravartako bhavati ..... evaṁ pravṛttirahitopīśvaraḥ ..... pravartayed ityupapannam,* Ibid, p. 419.
7. *lokāyatikapakṣe tu*
   tattvaṁ bhūtacatuṣṭayam
   pṛthivyāpastahā tejo
   vāyurityeva nāparam,
   Kārikā 1.
8. *pratyakṣagamyamevāsti*
   nāstyadṛṣṭam adṛṣṭataḥ,
   Kārikā 2 .
9. *kvāpi dṛṣtam adṛṣṭam cet*
   adṛstaṁ brūvate katham
   nityādṛṣṭaṁ kathaṁ sat syāt
   śaśaśṛṅgādibhiḥ samam,
   Kārikā 3.
10. *svargānubhūtir mṛstātir*
    dyaṣṭavarṣavadhūgamaḥ
    sūkṣmavastrasugandhasrak
    candanādiniṣevaṇam,
    Kārikā 9.
11. *śikhinaścitrayet ko vā*
    kokilān kaḥ prakūjayet
    svabhāvavyatirekeṇa
    vidyate nātra kāraṇam
    Kārikā 5.
12. Kārikā 6.
13. *jaḍamūkavikārāsu*
    caitanyaṁ yatra dṛśyate
    tāmbūlapūgacūrṇāni
    yogādrāga īvotthitam,
    Kārikā 7.

14. *ihalokāt paro nānyaḥ*
svargosti narako navā
śivalokādayo mūḍhaiḥ
kalpyantetaiḥ pratārakaiḥ,
Kārikā 8.
15. Kārikā 14.
16. *mokṣastu maraṇam tatra*
prāṇavāyunivartanam,
Kārikā 10.
17. Kārikā 11.
18. Kārikā 14.
19. Kārikā 15.
20. Kārikā 12.
21. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, p. 1.
22. *nītikāmaśāstrānusaraṇārthakāmāveva*
puruṣārthau manyamānā ....evānūbhūyante
Ibid, p. 1.
23. Ibid, pp. 1-2.
24. *tyājyaṁ sukhaṁ*
viṣayasaṁgamajanma puṁsām
duhkhopaṣṛṣṭam iti
mūrkhavicāraṇaiṣā
vrīhīn jihāsati
sitottamataṇḍulāḍhyān
ko nāma bhos
tuṣakaṇopahitān hitārthī,
Ibid, p. 2.
25. *agnihotraṁ trayo vedāstridaṇḍaṁ*
bhasmaguṇṭhanam
buddhipauruṣahīnānāṁ
jīviketi Bṛhaspatiḥ
Ibid, p. 5.

26. *na hi mṛgāḥ santīti śālayo nopyante*
na his bhikṣukāh santīti sthālyo nādhiśrīyante
.... yadi sa puruṣo mūrkho bhavet, Ibid. p. 2.
27. Ibid, p. 2.
28. Ibid, p. 5.
29. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 453; Naiṣadhacarita, 17.
30. Sarvadaraśanasaṁgraha, p. 2-3.
31. *na svargo nāparvargo vā naivātmā pāralaukikaḥ,*
Ibid, p. 5.
32. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 453.
33. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, p.5 (śloka 2).
34. Ibid, p. 2.
35. Ibid, p. 3.
36. Ibid, p. 3.
37. Ibid, p. 4.
38. *agniruṣṇo jalaṁ śītam samasparśo tathānilaḥ ......*
kenedaṁ citritaṁ tasmāt svabhāvāttadvyasthitiḥ,
Ibid, p. 5.
39. Ibid, p. 5.
40. Ibid, p. 5.
41. Ibid, p. 5.
42. Ibid, p. 5 (śloka 4).
43. Ibid, p. 5.
44. vide Ṛgvedabhāṣyabhūmikā, Part I, p. 4.
45. vide Sāyaṇa on Ṛgveda 10.106, 6.
46. Śuklayajurveda, 23.20.
47. Advaitabrahmasiddhi, p. 100.
48. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, p. 5.
49. Vide Introduction to Ṛgveda, part I, p. 4.
50. Nyāyakusumānjali 1.7.
51. Varadārāja on Ibid. 1.7.

52. Vide Nārāyaṇa Miśra's commentary on Ibid, 1.7.
53. Nyāyakusumāñjali, p. 75.
54. Kiraṇāvali, p. 86.
55. Ibid, p. 86.
56. Ibid, p. 86.
57. Bhāṣāpariccheda, 1.48.
58. Kiraṇāvali p. 87.
59. Nyāyamañjarī, part, II, p. 39.
60. Ibid, p. 46.
61. Ibid, p. 40.
62. Ibid, p. 13.
63. Ibid, p. 13.
64. Ibid, p. 41-42.
65. Advaitabrahmasiddhi, p. 99.
66. Ibid, p. 99.
67. *ghaṭasya kevalapārthivatvāt jñanaśūnyatvepi bhūtsamudāymātrakatvāccarīrasya jñānavattvasambhavāt,* Ibid, p. 99.
68. *cūrṇaparṇādisamudāye tāmbule rāgotpattivat,* Ibid, p. 99.
69. Ibid, p. 101.
70. Ibid, p. 101.
71. Ibid, p. 101.
72. Ibid, p. 100.
73. Ibid, p. 101. The reading of the relevent poem is new. The word *'pītañca* is probably a later inlerpolation.
74 Ibid, p. 102.
75. Ibid, p. 103.
76. Ibid, p. 99.
77. Ibid, p. 99.

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CHAPTER - VI

LOKĀYATA VIEWS IN OTHER LITERARY WORKS

Anti-religious views of nāstikas in the Viṣṇupurāṇa :

The *Viṣṇupurāṇa* casually refers to the anti-religious views propagated by the nāstika Māyāmoha who exerted a strong influence on demons. It has been said in this Purāṇa that one Māyāmoha, a nāstika preacher propagated a doctrine among the demons which was completely opposed to the Vedic religion. Dressed in a red garment, this preacher told the demons in a sweet language :

"O demons, if you hanker for heaven or salvation, you must avoid the religion of killing animals in the name of perfoming sacrifices. The entire universe is nothing but consciousness........ The world is without any substance. It is merely an illusion. It is full of attachment and other passions which throw us into a pool of pains."[1]

The description of Māyāmoha found in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* 3.18.2 gives the reader an idea that the Purāṇa refers to Digambara preachers here. But Digambaras never wear a red dress and always remain naked. Moreover, the philosophy of Māyāmoha appears to scholars as akin to the philosophy of the vijñānavāda school of the Buddhists. However, some views of Māyāmoha immediately lead the readers to the world of Cārvākas.

Māyāmoha condemns animal sacrifices as :

naitad yuktisahaṁ vākyaṁ
hiṁsā dharmāya neṣyate

He refers to a passage of the *Manusamhitā* viz. ā

yajñārthaṁ paśavah sṛṣṭās
tasmād yajñe vadhovadhaḥ
in the present context.

He rejects the age-old view of the Vedic preachers that articles burnt down in a yajña yield meritorious results like heaven. He refuses to believe in such an unscientific idea. Māyāmoha quotes a poem from the Cārvāka literature. The poem viz.

nihatasya paśor yajñe
svargaprāptiryadīṣyate
svapitā yajamānena
kinnu kasmānna hanyate.

appears in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* and Kṛṣṇamiśra's *Prabodhacandrodaya.* also. In this poem, Cārvāka argues that if an animal killed in an animal sacrifice (as is the Vedic belief) reaches heaven, the sacrificer can kill his own father in a sacrifice in order to assure a berth for him in heaven.

Māyāmoha also makes a sarcastic remark about the śrāddha ceremony. He says that if the meal enjoyed by a Brāhmaṇa on behalf of a dead person, gives the dead man satisfaction in the other world in that case it is useless to carry any food while going abroad, because another person can (remaining at home) satisfy the hunger of the traveller, from a distant land.[3]

The *Visnupurāṇa* also gives a few poems describing the Cārvāka philosophy. In this Purāṇa, Māyāmoha utters the following verses condemning the established religious order :

naitadyuktisahaṁ vākyaṁ
hiṁsā dharmāya neṣyate
havimṣyanaladaghāni
phalāyetyarbhakoditam
yajñairanekairdevatvaṁ
avāpyendreṇa bhujyate

śamyādi yadi cet kāṣṭhaṁ
tadvaraṁ patrabhuk paśuḥ
nihatasya paśor yajñe
svargaprāptiryadīṣyate
svapitā yajamānena
kinnu kasmānna hanyate
tṛptaye jāyate puṁso
bhuktam anyena cittataḥ
dadyācchrāddhaṁ śraddhayānnaṁ
na vaheyuḥ pravāsinaḥ. (3.18.24-27)

There is some similarity between these verses and a few poems quoted by Mādhava in his *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha.* In the first poem, it has been said that by killing animals in a sacrifice no extraordinary result is achieved. It is a foolish idea that the ghee burnt down in a sacrifice yields any result. The second poem is very interesting. It says that Lord Indra enjoys the burnt down śamī wood in sacrifice. Indra is the greatest of gods. If he meets this plight even goats and cows which eat green leaves are in a more covetable position than Indra.

Śrīharṣa's Naiṣadhacarita and the Cārvāka philosophy :

Poet Śrīharṣa gives an idea of the hedonistic and anarchist views of later Cārvākas in his *Naiṣadhacarita* (Canto 17).

The materialists in the age of Śriharṣa gave themselves upto laxity. They refused to believe in the words of religious preachers and led a licentious life. In the epic of Śrīharṣa, the hedonists have induced the people to enjoy sex-life fully. They twist the meaning of the Paninian rule *apavarge tṛtīyā* (2.3.6) and say that except the third sex (the eunuch) all other people should remain engaged in sex-life.[5]

The materialists discourage all kinds of religious practices. According to them, fasting as a religious cause and taking a holy bath in sacred places (like Prayāga) are without any benifit for the followers of religion.[6]

They advocate the best known philosophical view of Bṛhaspati that there is no soul apart from the body.[7] They argue that when a man dies and his body is burnt down in the pyre nothing is left out. Therefore, no body should fear for performing immoral acts.[8]

The Cārvākas scoff at the śrāddha ceremony performed in honour of the deceased persons. They ridicule the idea that the first meal in the Śrāddha ceremony enjoyed by a Brāhmaṇa gives satisfaction to the departed soul. They laugh at this absurd idea of a Śrāddha ceremony producing such an unbelievable result as :

mṛtaḥ smarati janmāni
mṛte karmaphalormayaḥ
anyair bhuktair mṛte tṛptir
ityalaṁ dhūrtavārtayā. (17.53)

In the *Naiṣadhacarita* the Indian materialists describe religion as a means of livelihood of a section of people who are deovid of any intellect and power. They condemn the Śmṛti texts, the Purāṇas, the Mīmāṁsā philosophy, the Nyāya views and the Vedānta Śāstra. According to the materialists the *Manusaṁhitā* prescribes various types of fine for offenders only in order to enrich the royal coffer.[9] The Mīmāṁsā śāstra directs the king to tie many elephants in the name of performing sacrifice. But when the sacrifice is over, the Brāhmaṇas take away the elephants. This is merely a covert means of collecting high priced elephants by priests.[10]

The *Nyāyasūtra* of Gotama describes salvation in his sūtra viz *"tadatyantavimokṣo'pavargaḥ"* (1.1.22). It means that a person aspiring for salvation must remain completely free from the senses of pleasure and pain. Cārvākas do not desire such a mukti or apavarga.

It may be noted here that like the Cārvākas, the Kāpālikas also do not aspire for such a state of life in the name of seeking salvation.

The sūtra *'tadatyantavimokṣopavargaḥ'* is a cryptic but highly significant sūtra. Jayantabhaṭṭa explains it as follows :

navānām ātmaguṇānāṁ buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣa-prayatnadharmā dharmasaṁskārāṇām nirmūlocchedo pavargah".[11]

It is learnt from the writings of Jayantabhaṭṭa that the Vedantists compare such a state of a person to a piece of dull and lifeless stone. They do not desire such salvation.

The Vedantists state :

ko hi nāma śilākalpam apagatasakalasukhasaṁvedana-sampadam ātmānam upapapādayituṁ yateta.........
apavargeṇa saṁsāra eva varam.[12]

Guṇaratna also discusses the view of the orthodox philosophers who reject such a salvation.[13]

Cārvāka condemns Gotama for propagating such a view as a perfect cow (go-tama)[14] in the *Naiṣadhacarita.*

Śrīharṣa lays more emphasis on the Cārvāka views on religion than on other aspects of the materialist philosophy. According to Śrīharṣa, the materialists adore the theory *"kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ."*[15]

Cārvāka advises the people not to take bath in the cold waters of the Gangā in the name of earning puṇya because, it is a painful job for the religious devotees',[16] particularly in the wintry season.

In the *Naiṣadhacarita,* the materialists denounce the Vedic sacrifices and other religious activities in the usual manner.

The Vedic texts inspire the people to perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice in the following manner :

'Jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta'

According to the materialists this statement has no authority. It is a false statement like "a rock floats in the water."[17] They criticise the religious activities like the perfoming of the Agnihotra sacrifice and the reading of the

Vedas with a religious motive as the means of earning livelihood of a section of people.[18] Readers are already acquainted with this view in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha.*

In the *Naiṣadhacarita* there is an interesting discussion on the body-soul theory of the materialists. The materialists argue that the body is another name of the 'soul'. It is destroyed in the pyre. Together with this body, all the sins committed by it are also burnt down. Now, if it is said that the 'soul' survives after death and experiences the evil effects of the sins committed by the previous body, in that case, a new problem arises. The non-sinner receives the punishment for others' crimes, which is not acceptable to anybody. It is for such reasons, the Cārvākas do not recognise a permanent 'soul' apart from the body.[19]

There were many Brāhmaṇas in the society in Śrīharṣa's time who claimed their purity. The materialists rightly challenge their purity. They say that it is an impossible task to maintain purity through generations. Nobody can claim that his family has never been contaminated in the past.[20]

Cārvāka tells the people that it is the mischievous propaganda of the notorious people that the dead man remembers his relatives; the dead person experiences the effects of his past action and then when Brāhmaṇas are fed, the dead person feels satisfied in the other world. In fact, there is no soul or no paraloka.[21] Therefore, the religious preachers merely play a trick on innocent followers to earn money through a cunning method.

The materialist philosopher Cārvāka points out to the common fact that there are divergent and conflicting opinions in the Vedas and Dharmaśāstras or other śāstras, and the different philosophical systems which stand on the way of materialist teachings. He condemns Vyāsa for his illegal sex relationship with his own relatives.[23] He refers to the Purāṇas where many absurd matters are narrated. Thus, in the *Matsyapurāṇa*, a fish is described as giving some important advices to Manu which is impossible for a fish.[24] The Purāṇas and other Śāstras declare that if a devotee worships Hari and Hara with single-minded devotion, he attains liberation. If it is so, Cārvāka asks: "Why do the consorts of Viṣṇu and Śiva remain undelivered till now in spite of their steadfast devotion to their husbands?[25] Cārvāka scoffs at the *Manusmṛtī* also.[26] Cārvāka advocates a hedonistic life for all people. He says *'kurudhvaṁ kāmadevājñāṁ brahamādyaira-pyalanghitam.*[27]

Śriharsa replies :

Śriharṣa tries to reply adequately to all the points raised by Cārvāka against religion. The materialist philosopher delivers a long tirade against all orthodox systems of philosophy. Many of the views expressed by Cārvāka were probably the result of Śrīharṣa's own deduction from the basic views of Cārvāka. He shows that the materialist philosopher does not spare Vedic seers Vyāsa, Manu, Gotama and other opponents of the Lokāyata system. Most of these views are not found in other sources where materialism has been discussed.

Śrīharṣa makes a serious attempt to reject many of the atheistic views of the Cārvāka school, but his arguments are very often questionable. Śrīharṣa argues in the traditional manner that many persons remain childless in spite of a normal physical intercouse with their spouse. They regularly complain that they did not perform the religious activities in the past life which are favourable for having a son in the present life.[28] Such utterances are practically based upon beliefs, without having any scientific foundation. However, the Indian tradition largely believes in such ideas of religious thinkers.

Regarding *'paraloka'*, he says that many persons are prematurely taken away by Yama's messengers to the abode of death, and then returned to their relatives after sometime. These persons have narrated the personal experiences of Yamaloka to the people. Hence, there is very little doubt about the existence of paraloka.[29]

Again, many people in different parts of India were reportedly appoached by the 'departed souls' to perform the śrāddha ceremony in Gayātīrtha for their deliverance from the state of "moving spirits".[30] Śrīharṣa says that this is an adequate proof of the existence of paraloka and the supreme need of the śrāddha ceremony for the deceased.

But these arguments are flimsy. The Cārvākas do not believe in 'anumāna' for distinct reasons. The report of persons returning from Yama's house and the the dead man imploring a relative to perform śrāddha for his deliverance appear to their hearers as amusing stories which cannot be relied upon. The connection established between childlessness and the error in the past life can be similarly dismissed. In India, people talk of fate and the results of past action most frequently. But these cannot be treated as strong postulates for establishing the existence of 'paraloka'.

In India, as the commentator Nārayaṇa describes, many householders blame themselves for not performing religious activities in the past life for which they remain childless in the present life.[31] Childlessness may be the effect of the lack of fertillity or caused by impotency also. But Indians generally think otherwise.

The Cārvākas possess a scientific outlook in all matters. But we cannot support some of the excesses of the Cārvāka school. The Cārvākas have advocated a hedonistic life for all people. But hedonism sometimes my lead to social anarchy and insecurity of women also. Śrīharṣa does not discuss the most important sūtras of Bṛhaspati except *"kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ'*. He gives his readers an approiate idea of the life and preachings of the 'duṣṭa' Cārvākas who forgot totally the theories of their great master and misused his views on *"kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ"*. These Lokāyatikas were interested in rebuking the religious ideas. They blame the priestly class alone; but not the real exploiters of the society.

The materialist philosophy in the Prabodhacandrodaya :

The *Prabodhacandrodaya of* Kṛṣṇamiśra is an important source for the study of the Lokāyata-cārvāka philosophy of a later period. Its author presents all the important views of the school together in the third Act. The author says :

> *sarvathā lokāyatameva śāstram yatra pratyakṣam*
> *eva pramāṇam, pṛhivyāpatejovāyuriti tattvāni*
> *arthakāmau puruṣārthau bhūtānyeva cetayante*
> *nāsti paralokaḥ mṛtyurevāpavargaḥ.*[32]

These views have been adequately discussed in previous chapters of the present work.

1. The statement *'sarvathā lokāyatameva śāstram'* in the above drama is significant. Kauṭilya in his *Arthaśāstra* describes Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata as the ānvīkṣikī vidyā. According to him, the Lokāyata śāstra renders a great service to the people. The Lokāyata is related to the practical life of the people. It teaches people how to live a practical life with perfect ease and comfort without being guided by emotions and religious dogmas.

2. In the age of Kṛṣṇamiśra (11th century), the materialists learnt to recoginse artha (material wealth) and kāma (enjoyment) as the two goals of the human life. Material wealth is essentially necessary as a means of enjoying the life to its full. Therefore, Bṛhaspati's theory viz. *"kāma evaikaḥ purusārthaḥ"* was revised by the later Cārvākas.

3. Purandara, who flourished a few centuries before Kṛṣṇamiśra, declared 'anumāna' as another pramāṇa for practical reasons. But the author of the *Prabodhacandrodaya* was not aware of the new standpoint of the Cārvākas. It is quite clear to the readers that the Cārvāka theory of knowledge viz. *pratyakṣam eva pramāṇam* as found in the *Prabodhacandrodaya* is an amended form of the Bārhaspatya sūtra already known to them.

4. The dramatist slightly amends the sūtra viz. *"maraṇamevāpavargaḥ"* given by Bṛhaspati as *"mṛtyur evāpavargaḥ"* in his allegorical play.

5. The view vix. *"bhūtānyeva cetayante"* is a new form of the Bārhaspatya sūtra viz. *"tebhyaścaitanyam"*.

6. Kṛṣṇamiśra recasts the Bārhaspatya sūtra (17) viz. *"paralokinobhāvāt" paralokābhāvaḥ* as *'nāsti paralokaḥ'*.

Readers will notice a new dimension of the Lokāyata philosophy in the *Prabodhacandrodaya.* In this drama, Mahāmoha questions the validity of the caste-division in the following way :

"tulyatve vapuṣāṁ mukhādyavayavaīḥ
varṇakramaḥ kīdṛśaḥ".[33]

The 'wicked' Mahāmoha plays the role of a progressive thinker in this verse where he asks the reason of the caste-division maintained by the Indian society. While a Brāhmaṇa, a Kṣatriya and a Śūdra look alike, it is difficult to imagine a caste distinction among them from external physical signs. A similar question has been raised by the grammarians also about castes. They find it extremely difficult to determine the caste of a person from physical structure.[34] Mahāmoha's revolt against casteism is certainly admirable. The caste-system was an instrument in the hands of a section of people for exploiting and torturing the downtrodden class of the society.

Mahāmoha, however, plays the role of an anarchist when he propagates the theory of enjoying anybody's woman and wealth without any regard for immorality.[35]

Women are not born for the physical enjoyment of men. They are born with equal rights and privileges of which they have been deprived over centuries. The emancipation of women is a primary concern of every progressive society. But the Cārvākas have propagated an anti-women philosophy. Had the Cārvākas advocated the theory of an equal distribution of wealth among all members of the society, it was appreciable. But they have preached an anarchical theory instead of fighting for a society free from rich and poor. In fact the Lokāyatas had no idea of richmen's exploitations of the poor.

In the *Naiṣadhacarita*, Cārvāka rebukes the religious people for cheating the rich men. But Cārvāka has never uttered a word against the unscrupulous behaviour of the rich men.

In the *Prabodhacandrodya*, the author has proved that the Indian materialists were practical people. They advised people not to refrain from enjoying happiness because it remains asscoiated with pains. There is no golden road to happiness. It is very often fraught with dangers and difficulties. But everybody should enjoy a happy life at all costs. They argue that if the finest kind of paddy seeds remain mixed with husks and broken grain, no sane person will ever throw the basket to the street.[36]

Like other writers on Lokāyata philosophy Kṛṣṇamiśra also describes that the materialists scoff at all religious activities. They challenge the utility of the Vedic sacrifices in the following manner:

If a performer of a Vedic sacrifice reaches heaven after his death, a burnt down tree also can bear fruits in a similar manner.[37] But this is impossible. The materialists describe the religious vows and austerities as false and futile exercises.[38]

In the *Prabodhacandrodaya*, Cārvāka ridicules the śrāddha ceremony performed for the dead person in the following poem :

mṛtānāṁ api jantūnāṁ
śrāddhaṁ cet tṛptikāraṇam
nirvāṇasya pradīpasya
snehaḥ saṁvardhyecikhām.[39]

[If the śrāddha ceremony performed for a dead man gives satisfaction to the dead, in that case even the oil poured on a light extinguished already will surely help it to reburn].

He denounces animal sacrifices in another poem :

nihatasya paśor yajñe
svargaprāptir yadīṣyate

svapitā yajamānena
kinnu kasmānnahanyate.[40]

This verse appears in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* and *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* also. In fact Kṛṣṇamiśra does not present any new idea regarding Lokāyata philosophy except for Mahāmoha's hatred for caste-system.

Cārvāka in Kṛṣṇamiśra's drama criticises the painful religious vows like parāka and sāntapana, and tells his student that the religious people have misguided their honest followers by advising them to observe these vows which do not yield any meritorious result at all.[40] Cārvāka describes Vedas a *dhūrtapralāpāstrayī.*[41] It reminds the readers of a poem written by Bṛhaspati (?) viz

trayo vedasya kartāro
bhaṇḍadhūrtaniśācarāḥ

found in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha.*

Lokāyatikasiddhānta in the Vidyāpariṇaya :

Lokāyatikasiddhānta is a dramatic character representing the group of heretics (Pāṣaṇḍa) together with the Bauddha and the Digambara Jaina monk in the *Vidyāpariṇaya* of Ānandarāyamakhin, written in the 18th century.

The Lokāyatikasiddhānta or the Lokāyata in this drama complains that the foolish people are not supporting his doctrine though it teaches them to live a comfortable life.[42] He soon disappears from the stage, but his views are adequately explained by Cittaśarman to the king. But he also does not present any new idea apart from what has been discussed earlier by us about the Lokāyata philosophy.

He says that according to the philosophy of the Lokāyatikas, the human body is a cumulative product of the four elements, which generate consciousness in the body like the red colour produced by betel nut, leaves and lime chewed together, Conscious bodies are souls. Perception is the only valid form of knowledge. There is nothing in the universe

which we never perceive. The ultimate goal of life is material enjoyment. The concepts of virtue and vice are unreal.[43]

Cārvāka, the staunch follower of Bṛhaspati also appears on the stage in this play. He recognises pratyakṣa as the only pramāṇa, and questions the Buddhist monk as *"kim anumānam api te pramāṇam*?"[44] This shows that Ānandarāyamakhin had no idea of the additional knowledege furnished by Kamalaśīla regarding laukika anumāna accepted by Puranadara and other later Cārvākas as a second valid means of knowledge. Cittaśarman declares that the aim of the Lokāyatikas is to eat, drink and enjoy sex-life without any discrimination of time, place and the legal right of possession.[45] The entire description in the present context is perfectly applicable to the anarchist section of Cārvākas who became a menace to the society at least from the 11th century onwards when Kṛṣṇamiśra wrote his historic drama the *Prabodhacandrodaya.*

Lokāyata darśana in Nīlakaṇṭha's Commentary :

Nīlakaṇṭha discusses some important views of the Lokāyata school in his commentary on the *Mahābhārata.* These views have been already examined by us in previous chapters. Nīlakaṇṭha's discussion deserves the attention of scholars for the originality of his approach to them. The *Mahābhārata* presents the theory of non-existence of a permanent soul and also the theory that perception alone is the valid means of knowledge propagated by the philosophers of the Lokāyata school in a few ślokas (218.27-30) of the Śāntiparvan.

While explaining these ślokas, Nīlakaṇṭha says that the Lokāyatikas do not believe in the existence of a soul described by many other philosophers as a permanent entity. According to these materialists, a live body derives its consciousness from the material elements which compose the body (and not from a soul). In this context they refer to the similie of wine already discussed by us for the emergence of consciousness. They also

present another striking similie of a pair of woods (araṇi). They opine that when two pieces of wood are rubbed against each other, they generate fire, and in a similar manner inanimate matter also generates consciousness.[46]

Now, when consciousness arises in this manner, it acts as the mover of the senses in the body, like a magnet which goads a dull and inanimate piece of iron to move towards it.[47]

This is a new philosophy of the Lokāyata school. The materialists, however, derive the symbol of magnet here from the commentary of Śankarācārya written on the *Brahmasūtra*.[48]

Nīlakaṇṭha does not accept the *bhūtacaitanya* theory of the Indian materialists for the simple reason that a dead body does not possess consciousness in spite of the fact that all the material elements are present in it.[49]

The commentator furnishes a sensational information to his readers that the Lokāyatikas of his age tried to cure the allergic fever of the cold season (śītajvara) by appeasing a goddess with the help of mantras. The goddess is supposed to enter into the body of the sick man and cure the disease. The goddess certainly assumes a subtle form the form of a spirit. But the Lokāyatikas do not believe that any subtle object including the soul ever enters into another body. If, however, the goddess is supposed to possess a gross body, it is wrong, because in that case the goddess would have been visible to the public. It is under such circumstances, the recognition of two separate and distinct entities viz. the soul and the body becomes imperative.

Nīlakaṇṭha shows that Cārvākas strongly condemn religious matters. According to them, Vedic studies, religious ear-marks and religious practices are a covert means of earning bread of a section of worthless people.[51]

The Lokāyata Philosophy in Ayurvedic Text :

Gangādhara, the author of the *Jalpakalpataru* commentary on the *Carakasaṁhitā* compartively a modern writer and an authority on the Ayurveda has incidentally given his readers some very important information on the Lokāyata philosophy.

He presents some new data on the Lokāyata philosophy in his commentary. Gangādhara describes the Lokāyatikas like Pāṇini, Patañjali, and Guṇaratna as nāstikas. The views discussed by the learned commentator have rendered a very valuable service to the researchers on the Lokāyata philosophy, though like many other commentators, he has not mentioned the particular Lokāyata texts where these views are recorded.

Gangādhara discusses the new views of the Lokāyata school together with the counter-arguments put forward by the philosophers of the āstika schools believing in the existence of ātman. It has been already said that according to the Lokāyata Philosophy, the material components of the body generate consciousness which is misinterpreted as the attribute of an independent, conscious, permanent soul by other philosophers. Gangādhara says that the nāstikas or materialists opine that there is an inherent tendency in the material elements which constitute the human body to create the body. This tendency is absent from other material objects like stones and wood. This tendency and its absence are the effects of the desire for and aversion to the action of moulding the human body. However, this desire or aversion is possible for a conscious object or person only. It proves that consciousness remains potentially present in matter.[52] Now, because, matter itself possesses consciousness, it is needless to recognise an independent, conscious soul apart from the conscious body which is the soul.

The opponents of this view argue that there is a conscious soul apart from the body. The material body does not possess any consciousness. The soul creates the tendency in material elements to shape the human body according to its will and purpose. Even mind is subordinate to the soul. Mind cannot be treated as a substitute of soul.[53]

It appears from the discussion of the materialists mentioned above that they believe in the existence of consciousness in matter in its potential form. But the

philosohers like the followers of Kapila do not accept this view. Kapila says that the body is constituted of five kinds of matter. There are senses and sense organs apart from the body, and also the mind. The soul is a completely distinct entity from them. The followers of Kapila reject the above view of the materialist thinkers on the ground that consciousness is significantly absent from Mahat, the second tattva of the Sāṁkhya philosophy, which has a material character.[54]

It has been already discussed that Śāntarakṣita refers to two distinct groups of materialist thinkers. One of them opine that inanimate matter itself generates consciousness, while the other group adhere to the above view. The thinkers of the first group immediately challenge the argument put forward by the followers of Kapila. They say that like the non-intoxicating ingredients of wine, inanimate matter also generates consciousness.[55]

The opponets of this view (the Sāṁkhyas) reject it on the ground that the intoxicating charater is present in every ingredient which is involved in producing wine. Therefore, when wine is finally produced the inherent character of the ingredients emerge into full form in wine.[56]

The philosophers of India headed by the Upanisadic seers recognise an immortal and eternal soul which can exist independently even after the destruction of the body. The Jainas also recognise an immortal soul. Kṛṣṇa says in the *Gītā* that the body is perishable not the soul. The Lokāyatikas say that if the soul is immortal, while the body perishes, in that case, even if a live body is burnt down like a dead body, it will not affect the soul in any way. Therefore, there is no sin in burning down a live body which is as useless as a dead body.[57]

The opponents of this view argue that it is a fact that the soul is immortal, and the body is impermanent and perishable. But in a live body, the soul remains associated with the body which enjoys worldly pleasures. Now, if the body is burnt down it will be deprived of its enjoyments, which will be a great sin.[58]

It has been already discussed in a previous context that some materialists considered senses as a synonym of soul. Gangādhara says that the opponents of this view clearly prove with the help of certain illustrations that senses are not the soul. According to them some persons of a sensitive nature who have a great liking for sour objects, become so much psychologically involved in sour objects that at the sight of them their tongue is filled with water out of greed. Now, this phenomenon adequately proves that there is an ātman or soul which remembers past affairs. If senses are recognised as remembering agents, in that case only the sense of sight would have reacted at the sight of a sour object, and not the sense of taste.[59]

Some later materialists recognise Manaḥ or Mind as a synonym of ātman. But the orthodox philosophers reject this view also of the Lokāyatikas. They say that mind is without any consciousness. But when it becomes associated with ātman, it behaves like a conscious being under the impact of the soul.[60]

The orthodox philosophers and also the Bauddhas and the Jainas believe in rebirth. They argue that a newly born baby feels the tendency to suck its mother's breast because of a similar tendency felt by the baby in its previous birth which it inherits in the next birth. The Lokāyatikas challenge this view. They opine that if the view is accepted, a new problem will arise. All babies in this world feel the same tendency which is supposed to be inherited by them from their previous birth. Now, a man who is free from all worldly attachment should not behave like other babies in the next birth. But no exceptional case is noticed in the case of babies after birth. Therefore, the very theory of rebirth is false. The materialists say that the baby feels the intution to suck the mother without previous memory like a piece of iron being automatically attracted by a magnet.[61]

To this, the opponents reply that a man who is completely free from worldly attachment is never reborn after death. Therefore, the argument of the materialiasts is without any foundation.[62]

References :

1. Viṣṇupurāṇa, 3.18.14-17.
2. Manusaṁhitā, 5.36.
3. Viṣṇupurāṇa, 3.18.27.
4. Ibid, 3.18.24-27.
   A poem similar to 3.18.26 is found in Hemacandra's Yogaśāstra in the following manner.
   svarge yānti yadi tvayā
   vinihatā yajñe
   dhruvaṁ prāṇinah yajñam
   kiṁ na karoṣi
   matṛpitṛbhiḥ putraiḥ iṣṭato bāndhavāiḥ, 2.40.
5. Naiṣadhacarita 17.52.
6. Ibid, 17.48,71.
7. *yasminnāsīti dhīr dehe*
   tad dāhe vaḥ kim enasā, Ibid, 17.52.
8. *balāt kuruta pāpāni tānyakṛtāni vaḥ*
   sarvān balakṛtān doṣān akṛtān manurabravīt,
   Ibid, 17.49.
9. Ibid, 17.63.
10. Ibid, 17.61.
11. Nyāyamañjarī, Part II, p. 78.
12. Ibid, p. 78.
13. Ṣaḍdarśanasamucaya, pp. 286-287.
14. Naiṣadhacarita, 17.75.
15. Vide Nārāyaṇa's commentary on the Naiṣadhacarita, 17.70.

16. Ibid, 17.71.
17. Ibid, 17.37.
18. Ibid, 17.39.
19. Ibid, 17.71.
20. Ibid, 17.40.
21. Ibid, 17.53.
22. Ibid, 17.79.
23. Ibid, 17.66.
24. Ibid, 17.64.
25. *dārā hariharādīnāṁ......*
    kiṁ na muktāḥ, kutaḥ santi
    kārāgāre manobhuvaḥ, Ibid, 17.76.
26. Ibid, 17.50.
27. Ibid, 17.59.
28. Ibid, 17.89.
29. Ibid, 17.91.
30. Ibid, 17.90.
31. Ibid, p. 712.
32. Prabodhacandrodaya pp. 70-71.
33. Act. II.18.
34. Vide Bālamanoramā on the Siddhāntakaumudī, Sūtra 418
35. Prabodhacandrodaya, II.18.
36. Ibid, II., 23.
37. Ibid, II. 19.
38. Ibid, 22.
39. Ibid, II.21.
40. Ibid, II.20.
41. Ibid, p.71
42. Vidyāpariṇaya, 4.11.
43. Ibid, 4.12.

44. Ibid, p. 74.
45. Ibid, 4.13.
46. Mahābhārata, Śāntiparvan, Chitrasala press, p. 403.
47. *evaṁ utpannaṁ caitanyam*
ayaskāntamaṇir loham iva indrīyasaṁghātaṁ
cālayiṣyati, Ibid, p. 403.
48. Quoted in Ch.V, Fn 6.
49. Mahābhārata, Śāntiparvan, p. 403.
50. Ibid, p. 403.
51. *agnihotraṁ trayīdharmās-*
trīdaṇḍaṁ bhasmaguṇṭhanam
buddhipauruṣahīnānāṁ
jīviketi Bṛhaspatiḥ, Ibid, p. 403.
52. Carakasaṁhitā (Sūtrasthāna), P-120.
53. Ibid, P-120.
54. Ibid, P-121.
55. Ibid, P-121
56. Ibid, P-121.
57. *śarīradāhe pātakābhāvāt............*
śarīrasya śavarūpsya dāhe.........
tasya puruṣavadhapāpasyābhāvāt, Ibid, P-114.
58. *ātmā nityah.......tasya.*
bhogayātanaṁ śarīram.... tadbhogavināśe pātakam,
Ibid, P-114.
59. Ibid, P-112.
60. Ibid, P-124.
61. Ibid, P-127.
62. *vītarāgajanmādarśanāt vigatarāgasya*
purnar janmādarśanāt, Ibid, P-127.

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CHAPTER VII

POETICAL LITERATURE IN THE LOKĀYATA PHILOSOPHY

It has been said in previous contexts that Bṛhaspati, Ajita and Kambalāśvatara propagated some important philosophical doctrines either in sūtras or prose sentences. But scholars can learn from the works of Guṇaratna, Mādhava and Sadānandayati that some excellent poems were also composed by materialist thinkers, a few of which have been commonly quoted by Sanskrit writers. Two such poems have been presented by Guṇaratna is his commentary while remaining poems appear in Mādhava's, *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*, and the writings of Jayantabhaṭṭa and others authors. According to the poems quoted by Guṇaratna, penaces, rigorous vows, self-control and restriction on food and drink in the name of religion, and also the performance of Vedic sacrifices are like the play of little children having no connection with the practical world.[1] Sadānandayati quotes another poem viz. *bhojanaṁ maṁsarahitam etc.* which has been discussed in an earlier context. He presents some important kārikās also which describe the Lokāyata views appropriately. These kārikās were apparently collected from some Cārvāka source.

Mādhava quotes a few poems from the Cārvāka literature, the authorship of which is attributed to the materialist thinker Bṛhaspati. These poems are given below.

1. *na svargo nāpavargo vā*
naivātmā pāralaukikaḥ
naiva varṇāśramādīnām
kriyāśca phaladāyikāḥ

2. *agnīhotraṁ trayo vedās*
tridaṇḍaṁ bhasmaguṇṭhanam
buddhipauruṣahīnānāṁ
jīvikā dhatunirmitā

3. *pasuścenihataḥ svargam*
jyotiṣṭome gamiṣyati
svapitā yajmānena
tatra kasmān na hanyate.

4. *mṛtanām api jantūnāṁ*
śrāddhaṁ cet tṛptikāraṇan
nirvāṇasya pradīpasya
snehaḥ saṁvardhayeccikhām

5. *gacchatām iha jantūnāṁ*
vyarthaṁ pātheyakalpanam
gehasthakṛtaśrāddhena
pathi tṛptiravāritā

6. *svargasthitā yadā tṛptīṁ*
gaccheyustatra dānataḥ
prāsādasyoparisthitānām
atra kasmānna dīyate

7. *yāvajjivaṁ sukhaṁ jīved*
ṛṇaṁ kṛtvā ghṛtaṁ pibet
bhasmībhūtasya dehasya
punarāgamanaṁ kutaḥ

8. *yadi gacchet paraṁ lokaṁ*
dehādeva vinirgataḥ
kaṣmād bhūyo na cāyāti
bandhusnehasamākulaḥ

9. *tātaśca jīvanopāyo*
bṛahmaṇair vihitāstviha
mṛtānāṁ pretakāryāṇi
na tvanyad vidyatekvacit

10. *trayo vedasya kartāro*
bhaṇḍadhūrtaniśācarāḥ
jarbharī turpharītyādi
paṇḍitānāṁ vacaḥ smṛtam.

11. *aśvasyātha hi śīśnaṁ tu*
patnīgrāhyaṁ prakīrtitam
bhaṇḍaistāvat parāṁ caiva
grāhyajātaṁ prakīrtitam
māṁsasya khādanaṁ tadvan
niśācarasamīritam.[2]

The materialist philosophy laid down in some of the above poems have been discussed in a previous context.

A critical examination of the verses shows that the materialists had a strong disgust for Brahmanical preaching. The Cārvākas put forward strong arguments that the śrāddha ceremony performed in this world cannot give satisfaction to the dead person living in another world in verse 5. In verse 6, the gift made in honour of a dead man is described as a futile excercise.

The Cārvākas do not believe in a soul or a spirit that survives after the death of a person. In the eighth poem, they argue that if any person survived in a new form after his death, he would have cartainly returned to his relatives out of love for them which nobody has ever experienced.

The seventh poem appears as :

yāvajjīvet sukhaṁ jīvet
tāvad vaiṣayikaṁ sukham
bhasmībhūtasya dehasya
punarāgamanaṁ kutaḥ
in Guṇaratna's *Tarkarahasyadīpikā.*

The third line of the poem, again, appears as *bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya* etc. in Jayantabhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī* and the *Bhāskarī* commentary of Bhāskara on the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī.*

Some other readings of the second poem quoted above have been already presented in different contexts. Nārāyaṇa, the commentator on the *Naiṣadhacarita* presents another version of this poem viz.

agnihotraṁ trayo vedās
tridaṇḍam bhasmapuṇḍrakam
buddhipauruṣahīnānāṁ
jīvīketi Bṛhaspatiḥ.[3]

Mādhava gives yet another version of the poem where the poem ends as *jīvīketi Bṛhaspatiḥ*[4] Similarly, he gives a different version of the verse 7 also, where the second line appears as *nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ.*[5] Sadānanda reads *bhasmadhāraṇaṁ* in stead of *bhasmaguṇṭhanaṁ* or *bhasmapuṇḍrakaṁ* in the second line of the poem.[6]

Unlike the above poems, the poems quoted by Sadānandayati in his *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* (p. 99) are a mere summary of the Lokāyata views discussed by the philosopher.

References :

1. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 453 (quoted in Ch. IV of the present work).
2. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, p. 5.
3. Naiṣadhacarita, 17.39.
4. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, ed. by Vasudeva Abhyankar, p. 5
5. Ibid, p. 2.
6. Advaitabrahmasiddhi, p. 100.

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CHAPTER - VIII

SVABHĀVAVĀDA (NATURALISM)

The svabhāva theory gained a strong ground in the Lokāyata philosophy. The Indian materialists of a later period have constantly discussed that all things in the universe come into being with all their specific and inherent characters by nature. They do not recognise any invisible creator like God responsible for their orgination. The svabhāva doctrine blooms into its full form in the writings of Sanskrit writers like Aśvaghoṣa, Guṇaratna, Bhaṭṭotpala, Mādhava, Śankarācārya and Śāntarakṣita.

Aśvaghoṣa elaborately discusses the Svabhāva theory in the following passage of his *Buddhacarita* :

kecit svabhāvād iti varṇayanti
śubhāśubhaṁ caiva bhāvābhāvau ca
svābhāvikaṁ sarvam idaṁca
yasmād ato'pi mogho bhavati prayatnaḥ (9.58)
yad indriyāṇāṁ niyataḥ pracāraḥ
priyāpriyatvaṁ viṣayeṣu caiva
saṁyujyate yajjarayārtibhiśca
kastatra yatno nanu sa svabhāvaḥ. (9. 59)

* * * * *

kaḥ kaṇṭakasya prakaroti taikṣṇyam
vicitrabhāvāṁ mṛgapakṣiṇāṁ vā
svabhāvataḥ sarvam idaṁ pravṛttaṁ
na kāmakārosti kutaḥ prayatnaḥ. (9. 62)

According to the above poems, all good and bad things originate due to their own nature. The same is the case of life and death. The svabhāvavādins say that the thorn becomes sharp, and different birds and beasts possess distinct colour,

structures and behaviour due to their inherent nature. Aśvaghoṣa describes the svabhāvadins as *'tajjnāḥ'* but not as Lokāyatikas.

Guṇaratna gives a clear idea of the Svahāva doctrine in the following passage of his commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccya* : Haribhadrasuri

> *svabhāvavādino hyevam āhuḥ-iha vastunaḥ*
> *svata eva pariṇatiḥ svabhāvaḥ sarve bhāvāḥ*
> *svabhāvavaśād upajāyante tathāhi*
> *mṛdaḥ kumbho bhavati na paṭādiḥ,*
> *tantubhyopi paṭa upajāyate na ghaṭādiḥ*
> *etacca pratiniyataṁ bhāvānām na tathā*
> *svabhāvam antareṇa ghaṭā saṁṭaṅkam āṭīkate.*[1]

Guṇaratna quotes one poem from Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* and another poem from the *Lokatattvaniścaya.* The meaning of the first poem has been discussed above. This poem appears in different forms in different works including Bhaṭṭotpala's commentary on the *Bṛhatsaṁhitā* (quoted below)

The second poem viz

> *vadaryāḥ kaṇṭakāṣṭīkṣṇā*
> *ṛjurekaśca kuñcitaḥ*
> *phalaṁ ca vartulaṁ tasya*
> *vada kena vinirmitam (Lokatattvaniścaya, 2.22)*[2]
>
> means that the thorns of a vadarī plant are sharp;
> its some thorns are straight and others are bent;
> its fruit is round. The poet asks;
> "Who has made them so?"

Guṇaratna nicely presents the basic views of the svabhāvavādins (Naturalists) in the above passage. These philosophers opine that nature is responsible for the origination of things in a particular manner. Such is the nature of things that earth produces only pots and not garments, and threads produce garments and not pots. It is by nature all things in the

universe emerge with a distinct colour, a distinict quality, and a distinct character. No other factor is responsible for this.

The svabhāva theory is presented by the author of the *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* in the following passage :

> *na svabhāvātirekeṇa*
> *garbhabālaśubhādikam*
> *yat kiñcijjāyate loke*
> *tadasau kāraṇaṁ kila*
> *sarvabhāvāh svabhāvena*
> *svasvabhāve tathā tathā*
> *vartante' tha nivartante*
> *kāmacāraparāṅmukhāḥ*
> *na vineha svabhāvena*
> *mudge paktirapīṣyate*
> *tathā kālādibhāvepi*
> *nāśvamāsasya sā yataḥ.* (Verses 169-172)

The author cites one very common illustration while explaining svabhāvavāda. He says that all other factors remaining in tact the mudga pulse becomes boiled only due to its own nature.

Guṇaratna explains the point very clearly in the following passage of his *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* :

> *apica, anyat kāryajātam, iha mudgapaktirapi na svabhāvam antareṇa bhavitum arhati tathā hi sthālīndhanakālādisāmagrīsambhavepi na tasmād yad yad bhavati tattad anvayavyatirekānuvidhāyi tatkṛtam iti svabhāvakṛtamudgapaktireṣṭavyā tatah sakalmevedaṁ vastujātam svabhāvahetukam avaseyam.*[3]

The author of the *Māṭhara* commentary on the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* also discusses the svabhāva theory. But he does not offer any critical discussion on the theory. He says :

> *apare svabhāvam āhuḥ-svabhāvaḥ kāraṇam iti tathāhi–*
> *yena śuklīkṛtā haṁsāḥ*

śukāśca haritīkṛtāḥ
mayūrāśctiritā yena
sa no vṛttiṁ vidhāsyati.[4]

All the philosophers whose names we have mentioned in the present context have discussed the basic view of the svabhāva theory, but none of them have said that the svābhava theory has been advocated by the Lokāyatikas. But Bhaṭṭotpala, Śankarācārya and Mādhava clearly sate that the Lokāyatikas strongly advocate the theory.

Bhaṭṭotpala says in his commentary on the *Bṛhatsaṁhitā* of Varāhamihira that the Lokāyatikas have propagated the svabhāva theory.

According to him :

Lokāyatikāḥ svabhāvaṁ jagataḥ kāraṇam āhuḥ. svabhāvād eva jagad vicitram utpadyate svabhāvato vilayaṁ yāti tathā ca tadvākyam :

kaḥ kaṇṭakasya prakarotī taikṣṇyaṁ
vicitrabhāvaṁ mṛgapakṣiṇāṁ ca
mādhuryam ikṣoḥ kaṭutāṁ ca nimbe
svabhāvataḥ sarvam idaṁ pravṛttam.[5]

Like Bhaṭṭotpala, Mādhava also describes Indian materialists as the advocates of the svabhāva theory, which alone is their shelter to avoid the āstika theory of God creating this universe. According to the materialists, no invisible hand of an invisible creator is involved in the emergence of the multi-coloured world. Some objects are naturally cold, some are hot. The Cārvākas opine that these specialities are natural and spontaneous. Mādhava quotes the following poem from Lokāyata literature which defends Naturalism :

agniruṣṇaṁ jalaṁ śītaṁ
samasparśāstathānilāḥ
kenedaṁ citritaṁ tasmāt
svabhāvāttadvyavasthitiḥ.[6]

According to this poem, the specific and inherent attributes of fire, water, air etc. are not the effects of the action of any agent, but these elements naturally become so. In a similar manner, we notice that a swan is white, while a parrot is green. We cannot attribute the origin of such phenomena to the action of an unseen agent. Water produces transversial waves, while some other physical objects generate longitudinal waves, and why? This is the natural character of these objects.

Śankarācārya casually refers to the svabhāva theory of the Lokāyata school in his discussion on the Lokāyata philosophy in the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṁgraha*. (Kārikā 5)

He presents the same view of the materialists that it is by nature a peacock possesses multi-coloured plumes, and similarly a koel becomes a melodious singer.

Śāntarakṣita devotes a chapter of his *Tattvasaṁgraha* to the theory of svabhāva. But the philosopher does not state categorically that the svabhāva theory was propounded by Indian materialists. Śāntarakṣita discusses the svabhāva doctrine in the following manner :

sarvahetunirāśaṁsaṁ
bhāvānāṁ janma varṇyate
svabhāvavādibhistehi
nāhuḥ svam api kāraṇam
rājīvakesarādīnāṁ
vacitryaṁ kaḥ karotihi
mayūracandrikādirvā
vicitraḥ kena nirmitaḥ
yathaiva kaṇṭakādīnāṁ
taikṣṇādikam ahetukam
kādācitkatayā tadvad
duḥkhādīnām ahetutā
(*Tattvasaṁgraha,* Kārikās 110-112).

It is clear from Śāntarakṣita's discussion on the subject that there were some philosophers who propounded the theory of *svata eva bhāvā jāyante* or things are born out of themselves.

Śāntarakṣita discards this view of these philosophers. According to the *svabhāvavādins* or Naturalists, things are not born out of anything nor they are generated by some other cause, but they are *'svaparakāraṇanirapekṣa.*[7]

These philosophers ask a critical question :

rājīvakesarādīnāṁ vaicitryaṁ
kaḥ karoti hi
mayūracandrikādirvā
vicitraḥ kena nirmitaḥ?[8]

Śāntarakṣita gives an appropriate reply to Lokāyatikas' question viz *rājīvakesarādīnāṁ vaicitryaṁ kaḥ karoti hi*? He says :

sarojakesarādīnām
anvayaryatirekavat
avasthātiśayakrāntaṁ
bījapaṁkajalādikam.[9]

The philosopher says that a lotus and other plants or trees with their special features are born from seeds. Moreover, water and mud are also two other important factors or causes responsible for the origination of lotus plants in particular. Therefore, the theory of *svabhāvavādins* is totally untenable.

The comnentator Kamalaśila explains the above point most clearly in the following manner :

yadi hi rājivādīnāṁ tad hetutā
pratiniyatadeśakālahetutā na syāt, tadā yeyam
upalādipariharena salilādervā pratiniyatadeśe vṛttiḥ
yā ca śiśirādiparihāreṇa nidāghādisamaye vṛttiḥ
sā na prāpnoti, kintu sadaiva deśe kāle ca te rājīvādyo
bhāvā bhaveyuḥ.[10]

In other words, Kamalaśīla says that if time and place are not recognised as the causes of the growth of lotus plants, in that case, even a rocky bed would be an ideal place for the growth of these plants. Similarly, lotus would have appeared in all seasons and not in summer alone.

A question has been raised by the naturalists in the following manner :

"If there is a cause of such things as we have described above, it cannot be proved. Who has seen the cause mentioned by you?"

To this Śāntarakṣita replies :

One cannot disbelieve everything which is not perceived. The durvā grasses and such other things (say rocks and stones) are lying inside the caves or holes of mountains which we have not seen. But these things exist.[11]

The propounders of the svabhāva theory certainly deserve a great credit in spite of the challenge offered by Śāntarakṣita. There is some truth in their obsevation. Fire is hot, because it is its inherent nature. A lotus grows red. It is also its inherent character. Light travels in straight line, Why? Even science will say it is its inherent law. A peacock has multi-coloured plumes. A swan is white. A crow is black. According to the Lokāyatikas these birds are naturally so. But the non-materiatlists, who are surprised by the beauty of a peacock or a swan or a parrot will naturally imagine an active agent who is behind such a wonderful creation. This invisible creator is God. Not to speak of the common people, even a great scientist like Einstein recognises the existence of God.

In reply to the materialist view of the *svabhāvavādins*, the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* says :

svabhāvameke kavayo vadanti
kālaṁ tathānye parimuhyamānāḥ
devasyaiṣa mahimā tu loke
yenedaṁ bhrāmyate brahmacakram.[12]

According to this Upaniṣad the Supreme Person is the cause of everything.

References :

1. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p-19.
2. Ibid, p-20.
3. Ibid, p-20.
4. Ibid, p-19.
5. Bṛhatsaṁhitā, part I, p. 9.
6. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, p. 3.
7. Tattvasaṁgraha, part I, p. 79.
8. Ibid, Kārikā, 111 p. 201
9. Ibid, Kārikā, 113.
10. Ibid, part-I, p. 81.
11. Ibid, part-I, p. 83.
12. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, 6.1.

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CHAPTER - IX

CONCLUDING REMARKS

All the materials available in different literary sources related to the study of *Lokāyatadarśana* or the materialist philosophy of India have been duly examined in the preceding chapters of the present work. One important fact which easily flashes in the minds of scholars from a critical study of these materials is that most of the authors including Śankarācārya and Haribhadrasūri have laid an emphasis on a few selected sūtras of Bṛhaspati and some poems composed by later Cārvāka poets in their treatment of Lokāyata. There was a distinct purpose behind it.

Lokāyata was extensive and neatly worked out philosophical system at one time. It possessed at least 18 sūtras composed by Bṛhaspati apart from the poems written by Cārvākas and commentaries. The number of Bṛhaspati's sūtras was probably more as it can be imagined from a critical examination of Kamalaśīla and Guṇaratna's writings.

Kamalaśīla quotes a number of important sūtras from Bṛhaspati's materialist text. But he does not discuss the relative position of some of the sūtras like–

i) *jātismaraṇam asiddham; ekagrāmagatānāṁ sarveṣāṁ smaraṇāt,*

ii) *etāvān eva puruṣo yāvān indriyagocaraḥ,*

iii) *punaruktadeśāntaraṁ kālāntaram avasthāntaraṁ vā paralokaḥ* and

iv) *nānumānaṁ pramāṇam*
in the work of Bṛhaspati.

Guṇaratna quotes a few other sūtras of Bṛhaspati in his commentary. But he is also silent about the actual position of

the sūtras in Bṛhaspti's materialist text. Sadānandayati also does not try to mention the numbers of the Bārhaspatya sūtras quoted by him.

Now, if these sūtras followed the sūtra *ihalokaparalokayor bhinnatvāt tadgatayor api cittayor naikaḥ santānaḥ* (sūtra 18) in the sūtra text of the great materialist philosopher, the number of Bṛhaspati's sūtras will naturally exceed the No. 18.

Only a part of Bṛhaspati's sūtra text, and the poems have been restored to readers by Indian writers.

Lokāyata was a highly developed and very popular philosophical system in the age of Jayāditya (7th century A.D.). Jayāditya writes in his *Kāśikāvṛtti* that the teachers of Lokāytata darśana earned a great applause from their pupils by delivering attractive lectures enriched with sound and convincing arguments. The philosophy flourished in full form even a few centuries after Jayāditya. In religious discourses organised by emperor Akbar, the Cārvākas also participated. Akbar ruled between a 1556-1606. Therefore, the Lokāyata philosophy existed in the 16th and the 17th century. Kamalaśīla, Guṇaratna, Udayana and Jayantabhaṭṭa describe in their works that Lokāyatikas strongly defended the *bhūtacaitanya* theory, the theory of the non-existence of *paraloka* and rebirth with the help of appropriate logic. These materialists presented many new ideas in their philosophical debate.

It can be easily imagined that there was an extensive, scientifically worked out philosophical text (or texts) in the age of these writers. There were probably some commentaries also on the sūtras of Bṛhaspati which adequately dealt with the views of the opponents. But there are only a covert reference to them in the works of above writers.

The Lokāyata philosophy, however, gradually lost its importance except some casual references to a few important views of Lokāyata darśana, and the philosophical texts of Lokāyata started to disappear for reasons best known to history. In modern times, no systematic or complete text of Lokāyata darśana is available to readers except some parts of the darśana found in traditional sources.

It has been discussed in earlier contexts that Kamalaśīla, Guṇaratna and Sadānandayati have presented may new and important ideas regarding the Lokāyata philosophy, which have not been discussed by many eminent authors probably due to the non-availability of these materials to them. It is worthnoting in this context that the authors like Śankarācārya, Haribhadrasūri, Mādhava and Kṛṣṇamiśra who play a leading role in the treatment of the Lokāyata draśana have remained confined to a small number of Bṛahaspati's sūtras and the atheistic and hedonistic views of Cārvākas. They express almost the same ideas in their discussion on this philosophical system. It is for this reason the present study may appear to some readers as a repitition of the same old views. However, an attempt has been made to collect as much new material as possible from the vast range of Sanskrit literature in the present work.

It is clear from the *Pañjikā* commentary of Kamalaśīla, the *Nyāyakusumāñjalī* of Udayana, the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayantabhaṭṭa and Guṇaratna's commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* that Lokāyata was a living philosophy in ancient India. Regular debates and discourses were held on Lokāyata darśana, where both the exponents and opponents of the philosophy put forth strong views rich in original thinking. These views were certainly recorded in some literary texts. But the above authors have not mentioned the texts where these views were put in writing.

It may be noted here that later Sanskrit poets have laid greater emphais on the anti-religious and hedonistic views of the Cārvāka school mainly found in the poems written by materialist poets, in their discussion on the Lokāyata philosophy. These poems were current in the Indian society over a long period. The anti-religious views particularly those which are related to the Vedic sacrifices and the śrāddha ceremony and the hedonistic views such as one should enjoy

sex-life fully probably earned a dominating place in the philosophy of the later Cārvākas, for which the Indian poets like Śrīharṣa, Hemacandra and the author of the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* consider it their duty to focus the attention of the readers to them. It may be mentioned here that Śrīharṣa and the author of the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* not only utilise the old poems but also compose some new poems either to amplify or to discredit the materialist system.

While discussing the Lokāyata philosophy, it will be proper for the present author to acknowledge that some philosophers have rendered a very valuable service to the academic circle by giving some additional information regarding the materialist philosophy avoided by other authors, in spite of the fact that these philosophers also lay an emphasis on some common and better known views of the Lokāyatas in their works. Thus, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla bring to the knowledge of scholars the essence of Kambalāśvatara's philosophy.

Kamalaśīla has quoted several rare sūtras from some Lokāyata text not known to other writers. These sūtras were probably written by Bṛhaspati himself. Kamalaśīla and Guṇaratna, again, discuss a very important view of later Cārvākas that they also recognise (popular) inference as another means of cognition. Two other philosophers viz. Mādhava and Varadārāja refer to a very important standpoint of the Lokāyata school that the king of the country is a synonym of God.

A Note on the concept of God in the Cārvāka Philosophy :

In Bṛhaspati's sūtras, there is no reference to Īśvara or God. But the Cārvākas casually refer to Īśvara in their philosophical texts. However, their concept of Īśvara is entirely different from that of āstika philosophers. It may be mentioned in this context that several pholosophical schools of India do not recognise Īśvara or God. Thus, the Mīmāmsā philosophy

does not believe in the existence of Īśvara. It also does not recognise the periodic creation and dissolution of the universe. Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy does not refer to God directly anywhere in his sūtras. However, his follower Praśastapāda describes Maheśvara or Īśvara (Śiva) as the prime mover of the atoms.

There are two distinct schools of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. One school believes in the existence of Īśvara, while the other shool does not. According so Guṇaratna, the non-believers in Īśvara, however, worship Nārāyaṇa as their deity.[2] But Nārāyaṇa is a synomym of Viṣṇu, who is described as the Supreme Lord of the universe in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa.*[3] The Bauddhas and the Jainas have been described as nāstikas in Indian philosophy. The Bauddhas do not believe in either God or Soul. The Jainas, on the other hand, recognise immortal individual souls, but not God.

According to Mādhava and Varadārāja, the Cārvāka materialists recognise God. Mādhava says that this God is none else than the king of the country. It may be noted here that the *Mahābhārata* describes the king as a great god, who lives on the earth in a human form.[4] But the Cārvākas do not accept any such theory of the divine origin of the king. For them, the king is a man. He exerts supreme power over his people in a all aspects of life for which he has been described as God in a metaphorical sense by the Cārvākas. Varadārāja states that the Cārvākas recognise the king or the image of a deity as God. It suggests that God must be a visible person or object in this philosophy and not an invisible one whose existence is established through supra-sensory inference only.

Lokāyata and some other philosophies :

Like the Lokāyata philosophy of Bṛhaspati, the Bauddha and Jaina philosophies are also described as *nāstika darśana* in Indian tradition. The Bauddhas and the Jainas do not recognise the authority of the Veda. This is the main reason for which

these religious people are called *nāstikas* in the Indian society. The Bauddhas also do not believe in the existence of soul. The Buddhists of the Sarvāstivāda school, again, declare everything in this world as real (sarvaṁ asti) though they are momentary in character. In spite of all this, the Bauddhas are not treated as materialists, because they believe in rebirth and Nirvāṇa (salvation). The Jainas consider matter (pudgala) as a reality. They do not recognise God. But they are not called materialists though they are placed in the category of nāstikas by the side of Cārvākas. The reason for this is that the Jainas believe in Karma, the soul, its captivity and salvation (mokṣa). The Jainas prescribe an austere religious life for the people to reach the ultimate goal of life, that is, mokṣa.

In this connection, we can refer to the Vaiśeṣika and some other Indian philosophies also which possessed or possess some materialistic elements. But they are not recognised as materialist philosophies for pertinent reasons.

The Vaiśeṣika philosophy propagated by Kaṇāda was initially a materialist system. Kaṇāda describes eternal atoms as the cause of the material universe. The atoms are combined into dyad, triad etc. under the impact of adṛṣṭa (chance or unseen power). The theory has been challenged by Śankarācārya on pertinent grounds. Kaṇāda's disciple Praśastapāda realises the limitation of Kaṇāda's theory, and amends it suitably by adding the concept of Maheśvara or Lord Sīva as the prime mover of the atoms. The new approach has saved the philosophy from being treated as a materialistic one.

The Mīmāṁsā philosophy does not recognise God. The older Mīmāṁsā texts and their followers laid a great emphasis on the Karmakāṇḍa or the ritualistic aspect of the Veda, through which, it was believed, a colourful divine land after death could be gained, or, some villages, or cattle, or other covetable objects could be earned. Thus, there is a distinct materialistic trend in the philosophy. Kumārilabhaṭṭa says that the philosophers like Bhartṛmitra reduced the Mīmāṁsā

philosophy to a materialistic system though originally it was not so.[5] Jayāditya says in his *Kāśikāvṛtti* that some Mīmāṁsakas become nāstikas after some time after following their philosophy.[6]

The Mīmāṁsā philosophy is, however, not treated as a materialist philosophy in spite of casual references to some materialistic ideas in it, because it recognises the authority of the Veda. Moreover, the philosophers like Kumārilabhaṭṭa have carried the Mīmāṁsā philosophy towards a higher spiritual goal.

It has been discussed in a previous chapter that Guṇaratna describes the Kāpālikas as nāstikas or materialists. Tīrthasvāmin in his *Darśanakaṇikāsaṁgraha* refers to the Kāpālikas as *kāmātmavādins.*[7]

Now, because Inidan materialists consider kāma as the ultimate goal of life, there is a scope to think that Kāpālikas were materialists. But tradition has recognised these Śaiva ascetics as a group of religious people. They hanker for mukti through the path of bhoga. Similar is the case of Kaula Tantrics. The Kaulas belong to the left path which is undoubtedly a hedonistic path. But their aim is also to achieve mokṣa. Their hedonism is only a means to an end and not an and in itself. The Bārhaspatyas or the Lokāyatikas are the perfect materialists.

The Lokāyata philosophy was propagated with great enthusiasm by Ajitakeśakambalī in the Buddhist period. A partial knowledge only of the anti-religious views of Lokāyata darāśana can be gathered from the limited number of sūtras of Bṛhaspati. Ajita presents these views in an exhaustive manner in his eloquent lecture. His language is bold and assertive.

Kambalāśvatara firmly advocates the *bhūtacaitanya* theory of Bṛhaspati. Only one sūtra of Kambalāśvatara is available to modern readers form Kamalaśīla's commentary. Kambalāśvatara amends the *bhūtacaitanya* theory suitably under pressure from his opponents.

There was apparently a comprehensive text written by Kambalāśvatara on materialism or at least the *bhūtacaitanya* theory, as the present sūtra appears only as a fragment of a discourse on the theory. That there was a loss of an important portion of the sūtra work of Kambalāśvatara can be imagined from the very sturcture of the sūtra. This is a sad message for scholars. Similarly, the loss of the *Vartikā* or the *Varṇikā* commentary of Bhāguri is equally regrettable. There were probably many important data regarding the Lokāyata philosophy in this commentary. In fact, this is the only commentary written on Lokāyata darśana as recorded by Indian tradition. Scholars probably will blame the opponents of the materialist system for the loss of materialist texts. However, it is these enemies of Indian materialism who have preserved the important views of Lokāyata darśana in their works.

The Vedic religion and Bṛhaspati :

The Vedic religion was apparently responsible for the emergence of Bṛhaspati's Lokāyata philosophy. The extravagant Vedic rituals and the bold claims of Vedic preachers that there is an extraodinary meritorious result of Vedic sacrifices by dint of which the sacrificer can move to a colourful divine land (svarga) after death had raised a strong doubt in the mind of Bṛhaspati, an inborn materialist about the utility of the Vedic religion. It inspired him to examine the issue of religion from a practical and scientific angle.

The Vedic religion received a serious jolt in the hands of Upaṇisadic thinkers who declared the Vedic sacrifices as useless. In the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.2.7 the sacrifices are described as producing no permanent, beneficial result and tying the sacrificer to the chain of rebirth. The Bauddhas and the Jainas also started a revolt against the Veda and established their own religions. But these religious sects preached and practised an austere religious life. The platform of Bṛhaspati was entirely anti-religious.

Bṛhaspati first examined the nature of the human body and found that the body is made up of four distinct kinds of elements. Now, a man is born as a conscious being. But when he dies, his consciousness totally disappears. Bṛhaspati critically examines the matter and finally draws the conclusion that consciousness is merely a cumulative product of the material elements of the body and nothing else. Bṛhaspati lays emphasis on the cumulative effect (tatsamudāya) generated by the four elements, because a single element has never produced consciousness in this world. The point has been clearly discussed by Sadānanda in his work. Bṛhaspati, however, fails to convince his opponents. His theory has raised a strong controversy in the religious circle. While challenging the theory the Vedantists and the Bauddhas and the Jainas have depended on their śāstras and āgamas; but Bṛhaspati's followers have defended the theory with the help of scientific arguments.

However, Bṛhaspati's opponents have rejected the *bhūtacaitanyavāda* on pertinent grounds. The philosophers like Kamalaśīla, Udayana and Rāmacandra have adequately proved that there is no cause and effect relationship between the material body and its consciousness.

Now, when a man dies, his consciousness disappears from the body. Thy Upanisadic thinkers opine that the individual soul, the source of consciousness of the body, migrates to another body after death for which the consciousness disappears. Bṛhaspati does not recognise such a soul, because it is not perceived by anybody. Kamalaśīla has discussed this materialistic view of the Lokāyata school very clearly. Bṛhaspati also rejects the idea of the existence of a divine land to which, a pious Vedic sacrificer is supposed to move after death, because such a land is also not perceived by anybody. He does not accept anumāna because unlike pratyakṣa it dos not give a correct and convincing result universally.

After rejecting the Upanisadic idea of soul and a land after death, Bṛhaspati now examines the question of the ultimate goal of human life. He finds that in the absence of a soul that survives the body, a man's existence is strictly confined to the life he lives in this world, As there is no supramundane reality for which he should live, Bṛhaspati advocates a life of pleasure and comfort for him.

Bṛhaspati was a perfect materialist. The religious preachers of India never accepted his view. But his materialistic ideas remained a constant source of worry for centuries for religious philosophers. The great popularity of his system can be imagined from the strong voice of protest raised by the religious preachers against it. It is a wonder that in those days when the Indian society was mainly religious and God-fearing, Bṛhaspati launched a revolution against religion. Bṛhaspati was a hedonist in the eye of his opponents. But he had a noble motive of seeing the people happy.[8]

Bṛhaspati was an opponent of religion. He did not believe that religious activities produce any result. Some of his followers in the age of Vātsāyana, however, argued in a different way against the utility of practising religion. According to them, there is a great doubt about religious activities yielding any result, as it cannot be proved by anybody, and, even if these activities produce any (meritorious) results, they cannot be enjoyed in the present birth as such results are supposed to benefit the performers of these activities in the next life only. Therefore, religion is useless for them in their practical life.[9]

The Cārvākas and the new trend in the Lokāyata philosophy :

The Cārvākas became an irresistible force in the Indian society in a later period of the development of Lokāyata philosophy. Readers notice a progressive trend in the Lokāyata philosophy in the age of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. The trend certainly started some time before these philosophers.

The Cārvākas accepted the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness and declared that the atoms are of a momentary character. We have distinctly shown that there were two distinct groups of Cārvākas—the educated and the wicked. The Educated Cārvākas played a great role in the development of the Lokāyata philosophy. Udayana, Jayantabhaṭṭa and Guṇaratna show that these materialists defended the *bhūtacaitanya* theory with strong, scientific arguments. Again, Sadānanda describes that some Cārvāka philosophers advanced new theories on soul. Gangādhara also presents some new philosophical ideas of later Cārvākas.

The wicked Cārvākas, on the other hand, became dangerous for the society. In the age of Kṛṣṇamiśra, Guṇaratna and Mādhava, these Cārvākas gained a strong ground in the Indian society. They propagated the idea of gross hedonism among the people. For them, everybody's property could be usurped by anybody, and everybody's woman could be enjoyed without fear. Kṛṣṇamiśra and Guṇaratna give a vivid picture of the philosophy of total anarchy propagated by these notorious elements.

These wicked materialists disturbed the very stability of the society for which Bṛhaspati's theory of enjoyment itself was responsible.

Lokāyata and Western materialism :

There are some similarities between the Lokāyata philosophy and some Western materialistic philosophies in many respects. Scholars very often point out to the Greek philosopher Epicurus (341-270) B.C. while discussing the Lokāyata philosophy.

Thus, Dr. Dakshina Ranjan Sastri compares the Lokāyata or Cārvāka philosophy with the philosophy of Epicurus in the following manner :

"Epicurus says with Lokāyata that all mental pleasures are derived from and related to the bodily pleasures of sense. There is a considerable agreement between these two schools

in their ends of actions. According to Epicurus pleasures and pain are the sole motives of our actions. That pain must be avoided and pleasure persued is a dictum as plainly evident as that fire is hot and ice is cold. Every animal as yet uncorrupted by false opinion naturally and instinctively persue pleasure and seek to ward off pain. In all our striving, willing and acting thus relate to pleasure and pain, we may call pleasure the highest good, and pain the worst evil, Lokāyata says the very same thing, sukham eva puruṣārthaḥ (?) duḥkhameva narakam".[10]

Sastri describes the canons of Epicurus in the following way :

1. The pleasure which produces no pain is to be embraced.
2. The pain which produces no pleasure is to be avoided.
3. The pleasure is to be avoided which presents a greater pleasure.
4. The pain is to be endured which averts a greater pain or secures a greater pleasure.[11]

According to Dr. Sastri, Epicurian philosophy is Egoistic hedonism.[12]

However, scholars equipped with more data will probably refuse to accept the view of Sastri. Epicurus is very often misunderstood by many interpreters of his philosophy. The data which are available to us from different other sources show that the great Greek philosopher was not what he is thought to be. Unlike the Cārvākas, his pursuit was not for small pleasures, but pleasure which meant tranquility and happiness. He was a great thinker for whom mental peace is the most important objective in life. He says :

It is not unbroken succession of drinking, feasts and of revelry, not the pleasure of sexual love, not the enjoyment of fish and delicacies of a splendid table which produce a pleasant life, it is reasoning, searching out of the reason for every choice and avoidance and banishing those beliefs through which greatest tumults take possession of the soul".[13]

The ultimate goal of the Epicurian philosophy is described in the *Encyclopedia Americanna* in the following manner :

With Epicurus man's chief end is the attainment of pleasure not in the sense, however, that life is a heedless pursuit of pleasure not pleasures. The Supreme pleasure, which is the constant source of all other pleasures is the tranquil and happy mind.

Epicurus taught that mere bodily pleasures were not an end in themselves but only as they minister to the peace of mind.[14]

Thus, Epicurus discarded the idea of living a voluptuous life, a life of laxity, but like the Indian seers he believed in the complete tranquility of mind which is the source of real happiness which is the final goal of life. In order to achieve this goal, Epicurus advised abstention from sexual love, and family life and from public life with its ambition and prizes.[15]

It is now clear that the Epicurian philosophy fundamentally differs from the Indian materialist philosophy of *kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ*.

The soul theory of Epicurus :

According to Epicurus the soul is composed of primodial atoms, and hence it is dissolved immediately on leaving the body at the death of a man. Thus, there is no life to come after death. The philosopher opines that soul is a material body of fine parts which is protected by the body. So long as it is protected by the body it sensationates–communicates sensation to the body. But when it leaves the body it dissipates and disappears.[16]

Lokāyata and Aristippus :

Dr. Dakshina Ranjan Sastri compares some important materialistic views of the great ancient philosopher Aristippus with the similar views found in the Lokāyata system. Sastri says :

"......... the view of Aristippus of Cyrene (435-356 BC) have no less a resemblance to the views of Lokāyata. According to Aristippus, the only good of life is the individual's own pleasure. Present enjoyment should never be sacrificed for the sake of future pleasures, for which future is always uncertain. We should fully enjoy the present. To sacrifice the present to the furture is unwarranted and perilous.[17]

Sastri does not refer to the source from where he gathers the above views of Aristippus. In the discussion on the *"Egoistic hedonism"* of Epicurus also he is similarly silent about the source on which the discussion is based.

Now, when the view of Aristippus quoted above is duly examined, it immediately reminds its readers of the practical approach of the Lokāyatikas to the realities of life. It has been already said that according to Vātsāyana the materialists consider money or object already possessed as better than what is to be attained.

The soul theory of Democritus :

In Indian philosphy, the soul occupies a vital position in both materialist and non-materialist systems. The Upaniṣads describe the soul as :

ajo nityaḥ śāśvatoyaṁ purāṇo
na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre.[18]

The *Bhagavadgītā* gives a description of soul as :

nainaṁ chindanti śastrāṇi
nainaṁ dahati pāvakaḥ
na cainaṁ kledayantyāpo na
śoṣayati mārutaḥ.[19]

Whatever may be the character of the soul according to the above religious works, it is at least not material in character. While the material body perishes, it remains independently. The Bauddhas do not recognise the Upanisadic soul or any other permanent entity called ātman or soul. The

Indian materialists as discussed above, identify the conscious body itself with the soul.

Now, coming to the philosophy of Democritus, it is found that this ancient Greek philosopher also describes the soul as an atomic composition. It has been discussed above that according to the Lokāyata Philosophy the body is composed of different kinds of atoms, and consciousness is a product of the combination of atoms. Democritus, on the other hand, recognises an atomic soul where the component atoms are the finest, the smoothest and most mobile objects. When they remain in isolation, they remain insensible, but when they are combined, sensation arises.[20] The theory of Democritus' insensible atoms generating sensation when combined immediately reminds us of the Bārhaspatya sūtra viz. *tebhyaścaitanyam* and its interpretation, though the standpoint of Democritus and Bṛhaspati are different.

Democritus opines that soul atoms behave differently in different organs. The soul atoms are lost in exhalation, and respiration, but life is maintained by inhaling fresh soul-atoms. The supply of atoms ceases at one stage when atoms are totally exhausted and the soul perishes in the same manner as the body.[21] According to Democritus, the soul is an atomic structure, an idea which Indian materialists have never conceived of during the long period of the development of their philosophy.

Western materialism in the modern age :

Some views of ancient Greek materialists have been discussed above. Materialism has been revived in the Western world in recent centuries. The development of science has contributed a great deal to the revival of materialism in the West in new form.

Bacon, Hobbes, Descertes and Marx have played a leading role in the new movement. Regarding Bacon, the father of English materialism, Marx says :

"The real founder of English materialism of all modern experimental science was Bacon."[22] He describes Baconian concept of matter in the following manner :

The first and the most important of the inherent qualities of matter is motion, not only mechanical and mathematical movement, but still more, impules, vital life spirit, tension [23]......

Marx also says that according to the teachings of Bacon, senses are infallible and they are the source of all knowlege."[24]

There is a similarity between the materialist views of Bacon and those of the Cārvākas, particularly in regard to the source of knowledge.

Thomas Hobbes is another great materialist thinker of modern times who, however, did not deny the existence of God or any immaterial things but intelligently evaded them and spoke about material bodies alone.[25]

In the words of Marx, Hobbes, a perfect materialist opines that since only what is material is perceptible, knowable, nothing is known of the existence of God.[26]

Lokāyata and Marxism :

There is a great similarity between Lokāyata and Marxism particularly in the matter of religion. Karl Marx, a German philosopher, is one of the greatest materialist philosophers of all times, whose (Marxist) philosophy was the guiding spirit in the Bolshevik revolution of Russia.

Karl Marx observed that religion acted as a sleeping pill for the people. The people (proletariat) were constantly exploited by the stronger class in the society but they could not stand up against the exploiters. Religion could not help them in the matter. On the other hand, religious speeches promised a sweet world for them after death. The entire social phenomenon was keenly observed by Marx. He says in an essay dated 1844 :

Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of heartless world just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation, It is the opium of the people.[27] *'Opium of the people'*–a penetrating complement for religion–which has been echoed by Lenin in his book *"On Religion"*.[28] The Cārvākas rebuff religion in a stronger language than Marx, the father of Communism. Marx describes religion as *'religion is the self-consciousness and self-feeling of man who has either not yet found himself or has already lost himself in the same way."*[29] Cārvākas, on the other hand, describe religion as a creation of wicked religious propagators for cheating the people.

But their view is wrong and motivated. Religion is not the creation of wicked people. The wise men of ancient India preached religious ideas of great moral and practical value in religious scriptures in the interest of the society. The fear for the consequences of immoral, illegal and anti-social activities generated by religious scriptures, which the sinners face in burning hell is aimed at controlling the unruly elements in the interest of preserving peace and order in the society. Again, the concepts of virtue and heaven inspire people to perform good deeds-deeds appreciated by the society. Materialists in Śankara's *Sarvasiddhāntasaṁgraha* describe the meritorius activities of kings and rich men like the building of inns for travellers as a source of attraction and nothing else. But the religious inspiration derived by kings and rich men from śāstras to perform such noble religious activities finally benefits the society enormously. After all, the service to the human society is a great religion. It is a fact that many members of the priestly class have a professional outlook of religion, but for that noble ideas propagated by religion cannot be ignored.

The wicked Cārvākas treated woman as an object of enjoyment. Their very idea was wrong and dangerous. Women are not anybody's property. They are not born for satiating the lust of sex-hungry men. It is the duty of every man to honour woman and offer a proper status to her in social life. The great law-giver Manu says :

yatra nāryastu pūjyante ramante tatra devatāḥ (gods adore that land where women are worshipped.)[30]

A similar poem is found in the *Mahābhārata* also which is :

pūjyā lālayitavyāśca
striyo nityaṁ, janādhipa
striyo yatra pūjyante
ramante tatra devatāḥ.[31]

Both Marxism and Lokāyata are materialist philosophies. But apart from this common feature, it is difficult to compare these two philosophical systems, because their aims are different.

Karl Marx casually refers to religion as the opium of the people. But his philosophy was mainly aimed at the emancipation of the oppressed people of the society. He appeals to the opressed class– the workers to unite and rise against their exploliters in the *Communist Manifesto* in the following manner :

Workers of all countries, unite. You have nothing to lose but yours chains.

The Indian materialists, on the other hand, laid an extraordinary emphasis on material enjoyment and nothing else. They consider religion and religious propogations and priests as their chief enemy. Hedonism is the ultimate goal of their life. Karl Marx did not consider hedonism as the final goal of the human life.

Marx desired to see the establishment of a classless Communist society free from the exploitation of the bourgeoisie, where everybody would enjoy a legitimate share of the national wealth. The Communist society would be a stateless one without any ruler or ruled. It still remains a utopia.

Can materialism give peace ?

In the present work an elaborate study of the Lokāyata philosophy has been made with a sincere wish that it will

benifit the academic circle. It is an objective study of the philosophy where the question of any personal involvement is ruled out. It is a fact which everybody must accept that materialism cannot be the shelter of a man, who is above other animals. Man cannot live by bread alone. Every person in this world seeks physical pleasure, physical comfort and happiness. But a purely materialistic life prescribed for a man by the Lokāyata materialists cannot give him lasting mental peace. The Pāṇḍavas gained the supreme power to rule the vast Indian empire. But they also quitted the empire in search of lasting peace.

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